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INTRODUCTION
The international uranium market is affected by many of the same
concerns that now attend all trade in energy: the adequacy of the
resource base, price uncertainty, and worries about security of access.
Uranium, like energy generally, is now a strategic commodity for reasons
of economic security. Uranium is also the subject of international
security concerns because of its association with the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Proliferation is a subject of disagreement among
nations--with some arguing that access to uranium or enriched fuel
should be coupled to restraint in technological decisions and acceptance
of wide-ranging safeguards; the net result is yet another dimension of
uncertainty about an energy commodity that many nations feel is vital to
their future.
These security concerns are related to the nature and behavior of
the international market for nuclear fuels. For example, political
aspects of security become more salient if the uranium market is tight,
or if there is little flexibility in supply arrangements. Conversely,
an oversupply situation--or growing diversity of supply--lessens the
impact of political and other constraints. Security problems are both
perceptual and real. There have been periods in which political
disruptions coincided with tight market conditions, resulting in
justifiable concerns. But there are also concerns that arise because of
uncertainty, and at least some of this uncertainty is due simply to lack
of information. Without adequate information, the worst is usually
assumed. Thus, a clearer view of the nature of supply and demand, of
government policy formulation, and of market functioning can help
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relieve at least some of the security worries felt by those in charge of
national energy policies. It is the purpose of this paper to improve
this understanding.
In the chapters that follow, we consider 1) how one might think
about uranium demand, resources and supply, 2) how producers and
consumers see the market and are likely to behave, including specifics
about export and import commitments, and 3) how these actors are brought
together in the international market. Our general conclusion is that
much of current anxiety about future uranium supply results primarily
from a brief but difficult period in the mid- to late-1970's; and that
current conditions and trends are so favorable (at least to consumers)
that there is now little basis for concern. Inventories, contractual
positions and producer commitments--when compared with realistic (or
even unrealistic) demand estimates--imply a buyer's market for at least
the next decade. The result will be considerable increases in market
flexibility and resilience to shock, and real prices that are low
relative to those of the past few years.
But while the energy security concerns of consumers are alleviated
by these market changes, other problems are created. There is a need to
reconsider assumptions about desired directions of technological
development, for many current programs were planned in an era of
pessimism about uranium supply and prices. Similar questions must be
raised about nonproliferation policies that depend on some level of
control of fuel supplies by the industrial nations. With a soft and
more diversified uranium market, any leverage that may have existed in
the past is rapidly being eroded. Finally, as world prices turn soft,
there may be significant problems created for U.S. uranium producers,
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who have relatively high costs in relation to several large-scale
foreign suppliers.
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II. URANIUM DEMAND
2.1 Introduction
The demand for uranium is a function of the demand for nuclear fuel
at the point of loading new or existing reactors, as modified by other
components in the chain of fuel processing and management. For
light-water reactors there are several steps in fuel preparation--
including UF6 conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication--plus the
transportation between the sites where these processes take place. Thus
the demand for uranium in the form of U308 occurs as much as two years
before demand at the reactor, even ignoring the role of inventories. In
addition, fuel processing--particularly the enrichment step--usually
involves long-term contracts. Since enrichment is available from only a
small number of suppliers, yet is essential, this service often is lined
up well in advance of reactor construction. If reactor schedules slip,
then enrichment contracts themselves can become a key determinant of
uranium demand at the mine. The fuel preparation for heavy water
reactors also involves a series of processing steps, but it is simpler
than that of the LWR (most importantly it avoids enrichment) and thus the
linkage of reactor operation to U308 demand is more direct.
Then there is the influence of inventories; as illustrated in Figure
2.1, these occur in three forms for the LWR cycle. There is the stock
of U308 and UF6 before enrichment which may be held by producers
or consumers, or by conversion and processing firms at various points
along the supply chain from the mine to the enrichment plant. Second,
there are stocks of enriched material, which may be in the form
of enriched UF6 or in partially-fabricated or completed fuel assemblies.
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Figure 2.1
URANIUM STOCKS IN THE LWR CYCLE
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These stocks may be held by enrichment authorities, by consuming
utilities or their governments, or by fuel fabricators. Finally, there
is the stock of tails which results from enrichment plant operations. If
an enrichment plant operates at 0.30 percent tails assay, while it could
process to 0.20 percent or below, then the tails from the 0.30 percent
operations represent a stock of uranium which can be fed back into the
system.
In the sections that follow, we begin with an analysis of reactor
growth, and then look briefly at the various factors that interpose
between the expected reactor population and its demand for U308 .
2.2 Fuel Demand at the Reactor
2.2.1 Economic and Technical Determinants of Demand
At the point of entry into the reactor, the demand for uranium is
almost completely a technical matter of reactor design and operation, and
the number of reactors in operation. For current light-water reactors
(and the heavy-water CANDU reactor as well) there is no viable substitute
for uranium.* Moreover, uranium represents only a small portion of
nuclear power cost. At roughly $40 per pound (in 1979 dollars)
U308 constitutes only about 30 percent of the cost of fabricated fuel,
and fuel represents only about 20 percent of the busbar cost of
*One qualification to this statement is the use of plutonium in
thermal recycle. However, its likely impact is small. There is strong
resistance to this fuel technology on nonproliferation grounds. Even at
uranium prices considerably higher than today's, the economic advantage
does not appear strong enough to overcome this opposition. Figure 2.1
omits these stocks of potential fuel materials, uranium and plutonium,
which are now held primarily at the reactor in the form of spent fuel
assemblies.
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electricity from a nuclear plant. Thus only about 6 percent of nuclear
power cost is attributable to uranium. Uranium prices could go up by 50
percent in real terms, say to $60 per pound, and the cost of nuclear
power would increase by only 3 percent. These differences are not
significant in the choice of nuclear vs. other sources of power
generation, or in the likely growth of electricity demand itself. Thus
at the point of use the demand for enriched fuel is almost completely
inelastic to the price of U308 .
For any given reactor, of course, the pattern of fuel demand is a
function of the operating characteristics--primarily the reactor capacity
factor. In general, utility operators try to attain as high a capacity
factor as possible, and early plans in the industry anticipated capacity
factors in the range of 75 to 80 percent. In practice, these factors
have averaged about 55 to 60 percent, due largely to problems of reactor
down-time. A secondary influence on uranium demand is the response of
utility fuel management procedures, given the capacity factors that each
individual plant is able to realize: fuel which has not reached design
burnup by the scheduled refueling date may be left in the reactor, if
possible, reducing the demand for new fuel.
In the long run of 20 to 30 years, there are new technologies--such
as the uranium-plutonium breeder or thorium-based cycles--that could
provide viable substitutes for uranium. Beyond the end of the century
there may be a real cost trade-off between uranium-fueled LWRs and these
alternatives, and uranium price will play a role in that calculation.
There are still other technical changes which--though not driven by
uranium prices--may nonetheless have a significant effect on demand and
price. For example, laser isotope separation may allow recovery of more
uranium-235 from natural uranium (and existing tails), and LWRs may be
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developed which achieve higher burn-ups and neutronic efficiencies.
But these prospects are decades distant in having a significant
impact. They may have some influence on the current price of
uranium--because of expectations about the longer-term future. But the
uranium prices of the recent past, and those expected over the next ten
to twenty years, have little or no effect on orders of reactors with
current LWR or HWR technology. Over the next couple of decades,
therefore, the demand for uranium, at the point of fuel use, may be
simply derived from expectations about reactor growth and operational
characteristics, independent of costs and prices in the uranium sector.
2.2.2 Reactor Growth
The early 1970's saw the high water mark of official optimism about
nuclear power, and since then reactor growth projections have been
reduced repeatedly. So too have expectations about uranium needs. In
Figure 2.2 we illustrate this trend with estimates of reactor growth
which are published periodically by a OECD/IAEA Working Group [l]. The
estimates cover the "world outside Communist areas" (WOCA). Each
estimate is built up from forecasts by the appropriate government
authority or nuclear-industry agency in each country. Thus these
projections tend to reflect official nuclear plans or ambitions rather
than independent external judgments. These projections have dropped
rapidly since 1975, and the estimates for 1980, 1985, and 1990 have
fallen by more than a factor of two in the last decade.*
*The change has been less severe in some countries than in others.
For example, in France, projections have the status of official plans,
which are closely coordinated bureaucratically. Because of this, and
perhaps because of a less effective nuclear opposition movement, French
projections have dropped only by about 30 percent while those of other
countries have dropped by 50 percent or more.
1600
1400
1200.
I000.
t- 800.
600-
600.
---
1 -
(- < IIII
-I I
II
-1
mI
mI
-1
~I
I
I
II
* I
-J
0~O IOIrO- h- - 1 - - - - - -
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000
SOURCE: TABLE A-3, APPENDIX
NOTE: WHERE APPROPRIATE, SOLID LINES INDICATE LOW ESTIMATES, DASHED
LINES HIGH ESTIMATES.
Figure 2.2
OECD-NEA/IAEA NUCLEAR GROWTH PROJECTIONS
200
2-7
From the perspective of the international uranium industry,
reductions of the magnitude shown in Figure 2.2 have profound
implications. For example, the projected uranium requirements for 1985
dropped by nearly 40,000 MTU in estimates made between 1975 and 1978--an
amount comparable to current annual world production. Given the long
lead times and lifetimes of mining investments, it clearly would be
unwise for the uranium industry to base its investments on official
nuclear growth projections.
As a guide to future discussions of supply, demand and market
function, it is useful to consider nuclear growth prospects as they
appear today. We use two published tabulations for this purpose. The
first is a projection prepared in connection with the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. During the first half of 1978, countries
with nuclear power plants were asked to make official high and low
estimates of growth through 2000. These estimates are thus very similar
to those presented in previous NEA/IAEA working group reports. (Indeed
the INFCE estimates are used in the most recent report in this series.)
Since nuclear growth expectations have almost uniformly declined since
early 1978, we have chosen to use the "low" estimate, reproduced here in
Figure 2.2.
A more conservative view of reactor prospects can be constructed by
considering only those reactors to which some contract commitment has
been made--that is, reactors that are either operating, under
construction, or ordered. Reactor lists of this form are published by
several groups, usually based on utility surveys. In Figure 2.3 we also
summarize the tabulations of one source (Nuclear News, August 1979). To
simplify, we have made no distinction between reactors at various stages
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of completion; we include those for which letters of intent exist, as
well as those operating and under construction. Until about 1986, this
reactor growth projection is slightly above the INFCE projection, due to
utility optimism about completing reactors. After 1986, the INFCE
projections rapidly grow to exceed present utility reactor commitments.
All the new reactors shown in the INFCE projection after this date have
yet to be ordered. Even if ordered, their completion is a decade or more
away.
Thus the actual future path of reactor growth probably lies
somewhere between the two forecasts shown in Figure 2.2. In our view the
INFCE low forecast is now unattainable. It is hard to imagine reactor
installation being much above the "present plans" level through 1990.
Given the lead times for reactor licensing and construction, the rate of
new orders over the next five years would have to be incredibly high to
come anywhere near the INFCE forecast by the end of the century. Of
course, while reactors may be ordered in some parts of the world, there
will be cancellations elsewhere, and it is even possible that
installations over this period would be even below the "present plans"
level. Probably the growth prospects are above the "present plans,"
particularly after 1990, but closer to the lower than to the upper line
in Figure 2.3.
The ultimate outcome cannot be forecast at this time; it depends
primarily on the outcome of public debate about nuclear power in several
developed countries. Nonetheless, analysis of potential developments in
uranium can be carried out using a range of possible outcomes, and
through the rest of this study we use these two forecasts to establish
that range.
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2.2.3 Associated Uranium Use
Using assumptions and procedures discussed in the Appendix, these
nuclear growth scenarios can be converted to uranium requirements, as
indicated in Figure 2.4. Being a compilation of official country
estimates, the INFCE reactor projections lead to a consumer view of
uranium demand. As noted above, this expectation has a much greater
chance of being high than low. On the other hand the preservation of the
option for higher growth has an important value to national energy
planners, and one would expect optimism in these estimates. Uranium
producers are likely to take a more conservative view of demand, unless
(as we shall discuss below) the risk of overestimating demand is borne by
consumers or their governments. The "present plans" estimate (based on
the Nuclear News survey) is what producers might, with some optimism,
regard as demand directly due to reactor requirements over the next
decade. Once again, it is very unlikely that new reactor orders could
make a significant contribution to demand until after 1990. Note that
these projections do not include other sources of demand such as
stockpiles or enrichment contract requirements in excess of reactor
needs.
Here it should be noted that in this study all estimates of uranium
demand at the reactor have been based on a reactor capacity factor of 70
percent. As noted earlier, the reactor experience to date is closer to
60 percent. Thus our demand estimates are most likely high, perhaps by
as much as 15 percent depending on the success of the nuclear industry in
improving plant performance. In any long-term analysis of the industry,
this uncertainty about reactor capacity factors lends an important
component of uncertainty to forecasts of uranium demand at the mine.
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The near-term demand picture is still more complicated than
indicated by these aggregated data. This simple view would be relevant
if the world market were homogenous, free of constraints, and without
major risks. However, the uranium market is fragmented along
geopolitical and other lines and flows of material are subject to a
number of constraints. As a result, a given producer will not have equal
access to all demand and a given consumer will not have equal access to
all sources of production. For example, U.S. producers are principally
oriented toward U.S. demand and central African producers toward demand
in France.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we look in some detail at the large producers
and consumers, and in Chapter 6 a picture of the supply system as it will
work in the early 1980's is constructed. Therefore it is useful to
disaggregate uranium demand forecasts by country and region. In the
later chapters, the analysis is focused on the world outside the U.S.,
but at this point the U.S. is included in order to give an impression of
its relative role in overall uranium demand.
Figure 2.5 shows such a breakdown of the requirements implied by the
INFCE low projection. Figure 2.6 shows the same breakdown for the
"present plans" estimate, based on the Nuclear News utility survey. At
present, U.S. requirements are about 45 percent of the world total; by
the late 1980's, the INFCE projection shows this percentage as declining
to about 34 percent, while the current plans projection shows a
relatively constant ratio. Both projections indicate that about 80
percent of non-U.S. demand in 1985 will be in Western Europe and Japan,
though the INFCE projection shows this share declining to about 70
percent by the mid-1990s. In absolute terms, the INFCE projections show
demand outside the major industrialized consumer countries (Europe, the
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U.S., Japan, and Canada)--largely in the developing countries--growing
from a present 1200 MTU annually (5 percent of total world demand) to
nearly 20,000 MTU in 2000 (18 percent of total demand in that year); the
current plans projection is for only 6 percent from the late 1980s on.
The disaggregation of future demand is thus rather uncertain, depending
on what one assumes about future reactor orders.
The possibility of changes in supply policies for political reasons,
or due to changes in market conditions (e.g., technical or labor
difficulties for a major producer or change in enrichment contracting
policy) means that this demand structure may shift in ways that open up
new sales opportunities for producers. Extra production capacity may be
maintained for this purpose. Similarly, the threat of supply insecurity
may lead to diversification and over-contracting by consumers. The
result of these uncertainties is thus a level of market activity, and
supply capability, greater than might be expected from actual reactor
requirements under efficiently functioning market conditions. Indeed,
the present high global uranium production level--compared to actual
reactor requirements--is at least in part a measure of these producer and
consumer responses to perceptions of instability and uncertainty. Part
of the excess over actual requirements is due to conservative consumer
behavior (over-contracting, stockpiling, and so forth), and part due to
producer anticipation of new market opportunities.
2.3 The Role of Enrichment
Enrichment plants may be operated at a waste or "tails" stream of
anywhere between 0.2 and 0.3 percent U235 or higher. At 0.2 percent
tails, a 1000 MWe reactor operating at a capacity factor of 70 percent,
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would require 138 MTU of natural uranium feed for a year's operation. If
the tails assay is increased to 0.3 percent, 172 MTU are required, and a
higher quantity of U2 3 5 goes into the stock of uranium held in the form
of tails. At some additional cost (for re-gasification of the UF6) these
tails can be run back through the enrichment process, and processed to a
lower assay, thus extracting more U235.
In the past, decisions about enrichment operations and contracting
have had a major effect on the demand for uranium feed. In the early
1970's, for example, the United States government had a stockpile of some
38,000 MTU, and it was decided to reduce this stockpile through a "split
tails" program. The enrichment plants were run at 0.25 percent tails
assay, but enrichment contracts were written as if they were running at
0.20 percent. In effect, the stockpile of natural uranium was to be
converted into a stock of "pre-enriched" 3-percent material--used to meet
part of customers' needs--plus a larger stock of U235 in enrichment tails
(see Figure 2.1). The reasons for this policy had to do with a
combination of factors, including a desire to reduce government-held
stocks of raw materials and a perception of a coming future shortage of
enrichment capacity F2]. For this discussion, what was important about
this procedure is that U.S. stocks were substituted for mine and mill
output, and the net demand on the uranium sector was reduced to about 90
percent of what it would otherwise have been.
Shortly thereafter, another change in U.S. enrichment policy had an
even larger effect on uranium demand, in the opposite direction. In 1973
the AEC switched to long-run, fixed commitment (LFTC) contracts. The
LTFC contracts required that utilities make firm long-term commitments
for enrichment services, and through the associated feed requirements,
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for uranium. The AEC also decided that orders would be accepted only for
reactors that would require the enrichment of initial cores by July
1982. By most accounts, the result of these requirements was a new wave
of commitments to reactors here and abroad and thus to new long-term
uranium demand [2].
These rigorous enrichment conditions have subsequently been
relaxed--in part due to competitive pressure from new European enrichment
ventures. New enrichment contracting flexibilities, including the option
of a customer-specific variable tails assay and stretchout provisions,
will reduce the direct future influence of enrichment program decisions
on uranium demand. Of course, the recent relaxation of these contract
requirements reduced demand expectations for the uranium industry, at
least in the near term.
At this point, the influence of widely shifting enrichment
contracting conditions appears to be a phenomenon of the past so far as
the uranium market is concerned. U.S. stocks of U308 have now been
converted into enriched form, and the tails assay seems to have settled
at around 0.2 percent both in the U.S. and in European enrichment
ventures. However, the existing stocks are large, both of natural
uranium and of enriched material. And due to a combination of less-than-
completely-flexible enrichment contracts, and reactors that are either
slipped in schedule or cancelled, the inventories of enriched material
will continue to build in the near future. No doubt these inventories
are substantially larger than those that consumers had originally planned
to develop. This buildup of stocks naturally adds to the demand for
uranium at the enrichment plant, although enrichment contract terms will
probably exert only a small influence on future uranium demand.
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2.4 The Role of Stocks
The demand for stocks is the total of several diverse effects.
First, there is some working inventory in the system, which increases
more or less in proportion to throughput. Then there are stocks--
usually of U308 or 3 percent UF6--which are held for security reasons.
These may be held by utilities or by governments and the size of the
stock varies according to the country and the holder's perception of
future risks of loss of supply. Finally, there are what we might call
"unanticipated stocks." That is, procurement plans and commitments are
usually based on some particular reactor forecast, and when reactor
expectations are scaled down, the consumer builds inventories he had not
planned to acquire. Once on hand, these inventories overhang the market,
and create uncertainty regarding future uranium demand.
There is an inherent difficulty in estimating how big these
"unanticipated inventories" are, or in predicting how they will be
managed. Though utilities or consumer countries may publish data on
existing and planned reactors, they rarely release data on stocks of fuel
materials, or on the desired levels of these stocks. Indeed, some
consumers may have no firm policy about the desired level, given reactor
forecasts and anticipated conditions in the world uranium market. At the
very least, different countries appear to be following very different
strategies in this regard, as discussed in Chapter 5 below.
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III. URANIUM SUPPLY
3.1 Introduction
The supply of uranium is a function of numerous factors. At the
simplest level, the supply of uranium depends on the geologic endowment.
Given perfect knowledge of the occurrence of all uranium, one could
estimate production costs and derive a supply curve--the amount of
uranium that would be available at a given price. If uranium were like
many other minerals, one would expect increasingly large quantities to
become available as prices increased and as one thus had incentives to
mine lower grades of ore, or deposits that were more difficult to
exploit. For example, such a picture might emerge for a resource that
had many different geologic expressions, or occured in deposits of vastly
different size. Alternatively, one might believe that uranium is
discretely deposited in such a way that there is not an continuum of
occurrences, grades and sizes of deposit, but rather a limited quantity
of high or moderate grade material in a limited set of geologic
environments. In this case, known deposits would represent a larger
fraction of total potential than under the former hypothesis.
Since we do not have perfect knowledge of the uranium resource
endowment, we cannot a priori distinguish between the two extreme views
above. However, the way in which information about uranium is developed
tends to bias one's perspective of the resources in the direction of the
second view. There are several ways in which this occurs. First, it is
economically attractive to explore only for those deposits that will be
profitable in the relatively near term. Thus information is biased
toward higher grade or more easily discovered and exploited deposits.
Regions further out on the supply curve tend to be explored only
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accidentally. Second, success in discovering reserves adequate to meet
demand over the period of time in which uranium industry investments are
repaid (perhaps two decades) tends to inhibit further investment in
developing additional information. And if this success is achieved in
one geologic environment or one geographic region, there is little
incentive to look elsewhere. Until recently, for example, most effort in
the U.S. was focused on sandstone deposits in a few proven basins, and in
Canada (which was intensively explored for weapons purposes) on
particular formations in the eastern provinces. At least in Canada, the
result of adequate success in the East was the failure to discover even
richer deposits in the West.
Third, commercial interest in uranium is relatively new and market
trends over the period have discouraged development of information about
resources that are more expensive to exploit. Before the last decade,
much of the exploratory effort was directed toward meeting the weapons
needs of a few countries. The search was limited to countries friendly
to the weapons states--Canada, Australia, South Africa, and the Belgian
Congo (Zaire) for the U.S. and the U.K.; former colonies in central
Africa (Gabon and Niger) for France. Little effort was made elsewhere
and even in the producer countries in question, exploration was retarded
by saturation of weapons requirements and declining real prices. For
example, the real price (corrected for inflation) offered by the
U.S.A.E.C. in 1955 was not achieved again--in the commercial
market--until late 1975; in the interim, it dropped by nearly a factor of
four. Declining expectations lead to conservative exploration and
development behavior, with an emphasis on exploiting known low-cost
reserves.
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Information development also has significant lead times. While the
existence of a new deposit may become known shortly after initial
exploratory work (though the companies involved have strong incentives to
restrict the availability of such information), it may be some years
before enough is known to make estimates of reserves. Companies will
invest in developing such information only in response to market signals;
thus additions to known reserves generally lag new demand indications.
Overall resource and reserve estimates tend to lag even farther behind
since time is required to analyze primary data and integrate them into a
comprehensive view. As a result, published estimates of national or
global reserves and resources may lag by a decade or so the occurrence of
the forces that motivated the exploration and other work leading to their
discovery.
Bias in the magnitude of such estimates may also be introduced by the
particular interests of the entities that prepare the figures. Companies
and producer governments may have an incentive to take a conservative
view of their uranium reserves, lest the prospect of larger quantities
undermine prices. On the consumer side, there is a complementary
conservatism: utilities and consumer nations tend to take a worst case
view of strategic energy commodities since the consequences of
overestimating availability are usually much greater than those of
underestimating it.*
*Countries can, in fact, have opposed views of this. The U.S., for
example, sees adequate uranium supply as desirable in reducing the need
to commit to plutonium or other proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle steps
worldwide. As a result, from the U.S. perspective, underestimating
uranium resources may lead to worse consequences than overestimating
them. This view is opposite to that held by countries that put a higher
priority on energy supply.
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Thus, many of the forces influencing perceptions and knowledge of
uranium resources and reserves work in the direction of conservative
estimates and toward a view of ultimately limited resources. Typical of
such estimates is the Uranium Subpanel Report of the National Academy's
Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES) [1], which
displays several of the conservatisms noted above, including the national
energy policy assumption that one should not count for planning purposes
on resources that are not already known. The alternative position is
well expressed by Landsberg in the Ford-MITRE Study [2]. Here, the
process of information development and resource exploitation is seen more
in economic terms (the CONAES Panel consisted of geologists); it
implicitly assumes that resources of various qualities exist (the first
view above) and that the problem is one of incentives to proceed to find
and develop them.
3.2 Trends in Exploration and Discovery
Given these alternative views, it is instructive to examine trends in
resource estimation and development. Outside the United States, the only
consistent long-term series of estimates has been compiled by the
OECD/IAEA working parties on uranium resources [3]. As with the nuclear
reactor projections, uranium estimates are based on country submissions,
though working party judgments are occasionally necessary. Two
categories of resource certainty are considered:
o "Reasonably assured" or (approximately) reserves for which there
is direct quantitative geological evidence of grade and
quantity, say by drilling. ,
o "Estimated additional" for which there is direct geological
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evidence of material, generally in association with known and
delineated deposits.
These two categories are parallel to the U.S. definitions of "reserves"
and "probable potential resources." Until recently, the OECD/IAEA group
did not estimate "possible" and "speculative" resources, as the U.S. has
for many years.
Two price/cost categories are also considered. These categories have
undergone two changes over time, the first due to changing production
costs and inflation, and the second due to a switch from a commercial
price to a forward cost basis. Thus, early reports refer to uranium
available at a price of less than $26/kilogram U ($10 per pound U308 )
while later reports refer to uranium available at a cost of less than
$80 per kilogram U ($30 per pound U308). The switch to a forward cost
basis removes the effects of market price fluctuations in periods when
tight market conditions drive prices well above production costs;
production costs worldwide currently range from $4 a pound
(U3 08 ) to above $20, while prices have been as high as $40 or more in
recent years. Despite these changes, efforts have been made by the
OECD-IAEA group to make historical estimates comparable. This effort
appears to have been most effective for the reasonably assured (reserve)
category. Changes in cost categories, and further efforts to convert
potential resources to reserves, tend to shift material into or out of
the estimated additional category, either shifting into the reserve
category, or into a higher cost bracket not considered in the estimates.
Figure 3.1 shows the reasonably assured, or reserve, estimates made
since 1967; for convenience, the two price categories are lumped
together. Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding estimates for estimated
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additional resources. The largest shifts in and between categories are
for Canada where the estimated additional category increased
substantially in 1973 and the reserve category declined in 1975. Apart
from this anomaly, the estimates track reasonably well over time.
Detailed data are tabulated in the Appendix.
The reserve estimates are essentially those for uranium that would be
available with some certainty on a relatively short time horizon, were
there adequate demand. That is, these reserves are such that commercial
mining investments and exploitation could be expanded within a few years
(a period often set more by the need for environmental and other
clearances than by construction times) following indications of
sufficient demand. The reserves in Figure 3.1 also represent the
resource data that have been the longest time in preparation. The
initiation of the exploratory and other efforts that resulted in
additions to reserves late in the decade (say 1980) occurred early in the
decade. The present reserves shown are thus the result of expectations
about current and future markets as they were perceived five, ten, or
more years ago.
Several important conclusions emerge from Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The
first is that reserves and resources have increased significantly, in
absolute terms and relative to prospective nuclear growth. Outside the
U.S. (and excluding Sweden, whose shales are unlikely to be exploited in
the near term), reserves have increased by a factor of 2.7 and estimated
additional resources by a factor of 2.6 since 1967. In absolute terms,
non-U.S. reserves have increased by nearly one million MTU and estimated
additional resources by more than 800,000 MTU. These additions occurred
during a period in which non-U.S. reactors required a cumulative total of
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only 85,000 MTU and non-U.S. reactor requirements grew to an annual level
of 14,700 MTU (1979). In comparison with past and present reactor
requirements, additions to reserves and known resources have been very
large.
Perhaps more interesting is the comparison with estimated
requirements forward in time. In 1967, known reserves and resources
outside the U.S. stood at about 1.4 million MTU; at about this time,the
estimate of non-U.S. nuclear growth 10 to 12 years ahead (1980 estimate
made in 1969) was for 240 GWe. This lead time is what realistically
might be required to move substantial known reserves and resources into
production. The estimated growth in capacity would require about 39,000
MTU annually in 1980 (actual growth, of course, has been much less than
this), for a ratio of reserves and resources to annual forward needs of
about 35. That is, reserves and resources in 1967 were 35 times expected
annual requirements eleven years ahead; alternatively, the resource time
horizon was 30 to 40 years off, if no additional reactors were
considered. In 1978, non-U.S. nuclear growth for 1990 was estimated (by
the INFCE working group and the OECD) at about 274 GWe, requiring about
43,000 MTU annually. Shortly thereafter, known reserves and resources
were estimated at about 2.9 million MTU for a ratio of the latter to
forward annual requirements of about 70--about twice that a decade
earlier.* Thus the uranium resource situation outside the U.S. relative
to expected nuclear growth has improved significantly. Of course, the
nuclear growth estimates play an important role in this: high early
*As noted above, the INFCE estimate now appears very unrealistic, at
least for this decade; the known uranium resource horizon is thus even
more distant.
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estimates may have stimulated exploration and development while lower
recent expectations mean that discovered resources will go farther.
While uranium may prove different from other minerals and energy
sources, it is worth noting that known forward supplies of oil and of
many minerals have--over much of this century--displayed resource
horizons that indicated depletion at the then current consumption rates
within, say, twenty or thirty years. Of course, the resource horizon has
always retreated ahead of time and consumption; we have not run out. The
reason is that knowledge about reserves and resources is usually gained
only at some cost, and investments to produce this information will be
made by the private sector only if there is a prospect for a relatively
near-term payoff. This term rarely extends beyond a few decades and for
private resource exploiters there is little need to know about material
that might be needed beyond this horizon.* As noted above, the
underlying question is whether there exist undiscovered resources and
undeveloped reserves that will reveal uranium to be like other natural
resources. Discovery and other trends are suggestive of this and there
is no strong evidence to the contrary.**
*Government programs to assess resources reflect a social interest in
the longer-term view.
**Very large deposits of relatively high-grade ore continue to be
found in traditional producer countries like Canada and Australia and in
new countries like Namibia and Brazil. This does not mean that certain
limited geographic regions--such as the current sandstone regions of the
U.S.--will not come to resemble terminally depleting regions in a few
decades. However, this limited view would not generalize worldwide or
even to the rest of the U.S.--there has been too little exploration and
uranium has been found in increasingly many new geological environments.
And even in the U.S. sandstone basins, there appear to be large deposits
at greater depths (e.g., Gulf's Mt. Taylor property). Thus while costs
may rise in some areas, there appears to be uranium available.
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 also show a changing pattern of geographic
origins for reserves and resources: major new additions have been made
in areas that have not traditionally produced uranium. Niger's known
reserves have increased by about 150,000 MTU since 1967, a seventeen-fold
increase; Brazil's reserves--little evident before 1975--have reached
about 75,000 MTU; and Namibia's uranium reserves have increased to an
estimated 117,000 MTU. Overall, reserves in countries other than
traditional producers (Canada, Australia, the United States, France, and
South Africa) have increased by about 580,000 MTU since 1967, about
210,000 MTU being added since late 1977 alone. Non-traditional
(prospective) producers thus account for more than half of the increase
in reserves over the past decade. A similar statement applies to known
resources. For consumer countries concerned about supply security and
supply diversification, this is a very important development. It also
reinforces the suspicion that exploration and reserve development--rather
than geologic scarcity--are the principal barriers to knowledge of much
greater uranium reserves and resources. Evidence for this comes also
from major new discoveries in traditional producer countries such as
Canada and Australia. Many of these discoveries are in new geologic
environments, such as calcrete and unconformity-related deposits and
often have ore grades well above those already being mined. Some major
discoveries, such as the reported half million tons at Roxby Downs in
Australia, do not yet appear in official estimates. This deposit alone
is comparable to non-U.S. cumulative uranium consumption through 2000 for
all presently committed reactors. The view that uranium is a mature
resource whose exploitation is proceeding to lower and more costly grades
and environments is thus contrary to the most recent evidence.
3-12
3.3 Capacity Development and Production
The supply of uranium is determined not only by geologic factors and
investments in reserve and resource information. Several different
groups of actors are involved in producing uranium and they often act
with different motivations. Historically, governments have played a key
role. Initially, in the 1940s and 1950s the governments of weapons
states and those of a few key producer countries promoted the development
of uranium production and production capacity. Bonuses, guarantees,
loans, and incentive prices motivated the discovery of uranium and the
development of a major industry, especially in Canada, Australia, France,
and South Africa. Later, as weapons demand fell but before commercial
demand rose, producer governments took actions to protect their domestic
industries.
3.3.1 Production History
Historically, uranium production worldwide rose to a peak in 1959 in
response to weapons procurement efforts. It subsequently fell with the
decline of weapons demand and the delay of commercial nuclear power.
During this period producer governments instituted support programs in
order to maintain a viable industrial base pending growth of commercial
demand; in some cases, substantial stockpiles accumulated. These
programs were most effective in the U.S., especially in the initial years
of commercial nuclear power growth, due in part to protectionist import
restrictions (exercised through the U.S. enrichment monopoly).*
Production has only recent reached the levels attained in 1959. These
features are shown in Figure 3.3.
*For further details of this history, and the linkages to other
nuclear issues, see [4].
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It is useful to compare historical production with actual reactor
requirements during this period. Reactor requirements were computed from
historical dates of initial operation for each existing reactor, assuming
operation at 70 percent capacity factor and 0.20 percent tails assay.
These assumptions probably overstate requirements: enrichment plants
often ran at higher tails assay but utilities delivered uranium as if
tails assay were set at 0.20 percent (the additional uranium came from
U.S. stockpiles rather than contemporary commercial sources) and capacity
factors were well below 70 percent.* Annual reactor requirements are
compared with production in Figure 3.4. Since weapons requirements were
dropping rapidly in the post-1965 era, much of the excess of production
over commercial requirements was stockpiled. In the U.S.and other
weapons states, distinctions between military and non-military stocks are
somewhat artificial. It is evident from Figure 3.5 that stock
accumulations in the U.S. may have been of order of 100,000 MTU.**
Abroad, a similar quantity seems possible, held primarily by Canada,
South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
The global supply/demand balance has actually been closer than
suggested in Figure 3.4 because of enrichment contracting requirements.
The introduction of fixed-commitment contracts and new enrichment plant
feed requirements in 1973 tended--when compared with slipping reactor
schedules--to result in uranium demand above that required for actual
reactor use. The effect of these rigid delivery requirements would have
*A potentially countervailing factor might have been the failure of
early fuel to achieve design burnup; however, this problem primarily
affected early fuel loadings whose aggregate volume, compared to current
consumption, was small.
**Non-military stocks have, on several occasions, been reported as
being in the vicinity of 50,000 STU 308.
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been most strongly felt in the last few years and in the future; but
recent changes allowing deferrals and creating more flexible conditions
have, in part, relieved this strain on consumers. Nevertheless,
substantial inventories have been built. As of January 1, 1980, U.S.
utilities, reactor vendors, and other companies reported inventories of
40,000 MTU (natural uranium equivalent--about 30 percent was already
enriched). About 82 percent of total inventory was held by utilities.
The pattern abroad varies and will be discussed in the next chapter.
But the most striking feature of Figure 3.4 is its revelation of the
relative immaturity of commercial uranium demand, compared to the length
and magnitude of previous industry efforts. Reactor requirements were
still less than half of production as late as 1974 and today are still
only about two-thirds of production levels. It is only in the past few
years that requirements and supply have begun to appear to be related.
In a sense, one can thus argue that a mature commercial uranium market is
only beginning to emerge internationally.
3.3.2 Forecasts of Plans and Potential
It would clearly be interesting to continue the above retrospective
comparison of supply and requirements prospectively forward in time.
Superficially, this might appear simple: one could project uranium
requirements forward in time--as in Chapter 2--and, independently,
estimate production capabilities. Estimates of attainable production
capabilities are presented by several groups, the best known being those
of the OECD-NEA/IAEA working group (as published in the "Redbook" series
[3]). In Figure 3.6 we present the most recent (February 1980) results
of this group. The attainable production capacity estimates are just
that: estimates of what might be achieved given adequate incentives and
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few new obstacles to exploitation. As discussed in the next chapter,
estimates for some producers are close to what is realistically planned;
for others, the attainment of the estimated production levels is quite
problematic. In Figure 3.7, we show the 1979 Redbook [3] estimates of
planned production capacity for which (at least) initial investment has
been made and clearances granted. For at least some countries, the
planned capacities are considerably lower than the attainable.
3.4 Demand/Capacity Balance to 2000
How do these attainable and planned production estimates compare with
the reactor requirements projected in Chapter 2? Figure 3.8 gives the
answer. For continuity, historical production and requirements are shown
up to 1979; after that the attainable and planned capacity estimates are
compared with the uranium requirements resulting from both the INFCE and
present plans growth projections. As discussed above, the present plans
projection includes only those reactors for which (at least) a letter of
intent has been issued. The INFCE projection includes a number of new
reactors abroad coming on line in the mid-1980s. Since this projection
was made (early in 1978), there have been few orders abroad and there is
little likelihood--given reactor lead times--that reactor demand in
excess of the present plans projection could arise until quite late in
the decade.
Figure 3.8 shows clearly that production presently exceeds reactor
requirements.* The magnitude of the disparity in the near-term future
*Total demand also includes desires for inventories and enrichment
plant feed requirements in excess of reactor needs. However, both appear
to be of declining importance.
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depends on the momentum in current plans and on the extent to which
existing production capacity is utilized. Figure 3.8 suggests that even
if production were just to continue at current levels, requirements
would not come into balance with supply until perhaps 1985. Moreover,
new production capability for which mine and mill investments have
already been made will come into existence in the next few years. The
obvious conclusion is that unless measures are taken to restrict use of
existing and prospective uranium production capacity, there will be a
general and substantial oversupply of uranium, at least during the
1980's. This prospect is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, after
a review of conditions in the major supplier and consumer countries.
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IV. MAJOR URANIUM PRODUCERS
The global view that emerges in the preceding section is of ample
supply in relation to actual demand. Yet there have been serious
disruptions and continuing concerns about uranium supply on the part of
consumers, and differing perceptions of market conditions on the part of
producers. These problems are situation-specific. In the sections that
follow we review conditions in principal producer countries, including
export commitments. In Chapter 5 major consumers are reviewed.
International trade in uranium is highly secretive, not only for the
usual commercial reasons, but because of its strategic importance to
both energy and international security. There are no comprehensive,
public sources of contract data, as there are for many other
commodities. Producers and consumers do not ordinarily disclose
quantities of imports or exports, or their origin or destination. As a
result, it is necessary to build up a picture of market activity from
fragments of information appearing in mining or financial journals
worldwide. In some cases, considerable inference is necessary, though
cross checks between supplier and consumer data are often possible. The
information presented below was derived from such a review effort--going
back ten or more years in industry journals* and company annual
reports--and from privileged communications from suppliers and
consumers. Where possible, the information has been checked with
companies and government agencies, and with the few industrial data
*These include Nucleonics Week, Nuclear Fuel, Nuclear Engineering
International, the Mining Journal (London), The Financial limes,
Canadian Mining Journal, the Canadian Minerals Yearbook and others.
__
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sources available.* However, the reader is cautioned that the picture
that emerges should be regarded as impressionistic, rather than exact in
every detail. There are enough conflicts between data sources to suggest
the possibility of incompleteness or incorrect details in all available
sources. But we believe the larger view that emerges is roughly correct
and suitable for policy purposes.
The producer countries considered here are Australia, Canada, Niger,
South Africa and Namibia. Together, these countries are expected to
account for 90 percent of prospective non-U.S. production in 1985 and
virtually all internationally-traded uranium.
4.1 Australia
As in other major producing countries, the Australian industry arose
in response to the weapons needs of the United States and the United
Kingdom. Uranium was discovered at Rum Jungle in the Northern Territory
in 1949, and subsequently at other sites--notably the Mary Kathleen mine
in Queensland. Liberal financial incentives administered by the Combined
Development Agency--and contracts with the CDA, the USAEC and the
UKAEA--led to production which began in 1954 and rose to a peak of 1200
MTU in 1961. However, as was the pattern elsewhere, this boom soon began
to falter. All contracts terminated by 1964, by which time total
cummulative weapons-related production had amounted to about 6,700 MTU.
Because of the economic importance of the uranium industry, the
*These include publications of Nukem (Hanover), Nuclear Assurance
Corporation and the Nuclear Exchange Corporation. In general, these
information sources serve producers and consumers seeking to make new
supply arrangements and thus emphasize a disaggregated approach. Our work
is different from, though complementary, to theirs in that it is intended
to provide an aggregated view more suited to an overall, policy-oriented
understanding of the market.
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Australian government (through its Atomic Energy Commission) arranged
for continued production at Rum Jungle. Australian production ceased in
1971. By 1971, a national stockpile of about 1700 MTU had been built up.
Uranium production did not resume until 1976, with the revival of
output at Mary Kathleen (which still possessed reserves of about 7000
MTU and an operable mill). In the meantime a number of new uranium
discoveries had been made, including Nabarlek, Ranger, Beverly and
Koongarra in 1970, Jabiluka in 1971 and Seelirrie in 1972. Their
collective reserves are now estimated at nearly 350,000 MTU.
Anticipating a major commercial market beginning in the mid to late
1970s, the owners of Mary Kathleen, Ranger and Nabarlek wrote contracts
for future output with utilities in West Germany, the U.S. and,
especially, Japan. By the end of 1972 a total of more than 8,000 MTU
had been committed (with government approval) for delivery over the
period 1977 to 1986. No further contracts were to be approved until
late 1979.
4.1.1 Industry Structure
In Australia the structure of the uranium industry has undergone a
number of changes, largely as a result of changing government policies.
Before the election of the Labour Party in 1972, the industry was
largely a free-enterprise activity. After the elections, however, the
government took greater control over the industry, beginning with denial
of approval for additional contracts for Mary Kathleen, Ranger and
Nabarlek. The propriety of earlier contract approvals was also
questioned. Although it was decided to honor these contracts, the
uncertainties created in this period were such that uranium exploration
all but ended. In late 1974, a new policy was announced. Its key
conditions included:
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o Greater government ownership and financing exercised through
the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) (beginning with
a 50 percent share in Ranger and financing of nearly
three-quarters of the development costs);
o Sole authority to explore--beyond existing licenses--in the
Northern Territory would be vested in the AAEC;
o Existing contracts would be honored, using the AAEC stockpile
and output from Mary Kathleen production and, eventually, from
Ranger; and
o All future sales would be made by the AAEC.
A number of trade unions and environmental groups also became
involved in efforts to block uranium mining and exports. As a result,
the government initiated the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry (the
Fox Commission) to evaluate the environmental implications of uranium
mining. While the Labour government is often portrayed as being
generally opposed to uranium development, the record reveals a more
complex perspective. For example, the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission provided funds to restart Mary Kathleen's production in 1974
(and thus obtained a 41.6 percent ownership share). It also undertook
or encouraged a higher level of exploration work in the Northern
Territory.
Governmental policy on ownership has undergone significant changes
since the election of the Liberal Party* in 1975. The requirement of
strong government participation has weakened, as have restrictions on
foreign capital involvement. The government announced its intention to
sell its shares of Mary Kathleen and Ranger. The Ranger share has now
been sold but buyers have not been found for the Mary Kathleen share.
*This party would be termed "conservative" in U.S. political
parlance.
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Former plans to require a minimum of 75 percent domestic ownership have
apparently been softened. A 50 percent ownership share seems to be the
current goal, though there are ventures that involve a higher foreign
participation. A softening international market will likely create
incentives to allow greater foreign involvement.
Thus at present, the uranium industry in Australia is dominated by
domestic private firms; government participation is declining; and
foreign concerns continue a strong presence, especially in exploration.
The status of major current ventures is shown in Table 4-1. Several
other smaller deposits are also in the process of delineation and
planning. These include Ben Lomond and Maureen in Queensland and Lake
Way in the Western territory. In addition to Australian interests,
there is involvement by French, American and Italian concerns.
4.1.2 Trade Patterns
Most of future Australian uranium production remains unsold. Future
contract commitments and recent deliveries total about 43,000 MTU. More
than three quarters of these exports were committed after the resumption
of sales in 1979. Current export commitments are shown in Figure 4.1.
As noted above, only the Mary Kathleen mine is currently delivering,
having begun production in 1976 and exports in 1977. Deliveries under
Ranger and Queensland Mines contracts are being made from the government
stockpile.
Before the accession of the Labor government in 1972, a number of
contracts were signed totalling 8600 MTU through 1986. Japanese
utilities (Chubu, Kyushu, Shikoku, Chugoku, and Hokkaido) were
responsible for over 70 percent of the contracted amounts. Mary
Kathleen also holds three contracts from this period, one with the U.S.
4-6
Table 4.1.
STATUS OF MAJOR KNOWN DEPOSITS
Deposit Year Average Resources*
(Territory) Discovered Ore Grade R.A.R. (MTU) E.A.R.
Mary Kathleen 1954 0.12 percent 6500
(Queensland)
Conzinc Riotinto Australia, Ltd. (CRA), a subsidiary of Rio
Tinto Zinc, (U.K.) owns 51 percent. The AAEC owns 41.6
percent; the remainder is in private Australian hands. RTZ
has a 72.6 percent share in CRA which it intends to reduce
to 68.2 percent through an Australian public offering. MKU
is producing at a rate of 770 MTU/y.
Koongarra 1970 0.34 percent 13,500 11,500
(Northern)
Deposit is wholly owned by the Canadian-origin company
Noranda Australia, Ltd. Despite serious environmental
obstacles, the company is seeking clearance to produce at
850 MTU/y beginning in 1981.
Nabarlek 1970 2.37 percent 10,000
(Queensland)
Owned by a privately-held company, Queensland Mines, Ltd.
(Australia). Ore has been mined and is awaiting
processing, expected to begin in late 1980 or early 1981 at
a rate of about 1350 MTU/y.
Ranger 1970 0.25 percent 85,000
(Northern)
Originally discovered and developed by Peko Wallsend, Ltd.
and Electrolytic Zinc Industries, Ltd. (both of Australia)
as equal partners. Labor government appropriated 50
percent in 1974 in exchange for 72.5 percent development
financing ($22.6 million spent). The government share was
sold in 1980 in a deal which transferred total ownership of
Ranger to a new consortium, Energy Resources of Australia,
Ltd., with Peko Wallsend and Electrolytic Zinc each holding
30.49 percent, 14.02 percent to be offered to the
Australian public, and the remaining 25 percent being split
between Japanese and West German concerns. Approval for
production has been granted: 2540 MTU/y beginning in late
1981 or early 1982, rising to 5080 MTU/y if and when
warranted.
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Table 4.1, continued
Deposit Year Average Resources
(Territory) Discovered Ore Grade R.A.R. (MTU) E.A.R.
Beverley 1970 0.24 percent 8,500 3,700
(South Australia)
Ownership distributed between Oilmin Group and others for
50 percent, and 50 percent for Western Nuclear, Inc.
(U.S.). Production goal is 1150 MTU/y.
Jabiluka 1971 0.39 percent 146,000 30,000
(Northern)
Pancontinental (Australia) owns 67 percent; Getty Oil
(U.S.) owns 33 percent but provides most of the financing.
Approval for production has been delayed and startup before
1985 seems very unlikely. Production plan is for 2500
MTU/y initially, 3850 MTU/y by third year and 7600 MTU/y by
fifth year, given sufficient market opportunities.
Yeelirrie 1972 0.15 percent 39,000
(Western)
Western Mining (Australia) owns 75 percent but will receive
only 50 percent of output; Esso Exploration and Production
(Australian subsidiary of U.S. firm) owns 15 percent but
will receive 40 percent of output; Urangesellshaft** owns
10 percent and will receive same share of output.
Production has been approved for 2500 MTU/y beginning in
late 1984 after pilot plant testing is completed.
Roxby Downs 1976 0.01-0.20 percent 500,000***
(South Australia)
Western Mining (Australia) has a 51 percent controlling
interest with British Petroleum's purchase of 49 percent
from Western approved by the Australian government in
1979. While low in grade, and at significant depth (1000
to 2000 feet) uranium is associated with one to two percent
copper and could be coproduced. Likelihood of development
is enhanced by the election of a Liberal Party government
in South Australia.
Notes:
* R.A.R. is Reasonably Assumed Resources (see Chapter 3); E.A.R. is
Estimated Additional Resources. Where only one number is given, the data
did not allow this distinction.
** Other reports put Urangesellshaft's share at 20 percent, reducing Western
Mining's share.
*** Estimates for Roxby Downs are still uncertain and may be influenced by
domestic political considerations.
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(Commonwealth Edison) and two with West Germany (Brunsbuttel). The
latter appear to be through Rio Tinto Zinc of London, which holds a
majority share in Conzinc Rio Tinto, one of the Mary Kathleen partners.
Since sales were resumed, a total of three contracts have been
signed, and a significant amount of uranium has been committed as
equity. American Electric Power and Korea Electric have signed,
respectively, 9- and 10-year contracts with the Ranger consortium for
more than 3500 MTU total, while Queensland has agreed to sell 730 MTU to
the Finnish utility TVO over a 9-year period. In addition, both Ranger
and Western Mining, owner of Yeelirrie, have allocated some future
production to equity holders. About 830 MTU per year will go to
Ranger's Japanese shareholders under equity arrangements, and almost
1200 to the German participants. For Yeelirrie, Urangesellschaft is
scheduled to receive 10 percent of production, an amount equal to its
equity share, while Esso Australia is slated to receive 40 percent of
production for its 15 percent equity holding. However, since both Esso
and Urangesellschaft are international traders in the uranium market,
the final destination of the uranium is not known with certainty; we
have not included the Yeelirrie equity shares as exports.
Obviously, the vast majority of committed uranium has yet to be
delivered. Of total Australian export commitments, West Germany and
Japan are the largest customers, each receiving about 44 percent. The
remaining but much smaller export commitments are to the United States,
South Korea, and Finland, in declining order of importance.
Under present plans, Mary Kathleen will continue to produce about
770 MTU/year, Nabarlek will begin to produce about 1350 MTU/year in
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1981, and Ranger will come on line with about 2500 MTU/year in 1982.
Yeelirrie (which appears to have written no contracts as yet to
supplement its equity shares, but whose development has government
approval) plans to be producing about 2500 MTU/year by 1985. Thus, as
of 1985, Australian production is planned to be about 6700 MTU/year.
Allowing for expansion of Ranger output (to about 5000 MTU/year) and a
go-ahead on Jabiluka, Koongarra, Beverley and Roxby Downs--and no major
obstacles--Australian production could be pushed as high as 23,000
MTU/year by the end of the decade.* By contrast, current contract
commitments are less than 3000 MTU/year in 1985, and drop to less than
2500 MTU/year in 1987. Planned and potential production capacity is
compared with export commitments in Figure 4.2.
Even if one considers only the four ventures for which approval has
been granted, and to which substantial commitment has been made,
Australian producers will have to find markets for three to five a
thousand MTU per year by the mid-1980s. Of this, 1000 MTU/year might be
sold by Esso, a partner in Yeelirrie, perhaps in the United States. But
three to four thousand MTU annually will have to be sold independently
by Australian companies in the world market.
How much of this production capacity will actually be installed and
operated clearly depends on perceptions of market opportunities and on
governmental assistance in overcoming environmental and other
*The 1979 Redbook (see reference [1l], Chapter 2) lists a maximum
production capacity of 20,000 MTU/year in 1990; our estimate is the same,
except for an additional 3000 MTU/year for Roxby Downs.
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obstacles. Compared to production costs in the United States and perhaps
elsewhere (e.g., Namibia) Australian uranium is inexpensive, being on or
near the surface, relatively high in grade, and low in extraction cost.
But financial incentives would have to be large enough to justify the
political and other costs involved in large-scale development. The
current expansionist momentum of the Australian industry--despite the
apparent lack of immediate contract opportunities--and the generally
favorable attitudes of national and territorial governments, suggests
that even today's decreasing prices provide more than adequate near-term
encouragement. In the longer term, deeper political and economic issues
are involved, as discussed below.
4.1.3 Government Role
Speculation about future uranium development depends heavily on one's
view of the role to be played by national and territorial governments.
Uranium is linked to several key economic and political issues. These
include:
o Environmental protection and aboriginal rights,
o Domestic and international economic strategy,
o International and regional security relations,
o Nonproliferation.
Aboriginal rights and environmental protection are central to the
domestic politics of uranium. These issues are raised particularly by
uranium developments in the East Alligator River area of the Northern
Territory, where the Ranger and Jabiluka deposits are located. These
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issues were explored in detail in the report of the Fox Commission.* Both
parties have embraced the report, which recommends cautious development of
uranium resources. This caution, and the need to make complex trade-offs,
imply that phased development is more likely than simultaneous development
of several mines, at least in the same geographical area. For example,
the delay of Jabiluka may have been a compromise (with aboriginal and
environmental forces) to allow Ranger to go ahead.
Economic issues associated with uranium are somewhat more
problematic. Uranium development is capital-intensive and, if it draws
capital away from other job-creating investments, it would be seen as
aggravating unemployment, already a serious problem for the governing
Liberal party.** Large-scale uranium production also could alter
Australia's international balance of payments and monetary situation.
Attainable production in 1985 could earn more than $1 billion a year in
foreign exchange, about ten percent of the current export volume.*** Such
an increase in export surplus could put upward pressure on the value of
the Australian dollar. If the government resists this pressure,
attempting to maintain the previous value for the currency, some of the
measures that are commonly used may result in expansion of the domestic
*The Fox Commission [1] enquiry was initiated by the Labour
government in 1974 but its work was not completed or received until
after the Liberal party came to power.
**For example, see [2].
***For a detailed study of the economic impact of uranium
development, see 13].
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money supply, aggravating inflation. In either case, the
competitiveness of Australian rural and industrial exports in world
markets would suffer, increasing unemployment. This secondary effect on
employment is in addition to that occasioned by a shift of capital to
the less labor-intensive mining sector. Domestic and international
economic issues are thus linked at a particularly sensitive political
point. The Labour government's experience in 1972-75, and its political
failure, are evidence of the significance and sensitivity of this
issue. A mineral and agricultural products boom in the early 1970s led
to a growing balance of payments surplus and pressure to appreciate the
Australian dollar. The Labour government resisted this development and
rapid inflation occurred. The reduced competitiveness of exports,
aggravated by Labour policies to increase wages and tighten credit led
to an increase in unemployment, from about 1 percent to more than 5
percent. Thus the problem of surpluses resulting from natural resource a
exports is a difficulty for any Australian government. In this
connection, it should be noted that decisions will have to be made
between expansion of coal exports and those of uranium.*
These effects would lead one to expect a cautious, moderate pace in
uranium development. Uranium decisions are also affected by Australia's
evolving role in the international political system. Australia appears
to be taking an increasingly independent posture in foreign policy,
especially in the Pacific basin, and as mediator between the developing
b
*For the Australian views of these issues, see [4], [5] and [6].
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and industrialized countries.* As a major raw material exporter,
Australia has interests in common with many developing countries,
especially in such areas as measures to improve price stability (as in
its activity in association with other bauxite producers). And
Australia is showing increasing sensitivity to the economic interests of
developing countries in the region. But Australia is also part of the
industrialized world and still depends, at least in part, on U.S.
efforts to maintain regional stability. Being part of both worlds might
enhance Australia's ability to act as mediator--it also creates
conflicts.
Nonproliferation is one such area, and in this domain trade and
foreign policy issues are being drawn together despite efforts to keep
them separate.** The Liberal government went ahead with uranium under
the terms of reference of U.S. policy: uranium would be exported under
full-scope safeguards and retransfer conditions embedded in bilateral
agreements. This policy is motivated by a need to provide
*For example, in March 1975, Prime Minister Fraser asserted that,
"Trade and foreign policy used to be kept strictly apart in our time,
trade and foreign policy need to be kept strictly apart for the future.
These rules of principle apply all the more strongly to small countries
because if the international world order becomes a jungle it is the small
countries that suffer; they are defenseless against the retaliation of
major powers. Resources diplomacy is one of the things that will help
plunge the world into a major depression and chaos. The continued
expansion of world trade, the availability of world developmental
capital, and access to adequate power are the three great economic
problems facing advanced western countries, indeed the the entire trading
world. For world trade to continue to grow we have to meet new
challenges. Trade is an increasingly politicized issue, not only
domestically, but also internationally, because of its importance in the
north-south dialogue." [7]
**For a general overview of the changing orientation of Australian
foreign policy, see [8].
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fuel assurance as a way of reducing incentives to pursue prolifera-
tion-sensitive nuclear technologies. However, there is evidence that
these measures may not succeed in stopping the spread of weapons
capability. Australia, like the U.S., will have to decide whether and
how to allow uranium exports to flow into sensitive fuel cycle
operations, including reprocessing, enrichment in Japanese facilities, or
breeder reactors. The present government went ahead with uranium
development and exports during the INFCE exercise, when it seemed that
consensus on a common technological and nonproliferation path might be
possible. To the extent that conflict remains over technological paths
now that INFCE is over, Australia will have to rationalize its role in
nuclear commerce. Recent government proposals include the possibility of
generic approvals of reprocessing material of Australian origin under
suitable conditions (which include Australia's judgment of the necessity
of reprocessing for technological, economic or waste management
reasons). This stance is significantly more relaxed than that of the
U.S. under its legislation (the 1978 NNPA), which calls for case-by-case
rather than generic approvals. However, Australian policy is still
evolving and the ultimate outcome is still uncertain.
The U.S. policy has held a potential self-contradiction that would
also affect a rigid Australian policy: fuel assurance has been
implicitly coupled with a threat to withhold fuel supply if the
technological behavior of recipient nations does not conform to U.S.
norms.* While this approach has thus far been aimed at other major
*See [9].
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industrialized countries--because of their nuclear leadership role--the
ultimate objective of U.S. policy has been to restrain sensitive
technological commitments in the developing world. To the extent that
Australian policy follows this lead, Australia is open to charges of
discrimination or failure to supply an important energy commodity. To
the extent that it deviates from solidarity with the U.S. it risks a
weakening of relations with a traditional industrialized leader in the
area. Australia's position is thus extremely sensitive: the conflicts
in U.S. policy are drawn even more sharply for Australia, and may create
significant problems in her relations with neighboring countries. If
external conflicts over nuclear policy should heat up, these issues
could serve to revitalize the internal debate over the whole question of
nuclear trade. There are thus many reasons to expect caution in uranium
development.
These complexities are perhaps in part responsible for the disparity
in political attitudes toward uranium in Australia, especially within
the Labour Party. Some leaders are opposed to uranium development and
have even threatened abrogation of existing contracts if the Party comes
to power.* However, the Party is far from homogeneous in its outlook.
Other party leaders favor moderate development, with suitable controls
and greater public participation. In this connection, it is our
impression that the trade press does not give an adequate picture of the
richness of the Australian situation. The issue of uranium development
vs. no development, in fact, is intertwined with a "public vs. private"
debate. The industry press tends to call attention to threats that the
*For a general discussion of the union movement, see [10] and [11].
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Labour party would abrogate or limit supply contracts (most of which are
private). It does not often highlight the possibility that under Labour
exports would go ahead but with greater public ownership at the expense
of private industry. The latter is the more realistic possibility in
our view. As noted above, Labour went ahead with uranium development,
with public funds, during its last term in office--a period that is,
with little justification, viewed even retrospectively as anti-uranium.
Such debates serve to create uncertainties about Australia's future
role in the world market. It is possible to entertain a ,p1 w of
Australia as the future Saudi Arabia of uranium, with a capacity (real
or threatened) large enough to give it a dominant position in setting
market and nonproliferation conditions; it is also possible to view it
as sufficiently conflicted over internal or foreign policy issues as to
have little material to export. As long as there are not major changes
in political conditions or assumptions, or proliferation events
traceable to the uranium market, the latter result seems unlikely. The
greatest likelihood is that Australian output and exports will expand
(as long as there is adequate world demand) but that they will do so
more rapidly under a Liberal than under a Labour government. Not only
are the cautions noted above more keenly felt by Labour, but the
restraint of private initiative in favor of public involvement advocated
hy Labour is likely to lead to slower and more rigorously sequential
development. Despite considerable environmental and other obstacles, it
is more difficult for the current Liberal government to retard private
and independent territorial interests favoring simultaneous development.
These same observations also suggest that a Labour government would
also be more likely to use existing and potential government mechanisms
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to influence prices and contract conditions.* There now exist export
and price review procedures. The second Fox Commission report of 1977
recommended a Central Marketing Authority and before the government's
share of Ranger was sold, consideration was apparently given to having
such a body market the government share. Current plans are for an
Australian Uranium Export Authority (AUEA). The Authority's duties are
to include advising the Minister of Trade and Resources, collecting data
and analyzing the uranium market, gathering information on domestic and
foreign uranium resources, and studying commercial arrangements for the
upgrading and enrichment of domestic uranium within and outside
Australia. More importantly, the Authority is to determine export
prices, and the rate of Australian production.
Due to the delays in the creation of the AUEA, the Trade and
Resources Minister was empowered to regulate uranium exports under the
authority of the Customs Act of 1901. At the time of the announcement
in mid-1978, the Minister said that shipments would be approved on an
individual basis, with three preconditions necessary: the project must
have government approval for production, the export contract must have
approval, and Australian safeguards policy must be complied with. Other
considerations to be taken into account include the quantity being
exported, the terms of the contract (duration, quantity sold, shipment
method, price payable, the manner of payment), and the end use of the
uranium.
The market power implicit in these regulations has not yet been
*Discussions of cartelization in the early 1970's were initiated
under a Liberal government, though actual cartel participation was
initiated by the Whitlam Labour government.
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fully tested, with only three contracts having been considered thus far.
But it appears that government did not exercise great influence over the
economic terms of recent sales. Undoubtedly, this was due in part to
Australia's relatively weak market position: with production coming on
line in an era of rising inventories, excess production and softening
prices, Australia has had difficulty in making sales at all. And a
liberal government seeking to shift uranium fully back to the private
sector may also be reluctant to threaten opportunities by imposing severe
price conditions on top of existing nonproliferation requirements. But
the governmental mechanisms now in place could--in principle--be used to
assist in coordinating international market activity with other
producers. The uranium cartel activity of the early 1970s was initiated
in a depressed market period even without such powers.
4.2 Canada
The Canadian uranium industry began in 1942, with a U.S. request
that the Eldorado Gold Mining Company reopen a mine closed in 1940 to
provide uranium for the Manhattan Project. In 1944, the Canadian
government acquired the shares of the company and formed a Crown
Corporation called Eldorado Mining and Refining, Ltd. and two years later
passed the Atomic Energy Control Act which remains the basic legislation
governing nuclear energy in Canada. In addition to Eldorado, several
private producers were mining large amounts of uranium by the 1950s, the
British and American weapons programs being the principal customers, as
with Australia. But in Canada the scale was greater; and so were the
difficulties when weapons demand decreased rapidly in the mid-1960s.
Canadian production reached a peak of 12,200 MTU in 1959, a factor of ten
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larger than the Australian peak (reached in 1961). By 1967, Canadian
output had dropped to 2800 MTU as a result of termination of U.S. and
U.K. contracts and a protectionist embargo on imports by the U.S. (U.S.
production dropped from a peak of 14,500 MTU in 1960 to about 7,500 MTU
in 1966.) The effect on the Canadian industry would have been even more
severe if it had not been for a stretchout of U.K. purchases (nearly 1000
MTU annually through 1971) and intervention by the Canadian government
through large stockpile programs which permitted the principal producers
to continue operations. Between 1963 and 1970 Canadian government
stockpile purchases totalled over 7,000 MTU at a cost of C$ 101.4
million. The industry depression of the mid-1960s is responsible in part
for the continuing role played by the Canadian government in uranium
affairs, and provides a well-remembered backdrop to more recent industry
attitudes and plans.
4.2.1 Industry Structure
Uranium production occurs principally in Ontario and northern
Saskatchewan. Uranium deposits in Ontario are relatively low in grade
(with uranium averaging less than 0.1 percent of ore) while those in
Saskatchewan are relatively high (fractions of 1 percent up to 45
percent). Early production in Saskatchewan came from the Beaverlodge
facilities of Eldorado Nuclear, a Canadian Crown company under government
ownership. Eldorado also managed national stockpile activities through
July, 1970. Beginning January 1, 1971, stockpiling activities were
controlled by a joint venture--75 percent government-owned--managed by a
newly created Crown Company, Uranium Canada Ltd. (UCAN), whose directors
were all federal government officials. In Ontario, Rio Algom and
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Denison Mines produced--and will continue to produce--more than half of
Canada's uranium from deposits at Elliot Lake.
The number of major producers in Canada is increasing rapidly and
the important producers of the past (Eldorado, Denison, and Rio Algom)
are increasing output. In Ontario, Denison Mines (at Elliot Lake) will
probably reach 2300 MTU for 1980 and Rio Algom (expanding and reviving
its Quirke and Panel mines nearby) will probably reach 2800 MTU annual
production. Madawaska Mines, Ltd.* has revived the Faraday mine in the
Bancroft area to produce uranium (about 300 MTU annually) largely for
Italy's AGIP, which provided much of the financing. Agnew Lake Mines**
has operated a heap-leaching operation in Ontario that will yield about
400 MTU annually in 1980.
But the largest producer in Ontario--directly or indirectly--is the
Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Ltd. of the U.K. Through interlocking
corporate entities, RTZ controls both Rio Algom and Preston Mines, which
will produce around 76,000 MTU over the next 40 years under contract with
Ontario Hydro. RTZ directly owns 80.9 percent of Preston and 51.3
percent of Rio Algom. Until recently, when the companies were merged,
Preston was an organization without employees and with a board of
directors identical with that of Rio Algom. Preston owned 43.8 percent
of Rio Algom (thus increasing RTZ's interest there); it also had a
management contract with Rio Algom to reactivate and operate its. other
*Madawaska is owned 51 percent by Federal Resources (U.S.) and 49
percent by Consolidated Canadian Faraday.
**Agnew Lake Mines is owned 90 percent by Kerr Addison and 10
percent by Uranerz Canada, Ltd., a subsidiary of Uranerzbergbau Gmbh. of
West Germany. Production is to be split according to these equity
shares.
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major asset, the old Stanleigh Mine from which Ontario Hydro's uranium
will come. This complex subsidiary-parent relationship--with a few other
RTZ subsidiary relationships included--means that RTZ has a larger
interest than may at first have been apparent.*
In Saskatchewan, Eldorado is expanding its production near Uranium
City, to reach perhaps 700 MTU annually by 1981. At Rabbit Lake, joint
venture activity by Gulf Minerals Canada, Ltd. (a subsidiary of Gulf Oil
Corporation of the U.S.) and Uranerz Canada, Ltd. (a subsidiary of
Uranerzbergau, Gmbh., a company with close ties to West German utilities)
reached a production level of 1730 MTU in 1979. At Cluff Lake, Amok (a
consortium of four French organizations)** expects to reach production
levels of 1000 MTU in 1981 and 1500 MTU by 1982.
Plans for the development of Cluff Lake were the occasion for
Saskatchewan's searching examination of uranium development issues, the
so-called Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry [12]. The board gave a general
go-ahead to uranium, under rigorous conditions. Under Canadian law,
mineral resources within provincial boundaries are owned by the
provinces; Yukon and Northern Territory resources are federally owned.
The provinces thus have considerable powers to regulate occupational
health and safety and environmental impacts, to require employment of
local (native) workers, to assess royalties and to participate in
exploration and mining ventures. The provinces have exercised all of
*Rio Algom also owns 10 percent of the R6ssing Deposit developed by
RTZ in Namibia, thus extending the corporate web of interrelationships
to the international sphere.
**Amok's equity is distributed as follows: Compagnie de Mokta (25
percent), Compagnie Francaise des Minerais d'Uranium-CMFU (20 percent),
Pechiny Ugine Kuhlmann (25 percent), and Commissariat a l'Energie
Atomique (30 percent).
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these powers. For example, through the Saskatchewan Mining Development
Corporation (SMDC) the province participates in most exploration
ventures (at up to 50 percent). The province can also buy into new
developments such as that at the fourth major deposit, Key Lake. Equity
in this development--which may reach an output level of 2300 MTU
annually by 1983--is distributed half to SMDC, 33.3 percent to Uranerz
Canada, Ltd. and 16.7 percent to Eldorado Nuclear, Ltd.
It should be noted, however, that provincial powers are limited at
least in theory by several circumstances, partially deriving from
uranium's special status. By the legal doctrine of paramountry, federal
legislation overrides provincial legislation should the two conflict.
The federal Atomic Energy Control Act and other federal laws regulate
such matters as uranium exploration, development, mining, health and
safety, price, stockpiling, and export conditions. Since many of these
questions are covered by provincial laws, duplicate regulations exist.
Thus far no conflict between them has been brought to the courts, though
the AECA has been challenged and its constitutionality upheld. In
general (and again--in principle) the federal government has
jurisdiction wherever international or interprovincial questions are
involved. It could, for example, overide British Columbia's moratorium
if it chose; but the political problem of federal control over resource
policy is presently a very sensitive issue in Canadian politics. This
political question also finds expression in mineral taxation. According
to Canadian law, provinces may levy only direct taxes, i.e. those levied
on some good and payable by its owner. The classic direct tax is a tax
on land or property. The provinces may not levy indirect taxes--those
intended to be passed on to a purchaser, such as a sales tax--nor may
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they tax in order to regulate interprovincial or international trade.
In fact they do both by writing mineral taxation laws phrased so as
nominally to be taxes on "mineral lands." Again, this procedure has
been upheld by the courts. Saskatchewan's de facto royalty laws add
significantly to the export price of its uranium, which nonetheless
remains competitive due to its low extraction costs.
As is evident in this review, foreign involvement in Canadian
uranium production--even in some of that for domestic uses--is high.
This appears to be in contradiction to official policy which calls for a
maximum of 33 percent foreign ownership. Legislative efforts have been
made recently to rationalize this situation, with proposals to allow up
to 50 percent ownership as long as Canadian control is assured. While
the effort to increase Canadian shares in investment and control is part
of a more general drive to use internal sources of capital and implement
a better resource policy, there is clearly some distance to go in
achieving these goals in the uranium sector.
4.2.2 Trade Patterns
Canada's past and future exports of uranium are the largest of any
producer. Since commercial contracting began in 1966, Canadian
producers have entered into arrangements to export about 126,000 MTU. Of
this about 44,000 MTU were exported prior to 1980, leaving a forward
commitment of at least 82,000 MTU.*
*These are the quantities for which we have been able to find
confirmation. There may be some recent spot sales that do not appear in
our tabulations or older commitments that have escaped our discovery
efforts.
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Japan is Canada's largest customer, receiving 36.5 percent of
lifetime export commitments; West Germany is next with 21 percent
followed closely by the U.K. (13.5 percent), the U.S. (10 percent), Spain
(6.8 percent), France* (5.8 percent), and Italy (2.5 percent). South
Korea, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland (in descending order)
receive the remaining 4 percent.
Under Canadian law, export commitments made since September 1974
must be approved by the Atomic Energy Control Board for conformity to
nonproliferation conditions, price, arrangements for uranium value added
in Canada (primarily UF6 conversion), and other conditions (such as the
requirement that sufficient reserves be held for domestic needs).
Approvals granted as of the end of 1979 totaled about 65,000 MTU. Thus
about 61,000 MTU was either (1) committed prior to September 1974, (2)
extends beyond the official ten-year approval horizon, or (3) has not yet
received approval on export conditions. With the exception of the French
purchases from Cluff Lake beyond 1983, there appear to be few major
contracts in the third category. However, the AECB has delayed contract
fulfillment in at least a few instances, until price or conversion
requirements were met. An example is the Madawaska contract with AGIP
(Italy). AGIP had provided major mine financing and expected to receive
uranium at about $32/pound; Canadian officials insisted on an increase to
about $42/pound.
*France's supply is entirely from the Amok consortium's Cluff Lake
operation. Although Amok has received only a two-year export
authorization on its French contracts, this approval is renewable and we
have assumed exports will go to France for at least ten years, as is the
case with exports to Germany from Cluff Lake.
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In Figure 4.3, we show annual export commitments by country of
destination. It should be noted that exports prior to 1980 include a
number of spot sales while commitments beyond 1980 are all long-term
contracts. The latter reach a peak of slightly more than 8500 MTU in
1984 and forward commitments decline rapidly in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Exports are not, however, the only commitments made by domestic
producers: there are also contracts to Ontario Hydro totaling more than
76,000 MTU, to meet fuel needs into the next century. In Figure 4.4 we
show domestic requirements and export commitments as they compare with
historical production and planned capacity.
4.2.3 Government Role
The Canadian government is unavoidably involved in uranium activity
for reasons that go beyond its participation in weapons procurement, and
its support of the industry in the years between weapons and commercial
procurements. Uranium is linked to several important current areas of
domestic and international concern. These include:
o Natural resource policies. Many Canadian leaders believe the
economy and foreign trade are excessively dependent on natural
resource exploitation [13]. Also, there is a strong body of
opinion that holds that foreign ownership and control
(primarily by U.S.-based organizations) is too great. In
uranium, these sentiments have led to restrictions on foreign
ownership, the requirement of a maximum domestic value added
(to date this involves requiring conversion to UF6 in Canada,
where capability exists), and the imposition of government
controls on export prices.
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o Social and infrastructural problems. Canada is a large country
with a population concentrated in a few centers. Development
outside these areas has historically involved extensive
government action. In the northern areas of the provinces,
native peoples' rights also are an important political issue.
Thus new uranium activities, as in northern Saskatchewan,
unavoidably involve governmental involvement in infrastructural
development and concern for environmental effects and the
rights of the original inhabitants.
o Federal/provincial relations. Because of the nature of the
Canadian confederation, the federal government must be
sensitive to provincial interests, both ethnic (as in Quebec)
and economic. For uranium, this situation is complicated by
the fact that production in Ontario is primarily committed to
domestic use, while that from new districts in Saskatchewan
will be sold abroad. This circumstance raises questions about
relations between sectors that meet domestic needs and those
that earn foreign exchange (which now take on geographical
identity), and interprovincial economic equity. Further, there
is a coupling between domestic provincial ambitions and foreign
policy.
o Domestic energy security. Concern that Canada might deplete
uranium reserves, to the detriment of domestic energy security,
has led to a governmental requirement that a portion of
reserves be held for future domestic use.
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o Nonproliferation. The 1974 Indian explosion (which involved
Canadian material) pushed Canada to the front of the
nonproliferation issue and led the Canadian government to
assume a greater role in setting conditions on exports.
Of these, the issues of greatest current importance appear to be
nonproliferation and the balance between federal and provincial
interests--especially since these two issues intersect. Their overall
effect seems to be a pressure toward softening Canadian commitments to
nonproliferation as they have been expressed through uranium export
policy. Following the Indian explosion, Canada was compelled to take
actions independently through its primary source of leverage, uranium
supply. The resulting crisis--which primarily affected Canada's
industrialized trading partners--was relieved by the entry of the United
States into the issue, and by the INFCE discussions. The INFCE allowed
Canada to retreat gracefully (if temporarily as far as the Euratom
countries were concerned) from confrontation and to delay permanent
formulation of nonproliferation conditions. (Interim agreements are
without prejudice as to the outcome of post-INFCE negotiations.) A key
issue will be whether Canada will hold veto power over reprocessing,
enrichment, or retransfer of its uranium. To argue for such a right
would be to follow the current U.S. policy lead; to accept softer
conditions (such as prior consultation or generic approvals) might be
interpreted as a break with of the U.S. in this area.
We believe it unlikely that Canada will hold to the rigorous
nonproliferation conditions of recent years. In part this is because of
actions by the U.S. When the U.S. retook the lead on nonproliferaton,
it removed Canada from its unaccustomed central position, and reduced
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the relative importance of international security issues in the
resources debate in Canada. But the U.S. is itself in a difficult
position with its policy after INFCE; the strict terms of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 reduce the U.S.'s negotiating flexibility
with its allies over the future evolution of global nuclear development.
The complexities of this debate are not unnoticed in Canada. Not
surprisingly, they arise most visibly in Saskatchewan, which has the
most at stake in conditions on uranium exports. The Cluff Lake Board of
Inquiry argued that nuclear proliferation can only be solved by a
comprehensive multinational effort and that unilateral actions are
ineffective if not counterproductive. The Board warned that the
withholding of uranium from world markets would probably have harmful
effects for nonproliferation; also such a move would conflict with
attempts to ameliorate global energy problems. According to the Board,
it is incomprehensible to speak of a Canadian contribution to
proliferation through its uranium exports: "proliferation exists
because of the security structure, not because of Canadian uranium."[14]
The Board went further in criticizing the philosophical foundations
of the nonproliferation policies articulated by the U.S. and other
countries, including--by implication--the Canadian federal government.
A few excerpts from the report make this clear:
o Both sides feared that nuclear weapons could get into the hands
of less responsible governments but the supporters of nuclear
power claimed that they would refrain from making nuclear
materials available to any nation likely to experience a civil
war or subnational coup while the opponents of nuclear power
wanted Third World nations to develop alternative sources of
energy. Nations in the Third World know that both superpowers
had serious civil wars themselves and that unstable or
dictatorial governments are by no means the special preserve of
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underdeveloped and developing nations. We agreed that
assumptions of inferior qualifications for nuclear energy did
sound like a modern version of the White Man's Burden.
o Both sides of the nuclear debate accepted in their evidence
that the balance of nuclear terror between the superpowers had
helped to keep the world free of a major war for over three
decades. We concluded that the non-aligned nations of the
Third World considered that international security for them
would be as well preserved by a balance of nuclear terror in
which they had a reasonable share.
o Both protagonists before us argued for international justice.
The pro-nuclear witnesses argued for the right to make nuclear
energy available to the Third World for peaceful purposes under
strict safeguards to prevent making nuclear weapons. The
non-nuclear witnesses argued that nuclear power was unsuitable
for many of those nations and that the traditional
non-industrial way of life should be preserved. The Third
World considers that these arguments mask the real reason--any
proliferation would be a shift in the distribution of power in
international decision-making. We agreed that it is a
redistribution of this power which they want. International
justice and equality requires not simply a redistribution of
wealth or resources, but also of global prestige, bargaining
power in political and economic agreements, and a voice in
international organizations. We deplored the fact that nuclear
weapons are used as a measure in the allocation of power in the
world community [15]
In making these arguments, the Board, and the provincial government that
endorsed and implemented the report, show more sympathy for the
developing country point of view than for that of the Canadian federal
government. With its heavy dependence on agriculture and natural
resources, Saskatchewan also shares other common ground with the
developing world.
However, the Province is also part of the Confederation and
perspectives on resource and export policy must ultimately be
reconciled. In a reopened debate on nonproliferation policy there is
much to favor the influence of Saskatchewan's view. There are the
paradoxes and internal contradictions of a restrictive policy, and
Canada is not likely to take a hard line position without seeing how to
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eliminate or resolve them. Also, there is a rapidly softening uranium
market in which competitive advantage is easily undermined by
restrictive political conditions.
Though internal and external factors may suggest a loosening of
political conditions on uranium exports, the nonproliferation debate may
have helped create mechanisms for imposing economic conditions on
exports. The Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) functions both to
impose both political and economic conditions, and the latter function
is potentially important as the uranium market softens. Canadian
interests are united in wishing a maximum return for natural resources;
the ability to maintain prices would help fulfill this desire. The
difficulties in doing so, however, are both internal and external.
Internally, it is difficult to control producers: if world prices
threaten to drop below levels judged appropriate by the AECB, there will
be pressures from low-cost producers (mining costs in Saskatchewan are
relatively low) to go ahead with exports even at lower prices.
Participation in a producer cartel would also require such a
disciplining of internal industry activity. This is probably very
difficult to do, except perhaps for a short period.
4.3 South Africa
Uranium production in South Africa also was initiated in response to
the weapons needs of the United States and United Kingdom. Uranium is
extracted from material mined with gold as the primary product.
Production began in 1952 and rose to a peak of 4,960 MTU in 1959, when
more than two dozen gold mining operations were involved. Weapons
demand and uranium output then fell to a minimum of 2260 MTU in 1965,
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the last year of deliveries to the Combined Development Agency. Since
uranium was a by-product of gold production and since uranium recovery
facilities were already in place, uranium output was continued after
1965 at a level of several thousand MTU per year. Fluctuations in
uranium production--notably a decline in the mid-1970s--occurred because
of changes in gold prices. The ratio of uranium to gold in the South
African reefs is relatively constant (at a value of about twenty) and
changing gold prices appear to result in changes in the grade of ore
mined--in both gold and uranium values. Given limits on ore treatment
volumes, the result can be changes in uranium as well as gold output
levels.
Until about 1976, South African uranium production exceeded
commercial contract deliveries, with the excess being sold to the
weapons states or put into inventories. These inventories were then
drawn down somewhat in the late 1970s when contracts exceeded production
capacity. Total South African production from 1966 until the end of
1978 was nearly 39 000 MTU; there are public indications of commercial
deliveries totalling only about one-fourth of this. The implication is
either that other, more secret, transactions may have taken place
(perhaps involving sales to the U.K. or other weapons states) or that
South Africa holds a substantial stockpile. The total amount to be
accounted for is about 30,000 MTU. South African stocks are now being
built up as production grows to exceed export commitments.
4.3.1 Industry Structure
Of more than forty gold-producing mines (most in the Witwatersrand
basin), about one-half are currently producing uranium, or proposing to
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do so. Most of these mines are controlled by the major mine financing
groups, the most important of which for uranium is the Anglo American
Corporation.* The current expansion in uranium production in South
Africa results from the extension of uranium recovery to additional gold
mines and from new uranium-oriented mining ventures.
With one exception, commercial uranium output has been sold through
the Nuclear Fuels Corporation (Nufcor), a corporation owned by mining
interests but using conversion facilities originally transferred to it
from the government. The exception is the uranium produced as a
by-product of copper mining by Rio Tinto Zinc (London) at Palabora
(about 100 MTU/year). Until a few years ago, Nufcor was an exclusive
intermediary between producer and consumer. However, in the mid-1970's
tight market conditions created opportunities for mining companies to
negotiate directly with consumers for the financing of output
expansion. The result has been an improvement in information concerning
trade patterns (as discussed below) since such direct arrangements give
important clues to uranium transactions.
South African production reached a record 5200 MTU in 1979 and will
expand rapidly in the next few years as the result of recent
investments. A maximum annual production capability of 10,600 MTU is
projected for 1985 (1979 Redbook). This estimate does not include
production from Namibia, discussed below.
4.3.2 Trade Patterns
South Africa's participation in international uranium trade is
veiled in greater secrecy than that of any other producer. In general,
*For details about individual mining ventures, the reader is
referred to the excellent study, [16].
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sales are not announced or acknowledged, and there are strong legal
restrictions on disclosures by potential South African sources. What
information is available, beyond occasional trade press reports, must be
obtained from consumers or inferred from financing or other arrangements
made by South African mining companies. The analysis in this section is
based upon a systematic but intrinsically uncertain process of such
inferences, along with discussions with individuals in consumer
nations.
Commercial uranium exports from South Africa appear to have begun in
1969 with sales to Japan and West Germany. Through the 1970s, Japan was
South Africa's principal trading partner, though significant exports
were also made to Germany, the United States (to a reactor vendor and a
fuel fabricator) and France. Smaller quantities were sold to
Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and, perhaps, Brazil and Spain. Total
exports appear to have reached a level of about 2,500 MTU by 1976,
comparable to annual production in that year.
A major change in this pattern began in the mid-1970's as the
uranium market tightened, prices rose, and South African producers began
to seek front-end and contract-related financing for expansion of
output. A principal source of this financing was Iran, which at that
time envisioned a large nuclear program and had already made an
investment in the Eurodif enrichment venture. There are indications of
uranium exports to Iran as early as 1977 as a result of financing
arrangements made in 1975 with South Africa's Free State Saaiplaas Mine,
and perhaps with East Rand Gold and Uranium.* There also are
*Delivery was not directly to Iran, but to the U.K., to be converted
to UF6. The total amount involved appears to be of order 2000 MTU.
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indications of deals for as much as 7,500 to 15,000 MTU with other South
African mining interests; and it is also possible that Iran assisted in
financing South African involvement in the R6ssing Mine in Namibia.*
(See below).
France also became involved financially, with an interest free loan
in excess of $100 million to Randfontein Estates, negotiated late in
1976 or early in 1977. France is entitled to more than 750 MTU/year
over ten years. Deliveries appear to have begun in 1978, though
production difficulties have delayed deliveries. Other countries may
also have been involved in financing, though the uranium commitments are
probably relatively small. There are more recent reports that the
material already delivered has been resold.
With the gradual decline in deliveries to Japan (which reached a
peak in 1978) and West Germany, South Africa's principal customers in
the 1980's appear to be France and Iran, with smaller commitments to the
United States (a 1973 contract to Exxon Nuclear for perhaps 500 MTU
annually to 1984), to Belgium (a 1978 contract for perhaps 150 MTU/year
in the 1980s), and to a number of unidentified customers whose
collective commitment is no more than a few hundred MTU annually. By
1983, long-standing commitments to Japan and West Germany will have
declined to less than 700 MTU per year and they disappear entirely by
1986. Identifiable export commitments are shown in Figure 4.5 and
compared with planned and attainable capacities in Figure 4.6.
*Two South African groups have equity shares in R6ssing: the
private General Mining Corporation has a 2.3 percent share and the
government-associated Industrial Development Corporation has 13.5
percent, for a total of 15.8 percent. Assuming a pro rata share of
output this will amount to about 800 MTU/year.
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Given current knowledge of future commitments and prospective growth
in South African capacity, it appears that South Africa will soon have
substantial excess supply. For example, commitments in 1983 appear to
be about 2600 MTU, not including those to Iran, while planned capacity
is expected to be about 7,900 MTU and potential capacity is as high as
10,000 MTU [17]. According to available information, contract
commitments to Iran in 1983 were somewhere in the range of 1000 to 2000
MTU, though it is possible that some of this uranium may come from
Namibia.* As with the French view of Iranian enrichment participation
in Eurodif, South Africa's view appears to be that the uranium involved
is Iran's responsibility. But whether resold by Iran or South Africa,
the uranium involved represents a significant unanticipated source of
supply to the world market. Directly or indirectly then, South African
production capacity may exceed commitments to active consumer customers
by as much as 5000 to 7500 MTU annually within a few years and even
increase thereafter.
4.4 Namibia
Namibia has recently become a major contributor to world uranium
markets. Production reached 3,700 MTU in 1979 and is expected to reach
*Industry sources indicate that Iran was attempting to sell its
contractually committed uranium from southern Africa in late 1979 with
prices quoted as being in the low $30 range (this would be high enough to
ensure a profit to Iran). Recent market changes may have made it more
difficult to dispose of Iran's contracted supply, suggesting that this
material will revert to South African control. Estimates of the total
amounts available range from about 23,000 MTU to 38,000 MTU, quantities
greater than we have been able to document, suggesting either that other
Iranian involvement in South Africa or Namibia may have been missed or
that industry estimates are double-counting South African and Namibian
uranium. A consistent view is achieved if one assumes that Iran financed
South Africa's share of R6ssing and that uranium associated with this
arrangement is variously attributed both to South Africa and Namibia.
4-42
5000 MTU annually in 1983. All of this is due to the R6ssing deposit.
Though the deposit has been known for more than fifty years, its
development began in the mid-1960s, with mine and mill operations starting
up in 1975 and 1976 respectively. Exploration in Namibia--especially in
the granitic environs of R6ssing--is active, with South African firms
dominant.*
4.4.1 Namibia's Political Status
Namibia has been under the territorial governance of South Africa
since 1920, and South African commercial, political and legal interests
have shaped Namibian uranium development. For example, uranium exports
are subject to the provisions of the South African Atomic Energy Act.
However, there are profound tensions in this relationship that may,
eventually, bring the Namibian independence that has been endorsed by the
United Nations and by many foreign governments. The path to independence
has been complicated not only by the opposition of South Africa (uranium
and other mineral interests combine with political considerations to
create strong incentives for South Africa to keep control) but also by
tribal and racial conflicts within Namibia itself. The independence
movement led by SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) has its
political base in one large tribal grouping. Whites and other tribal
groups are more sympathetic to some relationship to South Africa, while
they tend to have long-standing antipathies toward the tribal groups
*Previous OECD/IAEA and other reports tended to combine Namibian
production with tha+ of South Africa, or referred to a politically
imprecise "Southern Africa." The independence movement in Namibia, as
recognized by the United Nations and many major governments, seems to be
resulting in a real separation between uranium operations in the two
countries. For example, RTZ has moved its R6ssing-related operations
from South Africa to Namibia proper. How the direct South African
participation in R6ssing will be rationalized is still an open question.
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supporting SWAPO. Conflicts between these groups has occurred at
Rossing.
The United Nations has repeatedly called for free elections in
Namibia under its sipervision. South Africa has resisted, but instead
conducted its own election in 1979. The result was a government that
favors independence but with close ties to South Africa. The UN
continues to pursue discussions with South Africa regarding the
legitimacy of government in Namibia. As part of its long-standing
effort, the UN has also called for sanctions against foreign governments
who participate in trade with a South African-dominated Namibia. These
U.N. actions have created problems for those organizations and
governments seeking to benefit from Namibian uranium development. For
example, Japanese companies were led to cancel a major contract with
R6ssing (though, as discussed below, Japan will still obtain uranium
from Namibia under a different arrangement). There also are indications
that West Germany has been involved in R6ssing and will receive a
significant share of its output, though there appears to be no official
acknowledgment of this involvement.
Political evolution in Namibia will have a strong bearing on how
R6ssing's output is distributed and on the rate at which new deposits
are developed. Uncertainty cannot help but slow the latter. The
results of the recent elections--if they are sustained--tend to preserve
the status quo for the South African and foreign interests involved in
Namibia and one can expect existing trade patterns to be maintained.
New elections with a clear SWAPO victory might temporarily disrupt
Rbssing operations and result in changes in long-run patterns of market
participation; or perhaps only royalties would increase. Perhaps the
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most disruptive development would be the failure of a new government to
attain legitimacy and a growth of conflict within the country.
4.4.2 Industry Structure
Because of the close association with South Africa and South
Africa's rigid secrecy laws, there is little public information about
financing, equity shares and contracts involving Namibian uranium.
However, the fact that there is only one mine simplifies the task of
making estimates of these quantities.
R6ssing was developed by Rio Tinto Zinc, a multinational firm with
uranium subsidiaries in Canada (Rio Algom), Australia (Conzinc Rio
Tinto), and the U.S.; and with a copper and uranium operation at
Palobora in South Africa. A breakdown of Rbssing ownership shares is
given in Table 4.2.
Directly or indirectly (through Rio Algom, Canada), RTZ has a
majority share of 51.35 percent in R6ssing; South African organizations
control 15.7 percent and France's Minatome 10 percent. It is commonly
believed that West German interests hold a significant fraction of the
remaining 23 percent.
Table 4.2
Rbssing Ownership Shares*
Rio Tinto (South Africa) 41.35 percent
Rio Algom (Canada) 10.0 percent
General Mining (South Africa) 2.3 percent
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 13.47 percent
Minatome (France) 10.0 percent
Others 22.88 percent
*The RTZ (Rio Tinto S.A. and Rio Algom) share is from the 1978 RTZ
Annual Report. Various other sources disagree slightly (less than 1
percent) on this and other equity shares; the numbers in Table 4.2
represent the authors' best judgment, based on evaluation of these
conflicting sources.
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These equity shares are not an adequate guide to actual flows of
material, however, since RTZ and the South African organizations are not
end users. Thus, nearly two-thirds of Rbssing output is controlled by
middlemen. To develop further understanding of Namibian operations it
is necessary either to go to consumer data or to make inferences from
financing arrangements. Both RTZ and South Africa apparently found
financial backing for their shares of Rbssing. RTZ appears to have
obtained financing (through prepayment for future uranium deliveries)
from the United Kingdom and, probably, Japan. South Africa may have
obtained it from Iran.*
4.4.3 Trade Patterns
There are indications of uranium supply arrangements from R6ssing to
the United Kingdom by way of RTZ, from the late 1970's forward.
Similarly, Japanese utilities have large contracts with RTZ beginning in
the late 1970s. This uranium was almost certainly intended to come from
R6ssing, though by dealing with RTZ, the Japanese avoid the
politically-sensitive question of its origin.** Similar arrangements,
for smaller amounts, may have been made by other consumers, including
the FRG (perhaps in addition to an equity share) and Spain. There also
are indications that France may receive a larger share than indicated by
Minatome's 10 percent equity (this equity share would entitle Minatome
*There are also suggestions of direct Iranian financing of R6issing,
though these reports may simply be different perceptions of a channel
through South Africa.
**When the arrangement was made, Namibia was the only place RTZ
could have obtained such a large amount of material with any certainty.
Recently, the cancellation of the TVA-Rio Algom contract and other market
developments might make it possible for RTZ to supply Japan from Canadian
sources. Note also that Rio Algom is an owner of R6ssing, though its
share of output would only be about 500 MTU annually.
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to about 500 MTU/year when production reaches an expected annual peak of
5000 MTU in 1983).
Finally, there are reports that Iran may be entitled to twenty
percent of R6ssing output, an amount comparable to if not identical with
South Africa's participation share. Indeed, there have been press
reports of confirmation of Iran's role in Rbssing by the Chairman of
RTZ; the reports also indicated that initial deliveries had already been
made [18].
Fears of political instability and the political sensitivity of
dealing with Namibia under South African rule have sometimes led to
curious supply arrangements, in addition to those noted above. For an
extended period in 1978, RTZ reportedly arranged for weekly airlifts of
uranium from Namibia [19]. These flights landed not in England, but in
France, where uranium was transshipped to consumers. The exploitation
of Namibian uranium thus involves some rather special problems. As we
have noted above, the question is not so much whether Namibian uranium
will be available to the world market but rather what the supply
arrangements will be, and whether current patterns will remain stable or
require change.
4.5 Niger
As a uranium producer, Niger is just beginning to become significant
on the world market. Although it is the fifth largest producer outside
the Centrally Planned Economies, Niger's market share was originally
quite small, growing from 4.4 percent in 1972, to 5.6 percent in 1977.
However, three new finds are expected to raise that share to 11.2
percent by 1985, despite growing world production. By 1986, Niger may
pass South Africa, becoming the fourth largest producer in the
non-communist world.
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Exploration in Niger was begun by France's CEA in the 1950s, and the
first results were two small deposits (4000 and 6000 MTU), Azelik and
Modaouela. These are high-cost deposits in the context of the resources
more recently discovered in Niger. In 1966, the much larger Arlit
deposit (about 40,000 MTU) was reported, and Niger's first commercial
production began in 1971 (with about 400 MTU output). Subsequently, a
slightly larger deposit, Akouta (perhaps 44,000 MTU), was discovered
about 20 kilometers from Arlit. Production at Akouta began in 1978 at
about 500 MTU. In 1978 a still larger deposit of about 70,000 MTU
reserves was demonstrated at Imouraren. Production at Imouraren is
scheduled to begin in 1982 or 1983 at about 2500 MTU annually. Two
smaller recent discoveries, Arni and Abkorun, appear likely to begin
production in the early to mid-1980's. Exploration is occurring in more
than a dozen other concessionary areas and, if recent experience is any
guide, the potential for new discoveries is great. In the 1979 Redbook,
the OECD/IAEA working group estimates that Niger's output will increase
from a 1979 production level of 3,350 MTU to 5,800 MTU in 1983 and
12,000 MTU in 1986 [17].
4.5.1 Industry Structure
The Niger government, through its state uranium organization Office
National Des Ressources Minieres (Onarem) is a participant in all
exploration and development in Niger, usually at a 30 to 50 percent
level. Perhaps in reaction to its previous colonial status
(independence from France came only in 1970), the Niger government has
encouraged participation by a multitude of foreign private and
quasi-governmental groups. France, Italy, West Germany, the United
States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Nigeria, Iran, and Japan are
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all involved in Niger, though France (with Cogema, CFMU, Minatome and
Mokta involvement) holds a larger equity position than any other
country, comparable to that of Niger itself.
Mine development and production in Niger is generally under
multinational consortia with major financing from the foreign
participants. The first mine, Arlit, is operated by the Societe des
Mines de 1'Air (SOMAIR) with participation by the government of Niger
and companies from France, West Germany and Italy. France, Japan and
Spain are involved with Onarem at Akouta. Equity shares and prospective
production levels for the five mines under development or likely to be
developed by the mid-1980s are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3
Ownership Shares
Mines in Niger Under Development
Ownership Share Country
33 percent Niger
54.2 percent France
6.4 percent
6.4 percent
31 percent
34 percent
25 percent
10 percent
30 percent
35 percent
35 percent
50 percent
50 percent
50 percent
50 percent
Italy
W. Germany
Niger
France
Japan
Spain
Niger
France
United States
Niger
France
Niger
Japan
Organization
Unarem
Cogema
CFMU
Mokta
AGIP
Urangesel l schaft
Onarem
Cogema
OURD
ENUSA
Onarem
Cogema
Conoco
Onarem
Cogema
Onarem
International Resources
Mine
Arlit
(SOMAIR)
Akouta
(Comi nak)
Imouraren
Arni
(SMTT)
Abkorun
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In addition, there are about a dozen exploration concessions. Five
of these are joint ventures between Onarem and Esso (U.S.), though Esso
has now terminated active exploratory work on some concessions.
Canada's Pan Ocean, Ltd. is in joint venture with Onarem in three
concessions. On the Afasto-Est concession, the governments of Niger and
Nigeria have joined with France's Cogemma, Britain's Central Electricity
Generating Board and Japan's OURD. Similar arrangements--involving, in
addition, Iran's Organization de L'Energie Atomique, and Germany's
Saarberg-Interplan--exist for the Afasto-Ouest, Muasto-Est and In-Adrar
concessions. But in all of the latter, as in the areas under active
devoa'opment, Onarem and Cogema have the largest equity shares.
Uranium is Niger's principal source of income and the government's
share of revenue is the financial basis for national development. In
addition, Niger often requires that foreign organizations involved in
the country contribute directly to development projects, including some
only very peripherally related to uranium production. In part because
of the attractiveness of its uranium (including relatively low
production costs), Niger's strategy of fostering multinational
competition seems to have been effective in persuading foreign
organizations to make infrastructural investments. And while France
clearly has a dominant influence, the presence of many other groups
helps keep ultimate control of Niger's uranium in the hands of the
national government.
4.5.2 Trade Patterns
To a first approximation, the distribution of Niger's uranium
appears follow the equity participation of the various participants.
Thus of a potential production of 10,500 MTU in 1985, France might be
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entitled to about 4000 MTU, Japan to 1250 MTU and others to much smaller
totals, as indicated in Table 4.4. Under the equity allocations, the
Niger government retains the right to sell about 3900 MTU in 1985 . But
with the exception of a few reports of spot sales, Onarem is--at least
at present--apparently willing to sell its shares through its foreign
equity partners.* To the extent that it is possible to find evidence,
the principal buyer appears to be France, though Japan and other major
consumers also have made purchases. Sales by Onarem to these countries
appear to be at world market prices.
For the two producing deposits (Arlit and Akouta), indications are
that most of Onarem's share has been allocated as discussed above; for
the three deposits under development, there are no reports of
allocations of Onarem's share. This presumably preserves maximum
flexibility for the Niger government in dealing with its development
partners--including leverage for inducing additional development
investments. How future production from these deposits will be
allocated beyond equity shares is thus intrinsically uncertain. It
should be noted, however, that non-equity consumers--such as South Korea
and other developing countries--are becoming more active in the world
market. Niger will thus have more opportunities to sell directly.
Whether it will take such opportunities or simply use them to improve
its negotiating position with its equity participants cannot be
projected at this time.
*Onarem is known to have made sales to Belgium, the Netherlands,
Pakistan, and Libya, totaling only a few hundred tonnes. Concern has
arisen over the Libyan sale due to Libya's known desire to acquire
nuclear weapons, lack of safeguards, and indications that uranium was
transferred to Pakistan for use in its weapons program (believed to have
substantial Libyan support). There are also reports of direct sales of
uranium by Niger to Pakistan.
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Table 4.4
Prospective Production Capacity
(MTU)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986/1990
1,700 2,000 2,220 2,200 2,600 2,600 3,500
1,600 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
750 1,200 1,500
450 1,200 1,500
-- -- -- -- 1,000 2,000
3,500
2,000
1 ,750
1 ,750
3,000
TOTAL 3,300 4,000 4,200 4,200 5,800 8,000 10,500 12,000
Allocation By Equity Shares
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986/1990
1,460 1,760 1,870 1,870 2,460 3,040 4,030
500
130
200
130
500
140
200
140
500
140
200
140
720 1,100 1,250
170
200
170
170
200
170
220
200
220
700- -- -- - 350
1,080 1,280 1,350 1,350 2,080 2,970 3,880
4,500
1,370
220
200
220
1050
4,440
Source: Author's estimates, drawing on information from industry sources.
Arlit
(Soma i r)
Akouta
(Cominak)
Arn i
(SMTT)
Abkorum
(Azelik)
Imouraren
France
Japan
FRG
Spain
Italy
U.S.A.
Niger
400
100
160
100
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V. MAJOR CONSUMERS
There are now 18 countries (outside the Centrally Planned Economies)
operating power reactors with a total capacity of about 144 GWe. Of
this total about 79 GWe is outside the United States: 54 GWe in Europe,
15 GWe in Japan and 6 GWe in Canada. Only about 4 GWe is operating
outside of these industrialized areas. For this reason, most uranium
market activity is conducted by a few large consumers, notably the
United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, France, Spain and Italy. Moreover,
many countries with small nuclear programs still depend on reactor
vendors or fuel fabricators to provide uranium for first cores or
initial reloads. Only a few of these countries have had reactors
operating long enough to need to procure uranium for operation beyond
these first few years. For example, South Korea and Taiwan have only
recently entered the world market: Korea now has two contracts (with
Canada and Australia) and Taiwan has recently completed one with South
Africa.
The identified total contractual commitments made by consumers in
the international market through 1990 are shown in Table 5.1. These
data are derived from the survey described at the beginning of
Chapter 4. Over 320,000 MTU have been contracted. To the extent
possible, procurements through middlemen--such as Rio Tinto Zinc and
Uranex--are attributed directly to producers. There are about 10,000
MTU that appear to move through these agents over the period in question
which we have not been able to trace directly from producer to
consumer. This is not a large discrepancy. We have omitted the role of
the United States in the international market, largely because at
present there is only a weak coupling between the domestic U.S. market
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Table 5.1-
Contractual and Firm Equity Import Commitments*
1968-1990
(MTU)
Japan 120,030
France(1) 72,230
West Germany 56,530
United Kingdom (2)  20,300
Iran(3) 18,500
Spain 13,800
Italy 10, 800
Belgium (4)  2,600
South Korea 3,400
Switzerland 1,600
Austria(5 700
Sweden 700
Finland 720
TOTAL 321,910
* Commercial contracts with primary producers and explicit equity-
based supply commitments (principally Niger) are included.
Indirec+ supply arrangements through third parties and equity
participations without explicit destination specification are not
included.
(1) The figure for France is net imports; according to our estimates,
actual imports are 93,580 MTU, but 21,350 MTU are exported. The
figure also does not include France's domestic production, expected
to be about 60,000 MTU over this period.
(2) United Kingdom contracts do not include pre-1973 deliveries under
weapons-related procurements. However, at least some of the latter
would be available for power generation purposes.
(3) Iran's commitments are from Namibia and South Africa, and may be
underestimated due to the great secrecy involved. Iran appears to
be trying to resell this material to other consumers and there are
reports that material already delivered has been sold.
(4) The figure for Belgium does not include sales to that country by
France, which we estimate to be about 7000 MTU.
(5) Some of the Austrian uranium, from South Africa, has been sold (in
the United States) due to the deferral of operation of the
Tullnerfeld reactor.
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and the international market. On average, the U.S. imports about 2000
MTU annually (mostly to reactor vendors or fuel fabricators, rather than
utilities) and generally on long-term contract. Historically, U.S.
producers have exported comparable amounts, usually on a spot purchase
basis, often in connection with other U.S. nuclear activities such as
reactor sales, enrichment contracts with the U.S. government, or offset
(Germany) or preproduction (Japan) sales. In terms of forward
commitments, the United States appears to be a net importer, though this
may simply be an artifact of the difference in the nature of import and
export contracting; spot sales are not evident very far in advance.
Among the major consumers, procurement history and practices vary.
Some consumers ent red the market very early--in the late 1960s or early
1970s--for large quantities of uranium on long-term contracts. Others
have domestic reserves or preferred access to uranium in former
colonies, and thus delayed entry into the international market. And
then some countries have simply purchased uranium as needed, using a
combination of spot purchases and longer term contracts. Japan, France
and West Germany provide examples of these three modes of operation.
They also account for 77 percent of all identified international
commitments over the period 1968-1990, and a description of their
situations and behavior thus encompasses much of the activity in the
international market. Below, we examine each of these countries in
detail.
5.1 Japan
Japan's first uranium procurements were through the United States
in connection with reactor sales by General Electric and Westinghouse.
These vendors have constructed about 6.5 GWe of capacity in Japan, and
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imports to Japan from the United States for first cores and initial
reloads total about 4000 MTU, virtually all delivered prior to 1980. In
1969 Japan began independent contracting for uranium, with domestic
utilities or groups of utilities seeking uranium abroad, often with the
assistance of Japanese trading companies.
Imports from Canada and South Africa began in 1969 but
diversification did not occur until the mid-1970s. In 1974, Japan began
to receive uranium from France (through Uranex, the marketing agency of
the CEA) on a contract totalling about 9200 MTU and extending through
1985.* In 1977 imports began from Australia and, in 1978, from Niger.
Japan also receives substantial amounts of uranium from Rio Tinto Zinc
(London), from whom deliveries apparently began in 1977.**
Japan thus receives uranium from all major primary producers and
through the two major independent supply channels--RTZ and Uranex. This
supply pattern, and its behavior over time, is shown in Table 5.2.
Total commitments, through 1990 including past deliveries, are about
120,000 MTU.***
*These contracts were written prior to the halt of export
contracting by France early in 1974. In the initial years, the uranium
for Japan would have come from domestic French production or from Gabon
or Niger. In the 1980s, some of the contracted uranium could be
furnished from additional French supply sources in Namibia, South Africa
or Canada.
**Some of this uranium might come from RTZ subsidiaries in Canada and
Australia, but RTZ appears to be heavily dependent on Namibia to meet
contract obligations.
*** Japan is purchasing uranium beyond its equity share in Cominak in
Niger, reportedly 44 percent of output rather than the 25 percent equity
share assumed in Table 5.2. If this continues, Japan may receive an
additional 380 MTU/vear or 3800 MTU over the decade.
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Table 5.2
JAPAN
Contract and Equity Import Commitments
(MTU)
Aus- South Cumula-
Year tralia Canada Niger Africa U.S. France RTZ Total tive
1969 1190 100 240 1530 1530
1970 1150 100 90 1340 2870
1971 1250 100 90 1440 4310
1972 2080 100 560 2740 7050
1973 1150 500 200 1850 8900
1974 1150 200 300 1650 10,550
1975 1150 580 400 300 2430 12,980
1976 2390 1300 1000 300 4990 17,970
1977 690 2540 1150 700 900 600 6580 24,550
1978 460 2500 200 1200 500 900 950 6710 31,260
1979 740 2500 400 950 300 900 1950 7740 39,000
1980 730 1620 500 1030 900 2300 7080 46,080
1981 970 1690 500 720 900 3100 7880 53,960
1982 1500 1580 500 800 900 3100 8380 62,340
1983 1580 1900 720 740 900 3100 8940 71,280
1984 1300 3460 1100 610 900 3750 11,120 82,400
1985 1450 3540 1250 380 900 2900 10,420 92,820
1986 1160 1810 1370 1920 6260 99,080
1987 850 1730 1370 1550 5500 104,580
1988 850 1700 1370 1550 5470 110,050
1989 850 1700 1370 1150 5070 115,120
1990 850 1540 1370 1150 4910 120,030
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Of this, about 34 percent comes from Canada, Japan's largest supplier.
About 17.5 percent comes from RTZ, and of this, perhaps 11,500 MTU (or a
minimum of 9.6 percent of total uranium supply) comes from Namibia.
Some 8.6 percent comes from South Africa, 10 percent from Niger,* 7.4
percent from France, 11.6 percent from Australia and 3.6 percent from
the United States.
Two trends are evident in Table 5.2. The first is a successful
diversification in supply sources. Whereas in 1973 Japan received 90
percent of her uranium from only two sources (Canada and South Africa),
no two primary producers account for more than 40 percent in 1980. This
diversification clearly enhances Japan's energy supply security.**
The second evident trend is the declining relative importance of South
African supply. While South Africa provided up to one-third of Japan's
uranium in the mid-1970's, this share declines to 15 percent by 1980;
Japan's current contracts with South Africa decline to zero by 1986.
This shift away from dependence on South African supply may be due to a
perception of future insecurity of this supply channel or the
international political sensitivity of dealing with South Africa, or
both. The termination of Japan's dependence on France appears to be due
simply to the cessation of French export contracting. In both cases,
circumstances could change, creating new Japanese purchase
opportunities. Given prospective excesses of capacity and production,
Japan could contract for additional uranium from virtually all sources.
*The Niger figures include only Japan's equity share in production
in Niger. This is a lower bound on supplies from that country since it
is known that Japan purchases part of the Niger government's share.
**Note, in this connection, that RTZ and Uranex--with their
multiplicity of primary supply sources and ability to reallocate within
their own systems--may provide a further buffer against disruptive
events in producer countries.
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But Japan's current supply and demand situation is such that this
would not be necessary for quite some time. In Table 5.3, we show
annual consumption requirements in the past, and for two future growth
scenarios. The first scenario is based on plants operating, under
construction and on order; the second is based on the INFCE "low"
projection. Under present utility commitments, only about 20 GWe
(including a present capacity of about 14.5 GWe) would be built. The
INFCE projection envisions 45 GWe by 1990 and undoubtedly exaggerates
Japan's nuclear growth potential by that date.
Japan's uranium supply commitments have greatly exceeded actual
reactor requirements and will continue to do so over a wide range of
nuclear futures. Our calculations indicate that Japanese reactor
consumption of uranium to date has only been of order 13,000 MTU while
known delivery commitments have been nearly 39,000 MTU. By this
materials balance calculation,* current Japanese stocks--including
material currently undergoing processing for fuel and that being held
for Japan by producers and processors--may be as great as 25,000 MTU
(ten year's supply at current consumption rates). Based on present
utility commitments, this stock would grow to about 75,000 MTU by 1990,
with contracts exceeding requirements in all years. If the INFCE growth
projection were reached (which is virtually impossible), annual
requirements would begin to exceed contracts in 1987 and pre-existing
*Our calculation, as described in the appendix, computes uranium
feed requirements for reactors as they come on line. We assume an
enrichment tails array of 0.20 percent and 70 percent reactor capacity
factor. In earlier years, reactor capacity factors in Japan were
considerably below 70 percent but it is likely that significant amounts
of fuel did not reach design burnup. Our calculation thus may
overestimate consumption--and underestimate stocks--but probably not by
much.
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Table 5.3
JAPAN
Supply, Demand and Inventories
(MTU)
Historical and Present Plans INFCE Forecast
Import ;umul a-
Commit- Annual tive Require- Annual Cumulative
Year ments Reouirements Stock Stock ments Stock Stock
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1530
1340
1440
2740
1850
1650
2430
4990
6580
6710
7740
7080
7880
8380
8940
1,120
0,420
6260
5500
5470
5070
4910
190
110
290
710
1000
700
1950
2180
1050
1730
2580
2560
2760
2290
2500
2770
2770
2770
2770
2770
2770
2770
1340
1230
1150
2030
850
950
480
2810
5530
4980
5160
4520
5120
6090
6440
8350
7650
3490
2730
2700
2300
2140
1340
2570
3720
5750
6600
7550
8030
10,840
16,370
21,350
26,510
31,030
36,150
42,240
48,680
57,030
64,680
68,170
70,900
73,600
75,900
78, 040
3070
3170
3710
3880
4610
4660
5760
5950
6360
7050
7610
4010
4710
4670
5060
6510
5760
500
(450)
(890)
(1980)
(2700)
26,510
30,520
35,230
39,900
44,960
51,470
57,230
57,730
57,280
56,390
54,410
51,710
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stocks (about 57,000 MTU at the end of 1985) would begin to be run
down. But stocks -emaining at the end of 1990 would still exceed 51,000
MTU. These stocks do not include additional possible supply from
non-equity purchases in Niger or any new contracting after late 1980.
Thus, Japan's uranium supply situation is secure over at least the
next decade, with existing contracts in excess of the needs of even the
most ambitious nuclear plans. Even the loss of a major supplier could
easily be withstood (though this would cause reallocation problems for
individual utilities and a disruption of supply logistics). Contract
levels and stocks will be sufficient to allow leisure in making new
uranium procurement decisions. In addition, the prospective global
supply situation--as discussed above--is such that new procurement
opportunities will be many. Current Japanese contracts decrease rapidly
in the late 1980's, and no known contracts extend beyond 1996. But the
volume in the late 1980's is still greater than would be needed for
currently committed reactors. And the stock accumulated by 1990 would
be enough to fuel the 20 or so GWe now committed for an additional 28
years. Japan can thus wait without danger for significant new reactor
demand to materialize before committing to new uranium supplies.
The Japanese stock position is so strong that one must consider the
question of whether some of Japan's uranium might re-enter the world
market, on a sale or loan basis. While the cost of maintaining
inventories of nuclear fuel is not as high as for other energy
commodities, the carrying charges on a ten or twenty year forward
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inventory* are probably more than most utilities would bear
voluntarily. The government policy toward stocks will thus have a major
bearing on utility behavior and on the role of stocks in the world
market. Government might encourage large stocks as part of a national
energy security program or--if ways can be found to use the stocks as
part of an international scheme--for international fuel assurance
purposes. But given present trends in international uranium markets,
both these security-related concerns should decline in importance since
procurement possiblities are increasing, and real (and even nominal)
prices are declining. If the market softens greatly, Japan would be in
a good position to risk some of the higher-priced contracts it now holds
by insisting upon downward renegotiation of prices--much as producers
insisted upon upward price renegotiations in the tight market of the
late 1970's. In this sense, at least, Japanese stocks overhang the
market and may increase downward pressures on prices.
5.2 France
France's role in the uranium market is more complex, and less well
documented, than for other major consumers. Unlike Japan or Germany,
France has substantial domestic production of uranium; France also plays
*Each year of forward supply of uranium adds about 0.5
mills/kilowatt-hour to current power costs, assuming that the annual
carrying charge is 20 percent of procurement cost. If the stock is held
as enriched uranium or fabricated fuel, the effect on the overall
nuclear power cost may be double the above, or about one mill per
kilowatt-hour. A ten-year forward supply of fuel might therefore cost
utility customers five, ten, or more mills per kilowatt-hour, compared
to perhaps thirty mills (currently) for actual generation. Such a large
increase in nuclear power costs might be justified on national energy
security grounds, depending on the premium attached to the latter. It
would be difficult to justify in the more limited utility context,
especially under conditions of a buyer's market.
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a role as an exporter of uranium. France's procurement of uranium
abroad is also more firmly under centralized government control, despite
a multiplicity of organizations involved. And the dividing line between
military and civilian uranium activities is ambiguous. Analysis of
France's position in the uranium market is thus inherently difficult.
Prior to 1969, available data do not allow separation between
domestic production and uranium procured from Gabon or other
"affiliates." Annual supply through 1968 is given in the Appendix. The
known total to that date from all sources was 16,800 MTU; how much of
this was used in the French weapons program is not publicly known. Our
calculations indicate that reactor requirements prior to 1969 totalled
about 1300 MTU, so that the maximum known stock at the beginning of 1969
was about 15,500 MTU--a quantity that should be reduced by actual
weapons-related consumption. In 1969, it is possible to begin tracking
domestic production, and output from Gabon, France's sole import source
at the time. In 1971, production began in Niger, with France receiving
all output until 1976. Supplies from South Africa began in 1978 and
contract deliveries from Namibia and Canada start in 1981.
Niger is France's largest external supplier; equity participation
alone should yield France about 4500 MTU annually by 1986--slightly
exceeding expected domestic production--and France is buying at least
part of the Niger government's share of production. Current commitments
from Gabon, Namibia, South Africa and Canada are on the order of 1000
MTU annually each. The origins of France's uranium, to the extent they
may be deduced from available sources, are shown in Table 5.4. Imports
from Niger are based on equity shares in ventures there; as noted above
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Table 5.4
FRANCE
Domestic and Foreign
(MTU)
Year Domestic Gabon Niger
Supply
South
Namibia Africa Canada Total
+ Affiliates
500
400
pre-! 969
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
France
1180
1250
1250
1540
1620
1670
1740
1870
2100
2180
2600
3100
3300
3500
3600
3600
3600
4050
4050
4050
4050
4050
Cumul a-
tive
540
210
400
440
800
850
1410
1000
1000
1000
1000
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
400
870
950
1120
1300
1200
800
650
1460
1760
1870
1870
2460
3040
4030
4500
4500
4500
4500
4500
16,850
1680
1650
2190
2620
2970
3230
3840
3920
4310
4600
5830
6630
7570
8650
9730
10,840
11,830
12,750
12,750
11,980
11,980
11,980
16,850
18,530
20,180
22,370
24,990
27,960
31, 190
35,030
38,950
43,260
47,860
53,690
60,320
67,890
76,540
86,270
97,110
108,940
121,690
133,440
145,420
157,400
169,380
770
770
770
770
770
770
770
770
770
770.
0
0
0
110
460
850
1380
1380
1380
1380
1380
1380
1380
520
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
~
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this is a lower bound on supply. The evidence about the timing and quantities
involved in commitments from Namibia is mixed. Some reports suggest that
deliveries have already begun.
According to Table 5.4, which may underestimate supply, cumulative French
access to domestic and foreign uranium stands at about 54,000 MTU (including
some material used for weapons) as of the end of 1979. Annual supply in 1980
will be about 6600 MTU and forward commitments through 1990 probably approach
170,000 MTU. But not all of this uranium is available for domestic use.
Prior to 1974, France actively sold uranium in the world market through the
CEA-controlled marketing agent, Uranex. Deliveries under commitments made
before 1974 appear to have begun in 1972 and continue until about 1985. There
is evidence of about 21,000 MTU of such commitments, largely to Belgium and
Japan, though other commitments may exist. Table 5.5 shows domestic
production, and known imports and exports, allowing calculation of net annual
and cumulative domestic supply. Our estimates show a cumulative net
procurement of about 43,000 MTU by the end of 1979 and 149,000 MTU by the end
of 1990.
In Table 5.6, we compare these net supply estimates with historical and
prospective reactor requirements. At the end of 1979 stocks (from which
weapons needs should be subtracted) stood at about 29,000 MTU. Under any
reasonable growth rate, these stocks continue to grow over the next decade.
Under the present plans scenario (current utility commitments), stocks would
grow to nearly 76,000 MTU by 1990; assuming additional orders, as in the INFCE
Year Domestic Production
pre-1969 16,850
1969 1180
1970 1250
1971 1250
1972 1540
1973 1620
1974 1670
1975 1740
1976 1870
1977 2100
1978 2180
1979 2600
1980 3100
1981 3300
1982 3500
1983 3600
1984 3600
1985 3600
1986 4050
1987 4050
1988 4050
1989 4050
1990 4050
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Table 5.5
FRANCE
Net Domestic Supply
Imports Exports Net Domestic
500
400
940
1080
1350
1560
2100
2050
2210
2420
3230
3530
4270
5150
6130
7240
8230
8700
8700
7930
7930
7930
0
0
0
200
270
570
930
1250
1980
3050
2030
2030
1440
2000
2000
1800
1800
0
1680
1650
2190
2430
2700
2660
2910
2670
2330
1550
3800
4600
6130
6650
7730
9040
10,030
12,750
12,750
11,980
11,980
11 ,980
Supply Cumulative
16,850
18,530
20,180
22,370
24,800
27,500
30,160
33,070
35,740
38,070
39,620
43,420
48,020
54,150
60,800
68,530
77,570
87,600
100,350
113,100
125,080
137,060
149,040
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Table 5.6
FRANCE
Supply, Demand and Inventories
(MTU)
Historical and Present Plan INFCE Forecast
Lumul a-
Net Annual tive Require- Annual Cumulative
Year Supply Requirements Stock Stock ments Stock Stock
pre-
1969
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
16,850
1680
1650
2190
2430
2700
2660
2910
2670
2330
1550
3800
4600
6130
6650
7730
9040
10,030
12,750
12,750
11 ,980
11 ,980
1290
450
200
270
340
340
660
660
2330
2450
2880
2640
4000
4540
5790
4650
4780
5670
5840
5840
5840
5840
1230
1450
1920
2090
2360
2000
2250
340
(120)
(1330)
1160
600
1590
860
3080
4260
4360
6910
6910
6140
6140
15,560
16,790
18,240
20,160
22,250
24,610
26,610
28,860
29,200
29,080
27,750
28,910
29,510
31 ,100
31,960
35,040
39,300
43,660
50,570
57,480
63,620
69,760
4000
4540
5190
5810
5990
6500
6280
7920
7670
7810
600
1590
1460
1920
3050
3530
6470
4830
4310
4170
28,910
29,510
31,100
32,560
34,480
37,530
41,060
47,530
52,360
56,670
60,840
1990 11,980 5840 6140 75,919 8360 3620 64,460
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projection,* stocks still climb to more than 64,000 MTU. Larger stocks
are possible if France is able to purchase uranium in excess of equity
shares in Niger, as expected (as much as 20,000 MTU might be involved).
Thus, even though there may be uncertainty about early stock
accumulations because of unknown weapons demand, the rate of growth of
stocks is sufficient to overwhelm this uncertainty.
In absolute terms, anticipated French stocks are slightly greater
than those of Japan. On the other hand, France envisions greater
nuclear growth. France has 44 GWe presently planned by 1990 compared to
20 GWe for Japan; there are 86 GWe projected for France versus 45 GWe
for Japan, according to the INFCE estimate. Thus the ratio of stocks to
capacity is less than for Japan. If France builds 44 GWe by 1990,
estimated stocks at that time would fuel these reactors for perhaps ten
years. But France may be in a somewhat more vulnerable position than
Japan in its extensive dependence on supply from Niger. Over the next
decade, nearly half of France's imports come from Niger, and loss of
that supply early in the decade would narrow France's supply-demand
balance. Under the "present plans" growth scenario, stocks would be
reduced to about 40,000 MTU in 1990 (or perhaps much less, depending on
how much of past supply was used for weapons). Under the higher growth
(INFCE) scenario, stocks would be reduced to about 28,000 MTU by the end
of the decade without uranium from Niger. Thus unless there were also
great difficulties with scheduled supplies from Gabon, South
*Present plans and INFCE projections are in closer congruence for
France than for most other countries due to the official character of
nuclear power commitments.
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Africa or Canada, France's options for expanded nuclear growth do not
I
depend critically on the political stability and output performance of
Niger. The sensitivity of this connection is declining further with the
general increase in new contracting opportunities in other producer
/
countries.
5.3 West Germany
In contrast to Japan, West Germany did not enter the market early
for large quantities of uranium on long-term contracts and, in contrast
to France, Germany did not have the opportunity to establish major
equity shares in large production ventures until 1980, when it took a
share in the Ranger development. Nor does the FRG have significant
domestic resources. Perhaps because of a difference in procurement
philosophy,* Germany contracted only for relatively small quantities in
the tight market years of the late 1970.
Total identifiable commitments (including a 49 percent equity share
in Saskatchewan's Rabbit Lake deposit) from 1968 to 1990 are about
56,000 MTU. This might be compared with Japan's commitment to about
120,000 MTU over this same period. The Japanese and German nuclear
programs are very similar in current and prospective size. Of this
total commitment 39.2 percent comes from Canada (primarily the
Uranerz-Gulf joint venture at Rabbit Lake and the Amok deposit at Cluff
Lake), 21.2 percent from Australia, 14.5 percent from Namibia, 3.6
percent from Niger (based on equity shares--additional purchases
*Buying smaller quantities over shorter terms is a reasonable and
even preferable strategy under some market conditions. Except for the
panic years of the mid- to late-1970's, utilities in the United States
have generally bought in just this way.
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are possible), 14.3 percent from South Africa,* 1.1 percent from
France, and 6.2 percent from the United States. Prior to the
mid-lqO70's, Germany's uranium came primarily from Canada, South Africa
and the U.S.; and significant diversification has occurred only in the
past few years.
Over the past decade, annual imports have generally exceeded needs,
with spot purchases contributing significantly. German stocks have also
grown in each year, albeit slowly, standing now at about 7000 MTU.
About 2000 MTU of this (held as enriched uranium) resulted from the
"Offset Agreement" of 1970 with the United States. Under this agreement
the FRG agreed to purchase enrichment services from the United States
government and uranium from U.S. producers as a way to balance U.S.
expenditures for American troops stationed in Germany. Two increments
have been delivered and a third (for about 850 MTU) has recently been
negotiated. These known stocks provide a cushion for risks in
procurement strategy.
The past approach of German utilities--which was to limit purchases
to near-term needs and hold only small inventory--is now being augmented
with efforts to establish positions in the market that improve access to
supply. Uranerz, Urangesellshaft and RWE are active in exploration and
joint development ventures in a number of producer countries. Recent
commitments from Amok (Canada) and Ranger (Australia) represent a new
emphasis on long-term supply commitments that ensure substantial
stockbuilding through 1990. Under present contracts and reactor
*There is some evidence--unconfirmed--for additional quantities from
South Africa.
West Germar
Aus-
Year tralia Canada Namibia Nige
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
260
310
260
260
50
1230
1230
1220
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
300
70
70
70
360
70
70
460
460
460
1870
1600
710
1290
1480
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
300
600
900
900
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
130
140
140
170
170
220
170
220
220
220
220
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Table 5.7
n Supply Arrangements
(MTU)
South
r Africa U.S. France
30
30
30
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
1360
870
650
150
360
140
140
450
Cumul a-
Total tive
300
100
1460
100
860
570
1440
1970
1550
1960
3580
3?FO
2550
2480
3850
4000
3990
4010
3960
4010
3510
3510
3510
300
400
1860
1960
2820
3390
4830
6800
8350
10,130
13,890
17,150
19,700
22,180
26,030
30,030
34,020
38,030
41,990
46,000
49,510
53,020
56,530
__
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Table 5.8
WEST GERMANY
Supply, Demand and Inventories
(MTU)
Present Plans INFCE Forecast
Import Cumula-
Commit- Annual tive Require- Annual Cumulative
Year ments Requirements Stock Stock ments Stock Stock
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
300
100
1460
100
860
570
1440
1970
1550
1960
3580
3260
2550
2480
3850
4000
3990
4010
3960
4010
3510
3510
3510
70
580
120
120
710
590
1020
900
1190
1300
1900
1840
3280
1760
1970
2970
2680
2680
2790
2790
2790
2790
2790
230
-480
1340
-20
150
-20
420
1070
360
660
1680
1420
-730
720
1880
1030
1310
1330
1170
1330
720
720
720
230*
-250
1090
1070
1220
1200
1620
2690
3050
3710
5390
6810
6080
6800
8680
9710
11 ,020
12,350
13,520
14,850
15,570
16,290
17,010
2020
2120
2970
3590
3360
3430
4430
4630
4690
5140
5530
530
360
880
410
630
580
-470
-620
-1180
-1630
-2020
6810
7340
7700
8580
8990
9620
10,200
9730
9110
7930
6300
4280
---
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commitments, German stocks remain at four to five years times current
consumption through the decade.
Germany's greatest vulnerability is in its dependence on Canada,
simply because of the relatively large fraction of supply. However,
this vulnerability does not appear to be a great threat to the German
nuclear program. During the recent Canadian embargo, other deliveries
to Germany were adequate to meet reactor requirements without dipping
into stocks. And in the future, stocks would be adequate to make up for
a loss of Canadian supply for at least a few years. But the most
reassuring fact is that there will be very substantial opportunities to
buy more uranium, from primary producers or, perhaps, even from other
consumers. And prices are likely to be lower than in the recent past.
Given past and current market trends, it is difficult to fault Germany's
approach to uranium procurement.
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VI. THE URANIUM MARKET
6.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2 and 3, we reviewed the prospects for aggregate supply
and demand for world uranium. Based on reactor prospects and IAEA
estimates of uranium development plans it was evident that there is
likely to be a soft market in uranium for the next decade or more. The
detailed look at uranium producers in Chapter 4, and the review of the
three largest consumers in Chapter 5, reinforce this conclusion. These
country studies also provide data that can be used to construct a
disaggregated picture of how this excess supply situation may occur, and
of its implications for the market.
In this chapter, we begin with a look at trade patterns for a
selected set of producers and consumers. As will be seen, the data
cover most but not all international uranium trade; and contracts and
plans can change in the future. Still, even an approximate picture of
these trade flows will provide useful insight into the market and its
likely future evolution. Also, based on these detailed trade data, it
is possible to return to the types of forecasts shown in Section 3.4 to
add more detail as to where the points of stress (such as undesired
stock accumulation or shortage) are likely to appear. We can then
estimate how uranium prices, and market structure, are likely to respond
as the system works through an era of excess supply.
6.2 Trade Patterns
As noted at the outset, we have carried out this analysis assuming
that the linkage between the U.S. and the rest of the world uranium
market will be weak in the future, as it has been in the past. In the
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analysis below there are strong indications that this situation may
change: falling world prices, in the face of relatively high U.S.
uranium production costs, may lead to a larger entry of U.S. purchasers
into the world market. But as of the early 1980's, and for the next
decade (as reflected by contract commitments) the U.S. remains only
weakly coupled to the rest of the world.
Therefore, in looking at trade patterns, we concentrate on the
suppliers discussed in Chapter 3, Australia, Canada, South Africa,
Namibia, and Niger. As of 1980, they represent virtually all of world
uranium trade outside the U.S. and the Centrally Planned Economies.
Though new sources are being developed--in Spain, Brazil, and
elsewhere--it is unlikely that they will contribute a significant
fraction of export trade over the next decade or so. Where the consumer
sector is disaggregated, we break out the three nations discussed in
Chapter 5. To achieve a materials balance, we need to take some account
of the U.S., so it is shown as a net buyer. As noted earlier, the U.S.
tends to buy on long-term contract and sell abroad on spot. For future
years there is no indicator of spot sales, so the figures will tend to
overstate the role of the U.S. as a net importer.
Figure 6.1 shows the nation-to-nation trade patterns for 1980. It
is constructed using estimates of production plans, presently planned
reactor installations, and data on uranium contracts and firm equity
commitments. On the left-hand margin are the five largest
exporters--Canada, Namibia, Australia, South Africa, and Niger. On the
right-hand margin are the consumers--the FRG, Japan, and "other."
France--which is simultaneously a domestic producer, importer and
exporter--is shown in the middle of the diagram. Note that the figure
*<~/Ii000 MTU
.
-
.::. 
... 
.. .
Fiqure 6.1 1980 URANIUM FLOWS
Width of channel indicates quantity. Bars at left indicate production capacity (less domestic
consumption for Canada). Bars on riqht indicate reactor requirements.
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takes account of the fact that France receives the total output of
Gabon, a volume here combined with domestic production. The width of
the flow channels on the figure indicates the relative volumes of
uranium that will move from country to country during calendar year 1980.
Net inventory changes are shown on the figure. For Canada, South
Africa, and Niger, 1980 contract commitments are smaller than planned
production, so ther producers are shown as adding to inventory in that
year. (Note that the figure also indicates that in 1980 Australia is
drawing down inventories in order to meet current contract
commitments.) Similarly, for the FRG, Japan and the "other" group,
contracted supplies exceed reactor needs--resulting in a net addition to
consumer inventories. For France, any net inventory buildup is shown as
consumer's stock.
Several interesting aspects of uranium trade emerge from Figure
6.1. First, the FRG and Japan are seen to be very well diversified in
their uranium sources, whereas France depends heavily on sources from
her former African colonies (Gabon and Niger) and South Africa. Second,
France plays an important part in the overall market--because the total
volume handled is large, and because France has commerical connections
with several nations on both the supply and consumer sides. In effect,
the French network almost represents a separate submarket, though French
export commitments were made prior to 1974. Finally, a significant
fraction--about 40 percent or about 10,500 MTU--of expected total
production (including small producers not shown) will go into
inventories somewhere in the system. Of this about 6,000 MTU, under
current contracts, will show up as consumer stocks; the remaining 4500
MTU would be held by producers.
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Between 1980 and 1985, this pattern changes in several ways, as shown
in Figure 6.2. Under current contracts and equity arrangements, exports by
Canada, Niger and Australia increase greatly (though Australia's recent
sales to Japan the FRG, Finland and the U.S. do not appear in the figure),
while those of South Africa and Namibia do not. Imports by Japan, France
and West Germany increase significantly in volume while those of other
consumers do not. That is, the increase in committed exports by Canada and
Niger goes primarily to Japan and France. But French exports to other
consumers do not increase. Also notable in Figure 6.2 is the extent to
which planned production capacity exceeds export commitments for all majo"
producers save Namibia. Planned production capacity (for the five primary
producers) exceeds export commitments by a factor of about 1.6 or about
14,000 MTU. On the consumer side, import commitments exceed reactor
requirements for Japan and France and, collectively, for the "other" group;
as noted in Chapter 5, the FRG has only recently made arrangements to cover
all anticipated reactor requirements. Overall, production under present
plans would exceed present plans requirements by more than 100 percent, or
about 24,000 MTU. Under current contracts, about 14,000 MTU of this would
be added to consumer stocks.
Beyond the mid-1980's, it is not as useful to draw such flow diagrams
since uncertainties about uranium production and reactor requirements
increase. Moreover, current contracts begin to expire by the late 1980's
and the supply arrangements that will result in maps like those in Figures
6.1 and 6.2 are yet to be made. Indeed it is likely that nearer-term trade
patterns will be redrawn somewhat as the market is rebalanced: as
discussed below, changing expectations about nuclear power growth,
increasing inventories, and changing uranium market conditions will result
in a termination and revision of some contracts and the initiation of new
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contract arrangements and spot market sales. However, it is also evident
that these transactions will primarily involve reallocation; any
tightening of.the market will depend heavily on revitalization of nuclear
power growth expectations.
Thus the snapshots of Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the implications of
existing plans and contracts as best we understand them. As such, they
give an approximate picture of how world trade will evolve over the nest
few years. More importantly, however, they lead to a set of questions of
the form, "If these data are approximately correct, are these plans and
commitments likely to be carried out as these data show; and if not, how
is the market likely to adjust " In Section 6.3.2 below, we consider the
trends lying beneath these snapshots, and suggest some of our own answers
to these questions.
6.3 Market Trends
To look at trends, we essentially take snapshots of the type
presented above, and string them together to make a movie. Since the
data quickly multiply if many details are presented, the forecast is
based on a few key aggregates--planned production, likely reactor demand,
overall contract commitments, and stocks.
6.3.1 Commitments, Plans, and Stocks
Except for one brief period, the history of the international uranium
industry has been one of overcapacity and overproduction. In Figure 3.8
we considered aggregate data for production plans and reactor operation,
and drew conclusions about the potential softness of the uranium market
over the next few years. Now, based on the data developed in Chapters 4
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and 5 it is possible to consider this outlook in more detail, taking
account of the five major exporters studied in Chapter 4 (Australia,
Canada, South Africa, Namibia and Niger). As Figure 6.3 shows, exports
by these five countries were generally much below production levels
until mid-1975 when a sudden upsurge in demand* allowed producers to
sell not only their current production but also some inventory. Also
notable in Figure 6.3 is the rate at which production expanded, with
output rising by a factor of 2.7 from 1975 to 1979.
But there are now strong indications that this period of great
prosperity was but a brief moment in the experience of the industry,
unlikely to occur for at least another decade, if then. By late 1979,
export levels again fell below production, in part because of a leveling
off of demand due to lower reactor needs, and in part because production
capacity responded so vigorously to rising demand expectations and
exploding prices (discussed below). If production goes forward as
presently planned, either large inventories are going to accumulate in
the producer countries, or significant quantities of material are going
to be put on world markets, perhaps to be purchased and added to
consumer inventories.
To construct an estimate of the potential effect of these
developments on uranium markets, we consider the excess of planned
production over and above contract commitments. The totals for Canada,
*Due to several factors--including the introduction of new
enrichment contracting policies by the U.S. See T.L. Neff and H.D.
Jacoby, "Nuclear Fuel Assurance: Origins, Trends and Policy Issues,"
Cambridge, M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Report MIT-EL-79-003, 1979 and
"Supply Assurance in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle", Annual Review of Energy,
1979..
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Australia, Niger and South Africa are shown in figure 6.4.* This is
material which--if produced--will either be added to the stockpile of
these producers, or somehow offered for sale. Admittedly, this is a
mechanical forecast, assuming that plans will be realized; shortly we
will consider the forces that lend momentum to these plans or may lead
them to be changed. But still, this simple calculation indicates the
volumes are very large; by the end of the decade, cumulative new sales,
plus total inventories, would amount to about 170,000 MTU. This is
nearly eight years forward supply for (non-U.S.) reactors now built,
under construction, or ordered as of 1980.
The natural question is, how much of this material will consumers
want to buy A partial answer to this question can be had by observing
that consumers, like producers, seem to have had falsely high
expectations for nuclear power growth, and some seem to have
overcompensated for uncertainties about uranium supply. In Figure 6.5,
we show the total supply of uranium available to consumers (non-U.S.
WOCA) historically and prospectively. Total supply is the sum of
imports and domestic production.** Over the entire history of
commercial nuclear power, total supply to consumers has exceeded
requirements. Even during the tight market years of the late 1970s,
procurements exceeded reactor requirements and inventories increased.
For the future, total supply exceeds reactor requirements under the
*Namibia is assumed to accumulate no stocks since RTZ, the principal
agent involved, has contract commitments greater than any excess that
might be available from Namibia.
**Most domestic consumer production is in France, though Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Portugal and Spain will also produce significant amounts
of uranium over the next decade.
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"present plans" scenario and even exceeds the (unrealistic) INFCE
scenario until 1985 (and even then, large inventories would delay need
for new procurements until about 1990). Consumers have contracted for
more uranium than they can realistically use over the next decade.*
Reactors ordered even today cannot result in uranium demand
significantly greater than that shown in Figure 6.5; indeed it is more
likely that some of the demand shown there will disappear or be delayed,
due to reactor cancellations and delays.
The result of excess procurement is inventory. Figure 6.6 shows
annual and cumulative consumer stocks assuming current import
commitments and the "present plans" nuclear growth scenario. Today,
(non-U.S.) stocks are nearly 50,000 MTU, nearly three years forward
supply for all present reactors. By 1985, inventories would total
107,000 MTU--on average, 5 times the annual consumption rate in that
year--and by 1990 they are 145,000 MTU or 6.8 times annual consumption.
As the figure also shows, under the INFCE forecast, there would be a
need for new uranium contracts as of 1985 or so, else inventories would
be rapidly drawn down (as the figure shows). Since the INFCE forecast
is significantly above current expectations for reactor growth over this
period, there is a strong possibility that a high level of consumer
stocks would he maintained over the decade, even if no additional
uranium above existing contracts were purchased. Of course, the amount
of uranium that may be available from producers would be extremely large
in relation to any conceivable reactor need, as Figure 6.4 shows.
*Note that if our research has failed to identify all import
commitments, it simply means that this conclusion is strengthened.
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Note that these .observations concern the aggregate of all consumers;
in fact, different consumers are in very different positions with regard
to uranium procurement, as we have seen in Chapter 5. There are
uncovered requirements in Western Europe (outside France and the U.K.)
where about 20,000 MTU--in addition to current delivery
commitments--would be needed through 1990, according to present utility
plans. (The deficit under INFCE growth assumptions would be about
48,000 MTU.) In the OECD "rest of the world" group, which includes
South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and other developing countries (but excludes
Iran and South Africa), new procurements through 1990 of about 8,000 MTU
would have to be made, under present plans. (Under INFCE assumptions
this would'increase to 21,000 MTU.)*
A more detailed review of supply positions indicates that under
present plans, countries with prospective deficits might have to find at
most an additional 29,000 MTU through 1990 (including some stock
building). Where might this uranium be found? Obviously, as we have
seen, producers would easily be able to supply this quantity; indeed, it
is likely that one of several producers alone (Canada, Australia or
South Africa) could supply all the uranium needed through 1990. For the
developing countries--with their smaller individual needs--there are
many possibilities among suppliers.
*This demand is for those countries without indigenous supplies of
uranium in excess of reactor requirements. In fact, some of the LDCs
with domestic production will have sufficient excess supplies that the
present plans needs of the "other" group, taken as a whole, could be
more than covered by this production plus current contracts. Under
present plans, an overall stock of about 8000 MTU would accumulate.
Under the INFCE growth scenario, there would be a shortfall of about
6000 MTU. Given the difficulties and rising costs of nuclear power
construction in many LDCs, we suspect that these numbers--especially
those associated with the INFCE projection--overstate uranium
requirements.
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6.3.2 Prices
Prices will be a major influence on the degree to which uranium
development plans are realized, and on the level of stocks that various
entities will desire to hold. Much of the recent and planned expansion
of uranium capacity has been influenced by the rapid price rise in the
mid 1970s. The tight market conditions of this period can be seen in
Figure 6.2, which shows export commitments slightly exceeding production
for several years. The associated price jump is plotted in Figure 6.7,
in nominal and in constant 1972 dollars. Over this period, a classic
seller's market prevailed: joint ventures expanded with purchasers
taking a larger portion of the front-end capital risk, and price
provisions often were very favorable to exporters (e.g., escalating
price floor or spot market price, whichever was higher).
As of the late 1970s, the picture has changed drastically as
Figure 6.5 makes clear. Nominal prices are falling--from the mid-$40
range in 1978 to the upper $20 range now. The drop in real prices has
been striking: the real price for U308 is down to its level in early
1975, near the start of the great price upsurge.
How far can prices fall? In part this depends on how producers
react. One might expect that there will be a postponement of some
planned expansion in supply over the early 1980s (see Figures 6.2 and
6.5). Surely some projects will be delayed, if not canceled, if prices
continue to fall. On the other hand, it is evident from our review of
the major producers in Chapter 5 that there is considerable momentum
toward increased capacity and production. Major investments--economic
and political--have been made. In many cases, consumers have already
made the front-end investments in mines, mills and infrastructure--often
. NOMINAL
40
/
I
I
I,
I
/
50 55 60 65 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
SOURCE: TABLE A-32, APPENDIX
Figure 6.7
NOMINAL AND REAL URANIUM PRICES
(1972 constant dollars)
6-18
through zero-interest loans to be repaid out of production. For much of this
production, variable costs are low. For example, expenditures have already
been made for roads, mines and mills to exploit high-grade, easily mined
deposits in Saskatchewan, Australia's Northern Territory and in Niger.
Consumers who put up the capital may be entitled to half the output, subject
only to taxes and other royalties. But a host government or company may be
entitled to sell the other half, and its unit variable costs may be very
small. In South Africa, facilities for recovering uranium from the ore mined
to recover gold are already paid for, and the cost of recovering uranium may
be lower than the present value of reprocessing slimes at a later date if
they are simply dumped. There are thus economic incentives to sell such
uranium even at relatively low prices. In sum, as prices fall, the
short-term elasticity of supply may be very low.
A second major factor, of course, is the pace of reactor orders. If they
should pick up in the next 2 or 3 years--say, to levels close to that implied
by the INFCE forecast--then some of the downward price pressure may be
reduced. However, if (as is likely in our view) reactor growth continues on
a path closer to the present plans and commitments, then there will be
continuing downward pressure on prices over the next decade.
The third key factor, of course, is inventories. As we have seen, a
few consumer countries are rebuilding huge inventories--quantities that
will be very costly to hold. For example, under present procurement
schedules, Japan and France together could hold as much as 150,000 MTU
by 1990.* That will be very costly to hold. Perhaps these nations and
*Indeed, Japan and France are in danger of holding of order of 10 to
25 years forward supply for all reactors operating by the late 1980s; if
inventory costs are internalized, the increase in the cost of nuclear
power could be as much as 50-100 percent.
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their utilities will be willing to carry these stocks for a decade or
more, in the interests of fuel security and stability of long-term
planning. Such a development cannot be ruled out, for we know very
little about the stock-holding policies of these nations. Indeed
many of them may just now be realizing the magnitude of the
unexpected inventories, and may not yet have decided how to manage
them.
But there are preliminary indications that significant quantities
of these stocks will come onto the market from the consumer side and
there could develop a major pattern of sales, loans or other
agreements among consumers--with material flowing from those in
excos to those in need. As our global stock calculations show, if
efficient mechanisms of this type should develop (and there is no
reason why they should not if excess-holders are willing to part with
some of their material) then there are circumstances where growing
forward stocks could be maintained for most consumers with no further
purchases to 1990, beyond current contract commitments.
Whatever the level of this exchange of stocks among consumers, it
surely could rise to a level high enough to accommodate the purchases
required by the developing countries--under present plans, the 8000
MTU figure above. Fuel assurance for any of these countries, or all
of them, could be provided by any single large producer or consumer,
or by any combination desired. For the countries of Western Europe
that are in a deficit position regarding future needs, these needs
could also be met by consumers with large stocks, though some mixture
of consumer inventory and producer sales is more likely.
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The clear implication of our analysis is that the market for uranium
will be soft for quite some time. Producers are unlikely to make
significant new commitments for exports--at anywhere near the level of
planned capacity--for deliveries much before the end of the decade. And
when current contracts begin to expire in the late 1980's it is unlikely
that demand will exceed the level of those contracts, unless many new
reactors are ordered soon. In fact the current ordering rate is
negative, due to cancellations. The demand seen by producers over the
next decade will be higher if consumers are unable to rationalize their
stock positions, but even if they are unable to redistribute stocks,
uncovered requirements are not large on the scale of anticipated or
potential industry expansion. Moreover, even if Japan, France and other
consumers decide to carry large inventories, these stocks will overhang
the market, depressing prices. Uncertainties for producers are thus
very high and strongly biased on the downside.
All of the factors we have identified:
o producer momentum toward expansion of production and the
inability to retard this momentum,
o low variable costs and large sunk costs (often financed by
consumers),
o large producer and consumer inventories overhanging the market,
and
o a lack of new demand
imply that uranium prices in the world market are likely to decline
further--and probably significantly--over the decade. While some in the
industry believe that this is a temporary phenomenon and that prices
will rise again in a year or so, there appears to be little reason for
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this optimism. Rather, it is possible to see constant dollar prices
declining to the depressed levels of the early 1970's.
In the short run at least--for the next decade or perhaps two--the
international market situation we have described will be good for
consumers. There wil be many prospective sources of supply, allowing
the possibility of diversification, stock-building and other responses
to security of supply concerns. And prices will be relatively low. But
in the longer run, consumers may be concerned that exploration and
investment activity may be dampened so much by reduced expectations that
uranium will not be available if more nuclear plants are later deployed.
This fear appears to us to be without basis. The historical evidence is
that the uranium industry--even when in a depressed state--has
consistently over-responded to demand perceptions, with reserves and
production capacity well in excess of needs. Moreover, it has been able
to respond rapidly to changes in demand levels as Figure 6.3 shows for
the period 1975-79.* Finally, consumers have been willing to underwrite
producer risks in expanding production (e.g., with zero-interest loans
for mines and mills), thus making possible larger commitments to
capacity at an earlier date. (Indeed, one could argue that consumers
are largely responsible for the looming excess capacity in producer
countries.)
For the future, there is no reason to expect a change in industry
behavior. Resource horizons are still expanding and the uranium
industry is diversifying to other countries and geologic environments.
*Though for the brief period of 1975-79, consumers bought more than
they needed, and somewhat in excess of production, because of security
of supply concerns.
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But even more importantly, the time horizon for new demand--the time it
takes to order and build significant new reactor capacity--is comparable
to that for resource development. As we observed earlier, the industry
is well able to respond to real demand (it even appears to respond to
dreams and ambitions). But even those who doubt this view should be
reassured by other factors. First, inventories on both sides of the
market will remain high. Second, there will be considerable unused but
operable capacity whenever new demand arises. Third, production levels
at many deposits are below what is economically and technically
feasible; expansion is usually possible. Finally, consumer investment
and other involvement (as in exploration) are always possible and seem
effective in accelerating industry expansion. Countries with particular
concerns about supply and its security will probably find a welcome
reception in just about any traditional or prospective producer country
over the next decade and more.
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VII. ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of our analyses have implications for a number of issues
beyond those directly related to the international uranium market. In
this section, we identify these connections, leaving more extensive
analysis to future research.
7.1 Technological Change
The prospective long-term trends in the market identified
here--excess capacity, stock buildup and declining prices--tend to
undermine the rationale for rapid changes in nuclear technology.
Breeder reactors will have higher capital costs than LWRs, a
disadvantage that is overcome only if uranium is much higher in price or
lower in security of access than it is now. Neither condition seems
likely for some decades and the point where the breeder becomes
economically competitive will most likely be delayed further.
A similar argument applies to plutonium recycle, which would be
economically doubtful even at uranium prices above those we are likely
to see over the next decade. To the extent that lasers are of interest
to strip enrichment tails or enrich to lower tails assay, their
attractiveness may decline due to availability of lower cost natural
feed. Of course, to the extent that lasers reduce overall enrichment
costs they will be of considerable value.
Finally, there seems to be less urgency for changes in reactor
design or operation to conserve uranium, especially where there may be
reductions in overall efficiency or capacity factor, or significant
increases in costs. It should be noted, on the other hand, that uranium
is but one factor in decisions concerning these technologies, and that
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wise policy for the longer term favors the creation and maintenance of
technological options.
7.2 Fuel Assurance
As shown above, uranium supply conditions are becoming more
favorable. But securing an assured supply of nuclear fuel can still be
a complicated matter, especially for developing countries. In addition
to uranium, a consumer must arrange for conversion, enrichment and
fabrication services. As a result there are a number of opportunities
in the supply chain for breakdowns or the imposition of political or
other conditions on supply. The important question for consumers is
whether concerns about these problems can be reduced to an acceptable
level by exploiting new flexibilities in the uranium market.* This is a
question in need of further investigation, though it is evident that for
at least some countries, supply assurance is improving greatly.
7.3 Enrichment Markets and Nonproliferation
In the past there has been a strong linkage between the uranium and
enrichment markets. For many years the U.S. enjoyed an enrichment
monopoly; because of its downstream influence, the U.S. could affect the
demand for uranium (through enrichment contracting terms) and set terms
for supply (such as safeguards). In the 1970's the U.S. enrichment
monopoly yielded to the entry of the U.S.S.R., Eurodif and Urenco. At
the same time new nonproliferation concerns arose, most dramatically in
Canada in response to the Indian nuclear test.
*This question should be seen in the light of the corresponding
increase in flexibility in enrichment procurements; see [I].
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The fact that enrichment supply was becoming less a source of
potential leverage, and the active involvement of Canada in
non-proliferation actions, suggested to many in the late 1970's that
uranium supply could become the new focus of nonproliferation leverage.
On the positive side, assured supply could reward acceptance of a more
vigorous and comprehensive nonproliferation regime and encourage
countries to defer proliferation sensitive technologies. Or, the
implicit or explicit threat of withholding supply could compel
behavior. Our analysis indicates that the use of uranium supply as a
tool of persuasion will be increasingly limited at best, and
counterproductive at worst. Major consumers have strong market
positions, and most have large inventories (the exception being West
Germany); they would thus be able to withstand disruptions for the few
years that would be needed to arrange new sources of supply. Smaller
nations--notably several of the developing countries of primary
nonproliferation interest--probably have even greater flexibility than
the industrial countries because of the great number of different
arrangements that might be made for small amounts of material in today's
market.
But these observations reopen the enrichment question. Through a
combination of uranium and enrichment supply there may still be sources
of influence through the fuel cycle. It is evident that enrichment and
uranium markets are still coupled, though this linkage is declining in
importance. Efforts might be made to strengthen this linkage, or at
least retard its demise, in ways that advance fuel assurance goals, as
well as the interests of uranium producer countries. There is interest
outside the U.S. in this approach, interest strong enough to overcome
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the economic and other problems associated with an oversupply of
enrichment. Several countries (Japan, France and the U.S.) are now
engaged in discussions with Australia concerning construction of a
facility to enrich that country's uranium. Australia's interest is in
the value added and in the uranium marketing opportunities involved; the
consumer' s interest is evidently in the forging of greater security of
supply simultaneously for uranium and enrichment services. Vertical
integration of these markets with explicit consumer and producer
involvement could provide greater security. Japan is also contemplating
a domestic enrichment plant; given Japan's strong position in the
uranium market, enrichment may now be perceived as the most insecure
step in the fuel cycle.
Strengthening the connections between uranium and enrichment could
also have important nonproliferation implications. The key problem will
he in reconciling nonproliferation goals with the economic and security
concerns of producers and consumers. If efforts are made to develop
linkages that increase the potential for coercive action by producers or
others, then supply security and other interests may be undermined. But
such linkages may have positive benefits for nonproliferation,
especially if their coercive potential can be reduced or at least left
unexercised: they both draw key actors together into a sphere of common
interest and, by increasing supply security, they may help delay
proliferation-sensitive technological commitments. Thus, the carrot
approach may be better than the stick.*
21.*For an exploration of this issue in the context of U.S. policy, seer21,.
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The potential benefits for the economic interests of producers, the
energy security interests of consumers, and this particular side of
nonproliferation strategy must be weighed against the risks associated
with the wider spread of enrichment technology. This is indeed a
difficult problem and one in need of close analysis in a detailed fuel
market context.
7.4 U.S. and Foreign Markets
The domestic U.S. uranium market has long been essentially separate
from that of the rest of the world. U.S. uranium exports have usually
been of relatively small volume and generally associated with other
export trade: first cores and reloads for reactors sold by U.S. vendors
or as feed for enrichment contracts with the U.S. Similarly, U.S.
imports--historically comparable in magnitude to exports--have generally
come to reactor vendors or fuel fabricators, rather than to U.S.
utilities. Thus, U.S. involvement in the international uranium market
has been minimal and usually the result of its sales of technology and
fuel processing services.
However, this situation threatens to change. The U.S. uranium
industry faces increasingly high costs--due to the nature of the U.S.
resource base and its advanced stage of exploitation, and due to U.S.
labor, regulatory and other costs. In contrast, foreign ventures often
work with higher grade, larger and more easily exploited deposits, which
have inherently lower fixed and variable costs. Moreover, as discussed
above, many of the fixed costs associated with these ventures have been
underwritten by others or by co-produced products (such as gold in South
Africa or, prospectively, copper at Roxby Downs in Australia). Thus, at
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least some U.S. producers will be at a cost disadvantage relative to
foreign producers, who may enter the U.S. market with sales to domestic
utilities. While there may be a natural reluctance on the part of U.S.
utilities to buy abroad, even the threat of low-cost foreign competition
may restrain U.S. domestic industry investments in exploration and
development and thus threaten the long-term viability of the U.S.
uranium industry. The parallel with the earlier increase in U.S.
dependence on cheaper foreign oil at the expense of the domestic
industry is evident.
This problem is extremely difficult, involving not only domestic
energy security but also the linkages to nonproliferation, relations
with other producers, enrichment policy, and the potential for
cartelization of the international market. When U.S. producers were
threatened in the 1960's and early 1970's by excess capacity abroad, the
U.S. instituted an embargo on the enrichment of foreign uranium for
domestic use (at that time, U.S. utilities constituted most of the
market for fuel). This embargo was a source of much antipathy toward
the U.S. among other producers, especially Canada, and probably helped
create the conditions for cartelization abroad. Similar unilateral
action today would undoubtedly strain relations even further, at a time
when the U.S. needs the support of other producers in achieving its
nonproliferation goals.
U.S. producers would also like more than just protection in the home
market. With the decline in expectations for domestic nuclear growth,
some producers are looking for sales abroad. In some cases--as in the
recent UNC sale to the FRG under the Offset Agreement--they are
achieving them with government assistance. Potential trade competition
and conflict thus extends outside the U.S.
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The evident locus for protectionist measures, as in the past, is the
U.S. policy on enrichment. Virtually all U.S. consumers depend on U.S.
enrichment supply, and so too do many foreign buyers. Restrictions on
use of foreign feed, or lower prices for enrichment of uranium of
domestic origin, would benefit U.S. uranium producers and might be
justified on the grounds of maintaining diverse competitive sources of
supply for energy security and nonproliferation reasons. The
difficulties, of course, are the implicit subsidy involved--with the
U.S. having made a commitment to competitive enrichment pricing--and the
fact that other uranium producers might still see the measure as
targeted against their interests.
What foreign and domestic producers would probably prefer to do
would be to keep world uranium prices close to U.S. long-run marginal
cost. In this way all producers would have the same relative advantage
in the market, but low-cost producers would simply make more profit on
what they sold (careful calculation would be necessary to show that
pricing based on U.S. costs would yield enough return to make up for
whatever sales volume they would lose to U.S. producers). But to
implement such "orderly marketing" arrangements would involve formal or
informal cartelization and, probably, considerable government
involvement.
There are two key issues here: the potential for successful
cartelization and the effects on nonproliferation and other
international policy matters. While there is a clear congruence of
interest between producers--including the U.S.--it is questionable
whether cartelization could proceed successfully. Not only are economic
tensions between producers likely to be high, but political disparities
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may be great, especially between the U.S., Canada and Australia on the
one hand, and the African producers on the other. This disparity is
particularly large on the issue of whether strict conditions (e.g.,
full-scope safeguards or reprocessing veto rights) should be attached to
uranium supply. Nonproliferation concerns might help draw together the
U.S., Canada and Australia, but might separate these producers from
others in the market. There is also a question whether individual
producers would be able to exercise sufficient discipline over internal
industry activities to prevent price competition or implement
market-sharing arrangements. Not only are there competing private
interests involved, but there is a need to reconcile federal and
provincial (or state or territorial) interests in some countries.
Finally, foreign governments and companies (often motivated more by
security than economic concerns) are active in several producer
countries and it would be difficult to avoid potentially high foreign
policy costs in any effort to impose restraints on these interests. In
at least some countries, domestic firms, foreign participants and local
political interests would be in alliance against national attempts to
restrict freedom of action. It is difficult to see how all of these
differing interests can be reconciled in a cartel.
Finally, any effort to cartelize would be seen by consumers as a
threat to fuel assurance and would, therefore, undermine current
nonproliferation efforts. The U.S., especially, is thus at the center
of a host of conflicting interests involving nonproliferation strategy,
fuel assurances, enrichment policy and position in the world market, the
viability of the domestic uranium industry, and others. The full
exploration of these issues and the trade-offs involved are subjects for
further research and analysis.
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Table A-i
REACTOR FUEL REQUIREMENTS
Reactor Type LWR
(no recycle)
Initial Core
Natural Uranium
(MTU/GWe)
Separative Work
(MTSWU/GWe)
1
Reloads
Natural Uranium
(MTU/GWe)
Separative Work
(MTSWU/GWe)
363
243
138
111
145
119
236
310
918
57 214
1. Assumes 70% capacity factor, 0.20% tails assay where enrichment is
required.
Table A-2
FUEL CYCLE LEAD TIMES
All but HWR First Core
Enrichment
Natural Uranium
HWR
Natural Uranium
2 years
3 years
2 years
Same calendar year
1 year
1 year
(K
HWR HTR AGR
458
252
131
Reloads
CALCULATIONAL BASIS
As discussed in chapter 2, historic uranium requirements are estimated
on a reactor-by-reactor basis, computing first core and makeup needs as
required according to startup and refueling schedule. Variations in
reactor type were taken into account, though an average 70% capacity
factor is assumed (rather than using actual factors for each reactor).
Where enrichment was required, tails assay was assumed to be 0.20%.
Quantities required and lead times are summarized in Table A-1 and A-2.
Because reactors have generally not reached 70% capacity factors, these
calculations may overestimate uranium requirements somewhat, though the
premature failure of some early fuel provides a partially compensating
effect. Fuel cycle assumptions are shown in Tables A-1 and A-2. Reactor
capacities and startup dates were taken from the Nuclear News list of
August 1979, as shown in Table A-9.
For the future, two different nuclear growth scenarios are employed:
a "present plans" scenario and the INFCE "low" growth scenario. The
present plans projection is just the sum of reactors in operation, under
construction, or on order (letter of intent) as reported in the Nuclear
News utility survey of 1979 (August, 1979). In the near term this projection
appears generally optimistic, with delays in reactor completion and operation
likely. In the longer term--say toward the end of the decade--the "present
plans" scenario may understate the potential of nuclear power. The most
evident projection for this potential is the INFCE "low" scenario (higher
growth INFCE scenarios are now commonly recognized as being unrealistic, at
least over the next decade or two ). It envisions the ordering and completion
of 94 GI~e beyond reactors already ordered (as indicated by the Nuclear News
* Fuel requirements are very closely proportional to reactor capacity; fuel
requirements were thus proportioned linearly with capacity.
survey) by 1990 and 484 Gwe by 2000. We believe this expectation to be
unrealistically high, especially for the next decade, but use it to
illustrate uranium market conditions under high demand levels. The INFCE
projection is probably best thought of as an upper bound, at least until
well after 1990. The two growth scenarios are summarized in Tables
A-4 through A-8. The corresponding uranium requirements are shown in
Tables A-10 through A-12.
Table A-3
OECD/IAEA
HISTORIC NUCLEAR GROWTH PROJECTIONS
(GWe)
Year Of
* Estimates do not include Eastern Europe, USSR nor China.
S Actual capacity
Sources:
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Uranium
Production and Short-Term Demand. Paris, 1969.
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Uranium
Resources, Production and Demand. Paris. 1970, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1979.
Table A-4
PRESENT PLANS AND INFCE NON-U.S. WOCA
(MWe)
NUCLEAR GROWTH PROJECTIONS
Year INFCE Present Plans
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
82,120
96,420
105,620
121,281
136,910
156,510
178,210
200,810
224,310
249,610
274,210
301,270
328,340
355,410
384,480
414,550
446,270
477,990
516,745
542,630
574,950
78,870
98,920
114,880
135,070
146,700
158,830
164,350
166,580
168,390
169,270
171,080
171,080
172,010
172,010
172,010
172,010
172,010
172.010
172,010
172,010
172,010
Table A-5
INFCE REACTOR GROWTH PROJECTIONS 1
(MWe)
Year Europe Pacific Rest f Canada U.S. Total
(Japan) World'
1980 54,020 17,000 5,000 6,100 62,300 144,420
1981 64,720 18,000 7,000 6,700 66,300 162,720
1982 69,320 19,000 9,000 8,300 71,300 176,920
1983 78,680 21,000 12,000 9,600 78,300 199,580
1984 88,510 23,000 15,000 10,400 84,300 221,210
1985 99,510 26,000 19,000 12,000 100,300 256,810
1986 112,610 29,000 23,000 13,600 110,300 288,510
1987 125,310 33,000 28,000 14,500 123,300 324,110
1988 139,510 36,000 33,000 15,800 134,300 358,610
1989 153,310 41,000 39,000 16,300 147,300 396,910
1990 164,210 45,000 45,000 20,000 157,300 431,510
1991 175,670 49,000 54,000 22,600 165,900 467,170
1992 187,140 53,000 63,000 25,200 174,500 502,840
1993 198,610 57,000 72,000 27,800 183,100 538,510
1994 210,080 63,000 81,000 30,400 191,700 576,180
1995 221,550 70,000 90,000 33,000 200,300 614,850
1996 231,590 75,880 102,000 36,800 211,300 657,570
1997 241,630 81,760 114,000 40,600 222,300 700,290
1998 258,500 87,840 126,000 44,400 233,300 750,040
1999 262,510 93,920 138,000 48,200 244,300 786,930
2000 272,950 100,000 150,000 52,000 255,300 830,250
1 "Low"estimate OECD Redbook 1979 and INFCE Final Report, Working Group Three.
2 Does not include countries with centrally planned economies.
Table A-6
PRESENT PLANS REACTOR GROWTH PROJECTIONS 1
(MWe)
Year Europe Pacific Rest of Canada U.S. Total
(Japan) World 2
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
53,320
69,450
78,780
93,240
99,890
107,720
112,490
112,490
113,420
113,420
114,350
114,350
115,280
115,280
115,280
115,280
115,280
115,280
115,280
115,280
115,280
1Based on the util
22, No. 10.
14,490
15,020
16,630
18,190
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
20,400
4,930
7,680
11 ,670
14,060
16,080
20,380
20,380
20,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
29,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
20,980
6,130
6,770
7,800
9,580
10,330
10,330
11 ,080
12,710
13,590
14,470
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
15,350
65,870
79,000
92,685
106,470
121,550
128,640
140,050
146,840
155,960
161,530
168,390
171,630
175,360
175,360
175,360
175,360
175,360
175,360
175,360
175,360
175,360
144,740
177,920
207,560
241,540
268,250
287,470
304,400
313,420
324,350
330,800
339,470
342,710
347,370
347,370
347,370
347,370
347,370
347,370
347,370
347,370
347,370
2Does not include countries with centrally planned economies.
ity survey as reported in Nuclear News, August 1979, Volume
-- --
Table A-7a
INFCE REACTOR GROWTH
(GWe)
PROJECTION
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1995 2000
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany, FR
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Rest of World
TOTAL
.7
2.6
6.1
2.2
17.5
11.2
1.4
17.0
.5
4.9
3.8
1.9
7.4
62.3
5.0
144.5
.7
3.5
6.7
2.2
22.9
13.0
1.4
18.0
.5
5.8
3.8
1.9
9.4
66.3
7.0
163.1
.7
3.5
8.3
2.2
24.6
15.0
1.4
19.0
.5
6.7
3.8
1.9
9.4
71.9
9.0
177.9
.7
4.5
9.6
2.2
30.3
16.6
1.4
21.0
.5
7.7
3.8
1.9
9.4
78.3
12.0
199.9
.7
5.5
10.4
2.2
34.2
17.6
2.4
23.0
.5
9.8
3.8
2.8
9.4
84.3
15.0
221.6'
.7
5.5
12.0
2.2
39.0
20.2
5.4
26.0
.5
9.8
3.8
2.8
.6
9.4
100.3
19.0
257.2
.7
5.5
13.6
2.2
44.0
24.0
8.4
29.0
.5
9.8
3.8
2.8
.6
10.7
110.3
23.0
288.9
.7
5.5
14.5
.7
6.8
15.8
2.2 2.2
48.0 53.0
26.8 26.8
.6 .6
11.4
33.0
.5
.9
10.5
3.8
2.8
.6
11.4
123.3
28.0
324.5
15.9
36.0
.5
.9
11.9
3.8
2.8
.6
11.4
134.3
33.0
357.0
.5 .5
1.8
14.2
3.8
2.8
.6
12.3
147.3
39.0
397.3
1. From Nuclear News, August 1979, Volume 22, No.
2. From Uranium Resource', ProdiuCtion and Demand
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OECD-NEA/IAEA, Paris 1979.
3. Data were not included for Eastern Europe, USSR nor China.
.7
6.8
16.3
2.2
55.0
32.1
.6
20.3
41.0
.7
6.8
20.0
2.2
59.0
35.9
1.2
25.9
45.0
.7
8.1
33.0
3.2
73.0
49.1
2.2
32.0
70.0
.7
9.4
52.0
4.2
86.0
53.8
3.2
43.0
100.0
Notes:
1 .8
1.815 8
0
2.8
.6
12.3
157.3
45.0
432.8
3.6
28.0
0
2.8
.6
19.7
200.3
90.0
616.8
- 5.4
38.0
0
2.8
.6
27.6
253.3
150.0
830.5
--- ----
i
Table A-7b
PRESENT PLANS REACTOR GROWTH PROJECTION
(GWe)
1980
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany, FR
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Rest of World
TOTAL
1.6
6.1
2.2
15.5
10.3
1981
3.5
6.8
2.2
21.9
12.8
1982 1983 1984
3.5
7.8
2.2
25.4
14.3
5.5
9.6
2.2
31.9
19.4
5.5
10.3
2.2
36.2
19.7
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.4
14.5 15.0 16.6 18.2 20.4
.5
3.8
7.3
1.9
8.7
66.1
4.9
144.8
.5
6.6
7.3
2.9
10.5
79.3
7.7
178.4-
.5
9.5
7.3
2.9
11.8
93.0
11.7
207.9
.5
10.4
7.3
2.9
11.8
106.7
14.1
241.9
.5
10.4
8.4
2.9
11.8
121.8
16.1
268.6
1985 1986
5.5
10.3
2.2
42.6
19.7
3.4
20.4
.5
10.4
8.4
2.9
.4
11.8
128.9
20.4
287.8
5.5
11.1II .
2.2
43.9
20.5
-
3.4
20.4
.5
10.4
9.4
3.8
.4
11.8
140.3
20.4
304.0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1995 2000
5.5
12.7
2.2
43.9
20.5
3.4
20.4
.5
10.4
9.4
3.8
.4
11.8
147.1
21.0
313.0
5.5
13.6
2.2
43.9
20.5
5.5 5.5
14.5 15.4
2.2
43.9
20.5
3.4 3.4
20.4 20.4
.5
.9
10.4
9.4
3.8
.4
11.8
156.2
21.0
323.9
.5
.9
10.4
9.4
3.8
.4
11.8
161.8
21.0
330.4
2.2
43.9
20.5
3.4
20.4
.5
1.9
10.4
9.4
3.8
.4
11.8
168.7
21.0
339.2
.7 .7
5.5 5.5
15.4 15.4
2.2
43.9
20.5
3.4
20.4
2.2
43.9
20.5
3.4
20.4
.5 .5
2.8
10.4
9.4
3.8
.4
11.8
175.6
21.0
347.7
2.8
10.4
9.4
3.8
.4
11.8
175.6
21.0
347.7
From Nuclear News, August 1979, Volume 22, No. 10
2. From Uranium Resources, Production and Demand , OECD-NEA/ IAEA, Paris 1979.
3. Data were not included for Eastern Europe, USSR nor China.
Notes: 1
1 QAO 191 1982 983 198
~
--
~~~
Table A-8
REST OF WORLD PRESENT PLANS NUCLEAR GROWTH ESTIMATES
1(GWe)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1995 2000
Argentina .34 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94
Brazil .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Egypt - - - - - - - .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62
India 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Iran 1.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Korea .56 .56 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Mexico - - .65 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Philippines - - .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62 .62
South Africa - - .92 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Taiwan 1.2 2.2 3.1 3.1 4.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
TOTAL 4.9 7.7 11.7 14.1 16.1 20.4 20.4 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
INFCE Total 5.0 7.0 9.0 12.0 15.0 19.0 23.0 28.0 33.0 39.0 45.0 90.0 150.0
1. From Nuclear News, August 1979, Volume 22, No. 10.
a,
Table A-9
HISTORIC 1 NUCLEAR CAPACITY GROWTH2 (GWe)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Dennark
Finland
France
Germany, FR
Creece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
lNetherlands
New Zealand
Ncrway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Rest of World
2
TOTAL
Notes: 1. Fr
2. Da
1.7
.2 .2 .2 1.3 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
.04 .1 .1
1.7 1.7 1.7
4.0 4.8 5.5
.4 1.5
4.6 10.1
7.3 9.1
.3 .6 .6
.2
.6 1.4 1.4
7.6 11.2 14.5
.1 .1 .1 .1 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
.2 .2 .6 1.1 1.1
.5 .5
.4 .4 .4 1.0 1.0
.2 .4 .4 .4
.2
.2 .4 .4 .4 .9 1.9 2.0 2.6, 4.7
om Nuclear News, August 1979, Volume 22, No. 10.
ta were not included for Eastern Europe, USSR, nor China.
.2 4.2
1.9 6.4
.4 .4
5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 6.8 8.1 8.1 8.1
14.6 19.4 29.2 36.3 40.3 46.4 49.3 55.2
.5 .7 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.2 3.0
6.3 7.3 9.4 12.6 15.7 21.4 32.1 38.2 50.9 63.6 72.7 86.0 97.3 120.0
Table A-10
TOTAL NON-U.S. WOCA ANNUAL URANIUM REQUIREMENTS
PRESENT PLANS AND INFCE NUCLEAR GROWTH PROJECTIONS
(MTU)
Year Present Plans INFCE Low
1980 17,320 15,920
1981 17,550 19,990
1982 20,320 21,490
1983 20,340 24,730
1984 20,470 27,560
1985 22,900 28,940
1986 22,560 22,140
1987 23,170 36,230
1988 22,940 40,030
1989 23,380 43,300
1990 23,280 46,650
1991 23,620 50,490
1992 23,410 54,190
1993 23,440 57,870
1994 23,540 61,660
1995 23,540 65,580
1996 23,540 69,540
1997 23,540 73,520
1998 23,540 79,820
1999 23,540 83,350
2000 23,540 92,040
Table A-11
INFCE URANIUM REQUIREMENTS1
(MTU)
Year Europe Pacific Rest of Canada U.S. Total
(Japan) World2
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
10,390
12,780
13,890
16,380
17,720
18,390
20,31 0
22,130
23,670
25,360
26,900
28,370
29,840
30,540
32,010
33,480
34,710
35,940
37,910
38,710
41,630
3,070
3,170
3,710
3,880
4,610
4,660
5,760
5,950
6,360
7,050
7,610
8,450
9,140
9,680
10,470
11 ,380
12,170
12,960
14,080
14,870
16,500
1,550
2,130
2,670
3,100
3,860
4,270
5,380
5,900
7,740
8,570
9,380
10,610
11 ,830
13,790
15,020
16,240
17,740
19,240
21,170
22,660
25,820
910
910
1 ,220
1 ,370
1 ,370
1 ,620
1 ,690
2,260
2,260
2,320
2,760
3,060
3,375
3,860
4,170
4,480
4,930
5,380
6,660
7,110
8,090
11,100
11,290
15,610
14,390
16,310
17,790
19,900
20,610
21,610
23,410
24,790
25,980
27,150
29,220
30,420
31,590
33,120
34,630
36,150
37,660
40,700
27,020
31,280
37,100
39,120
43,870
46,730
53,040
56,840
61 ,040
66,710
71,440
76,470
81,340
87,090
92,080
97,170
102,660
108,150
115,970
121,010
132,740
1 INFCE Working Group 1 on Availability of Nuclear Fuel and Heavy Water.
Final Report. Draft. Vienna, Austria. June 11, 1979.
2Does not include countries with centrally planned economies.
Table A-12
PRESENT PLANS URANIUM REQUIREMENTS1
(MTU)
Year Europe Pacific Rest of Canada U.S. Total
(Japan) World2
1980 12,280 2,560 1,480 990 13,400 30,720
1981 12,140 2,760 1,720 920 15,680 33,280
1982 14,060 2,290 3,040 930 14,680 35,000
1983 14,780 2,510 1,810 1,250 18,160 38,500
1984 13,920 2,770 2,310 1,470 18,550 39,020
1985 16,090 2,770 2,680 1,360 20,380 43,280
1986 15,660 2,770 2,680 1,450 20,660 43,220
1987 16,000 2,770 2,760 1,640 22,070 45,240
1988 15,790 2,770 2,760 1,620 22,010 44,950
1989 16,130 2,770 2,760 1,730 22,970 46,350
1990 15,920 2,770 2,760 1,830 22,550 45,830
1991 16,260 2,770 2,760 1 ,830 23,450 47,070
1992 16,050 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,520 46,930
1993 16,050 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,490 46,930
1994 16,170 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,680 47,220
1995 16,170 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,680 47,220
1996 16,170 2,770 2,760 1l,830 23,680 47,220
1997 16,170 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,680 47,220
1998 16,170 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,680 47,220
1999 16,170 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,680 47,220
2000 16,170 2,770 2,760 1,830 23,680 47,220
1INFCE groupings.
2Does not incude countries with centrally planned economies.
Table A-13
HISTORICAL RESERVE AND RESOURCE ESTIMATES (1 )
1967 1970
R.A. E.A. R.A. E.A.
1973
R.A. E.A.
1975
R.A. E.A.
9
11
243
-
15
24
80
1977
R.A. E.A.
1980
R.A. E.A.
28 50
0 0
18
24
289
7
292
8
2 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
3 10
1
154
100
223
131
178
100
Central African Empire
177
131
8 8
185
122
190
219
144
22
8 8
9 18
0
324
95
8 8
100
0
167 392
15 264
8 8
0 0
0 5
0 0
215 369
19 358
Denmark
(Greenland)
6 10
6 10
1 0
2 0
35 19 37
7 12 20
24 39
20 16
10 5 20 5 20 5
5 - 5 - 5
Note: The first row of entries for each
resources while the second is for
country is for the lower cost category of
the higher. See text discussion, Chapter
reserves and
COUNTRY
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Finland
France
Gabon 3 3
Table 13-A (con't.)
1967
R.A. E.A.
1970
R.A. E.A.
1973
R.A. E.A.
1975
R.A. E.A.
1977
R.A. E.A.
1980
R.A. E.A.
1 1
1 3
2 1
2 -
4 -
3 1
1 26 23
1 1
0 0
2 -
10 20
10
Philippines
South Africa
7 6
12
202
62
186
90
COUNTRY
Germany
India
Italy
Japan
Korea
2 1
Madagascar
Mexico
Namibia
Niger
0 0
3 0
0 0
0 2
0 0
3 0
0 0
0 2
Portugal
Somalia
7 5
9
160
0
117
16
162
0
158
50
154
50
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
7 1
2 0
0 0
6 3
306
42
246
145
Table 13-A (con't.)
1967 1970
R.A. E.A. R.A. E.A.
38 269
1973
R.A. E.A.
270
1975
R.A. E.A.
COUNTRY
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
1977
R.A. E.A.
1 3
300 0
1980
R.A. E.A.
1
299
United Kingdom
United States
Yugoslavia
Zaire
TOTALS
139
77
250
154
535 540
192
108
390
231
643 669
259 538
141 231
6 10
2 2
867
2 4
320 500
134 312
4 -
2 15
2 2
0 0
0 7
523 838
120 215
917 1,085 1,005 1,649 1,511 1,843 1,538
529 417 579 459 682 619 731 683 545 586 730 964
1,064 957 1,222 1,128 1,549 1,536 1,816 1,688 2,194 2,097 2,573 2,502
Sources:
OECD Nuclear
OECD Nuclear
Paris, 1969.
OECD Nuclear
Paris, 1970,
Energy Agency and the I
Energy Agency and the I
Energy Agency and the I
1973, 1976, 1977, 1979.
nternational
nternational
Atomic Energy Agency.
Atomic Energy Agency.
Uranium Resources. Paris, 1967.
Uranium Production and Short-Term Demand.
nternational Atomic Energy Agency. Uranium Resources, Production and Demand.
40 300
- 7
1
269
0 0
0 8
531
177
777
381
0
Table A-14
WORLD URANIUM PRODUCTION
(MTU)
YEAR U.S. Canada Niger France( 1 ) Gabon S. Africa Namibia Belgi2) Australia Others (3) Total Cumulative
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
i66
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
200
365
420
690
770
1,500
2,700
3,100
6,200n
7,567
10,766
13,381
14,457
14,226
13,150
11,304
10,689
8,151
7,536
8,228
9,300
8,900
9,900
9,470
9,900
10,200
8,900
8,900
9,800
11,460
14,400
14,800
100
100
200
200
430
800
970
970
1,730
5,075
10,305
12,227
9,786
7,382
6,459
6,459
5,614
3,384
2,999
2,845
3,014
3,430
3,530
3,830
4,000
3,710
3,420
3,510
4,850
5,790
6,600
7,000
75
100
100
100
100
100
180
200
369
807
896
1 ,038
1,450
1 523
1,584
1,580
1,611
1,622
1,692
1,720
1,180
1,250
1,250
1,545
1,616
1,673
1,742
1,871
2,097
2,183
2,180
500
400
540
210
402
436
800
850
,408
,000
,000
100
780
1,290
2,153
3,445
4,383
4,806
4,960
4,922
4,206
3,876
3,460
3,422
2,261
2,522
2,476
3,050
3,080
3,167
3,220
3,197
2,735
2,711
2,488
2,758
3,360
3,960
5,200
650
2,340
2,700
3,690
1,300
1,400
2,040
1,600
1,070
970
970
970
1,000
1,200
1,822
1,784
915
123
100
180
220
321
466
859
934
,197
,047
917
282
260
260
260
260
254
254
0
0
0
0
0
360
360
516
600
250
110
194
168
162
215
334
348
413
472
712
______________ a I _______________ . -
1,600
1,940
2,760
2,590
2,470
4,150
6,130
7,553
12,795
18,915
28,972
34,107
32,052
28,584
26,055
23,724
21,587
15,667
14,939
15,501
17,344
17,594
18,611
18,934
19,887
19,773
18,472
19,080
22,947
28,837
34,031
38,482
1,600
3,540
6,300
8,890
11,360
15,510
21,640
29,193
41,988
60,903
89,875
123,982
156,034
184,618
210,673
234,397
255,984
271,661
286,600
302,101
319,445
337,039
355,650
374,584
394,471
414,244
432,716
451,796
474,743
503,580
537,611
576,.093
(1) Before 1969 French production includes that from Gabon and other "affiliates."
(2) The Belgian Congo is now Zaire.
(3) Other includes: Argentina, Japan, West Germany, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Brazil.
HISTORICAL
430
867
948
1,117
1,306
1,460
1,609
2,200
3,300
I
SOURCES FOR TABLE A-14
Data through 1956 are from U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper
820, 1973.
Data through 1957-1976 are from Uranium Resources, Production and
Demand, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic
Energy Agency, Paris, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1979.
Data from 1977-1979 are taken from The Balance of Supply and Demand
1978-1990, Supply and Demand Committee of the Uranium Institute,
Mining Journal Books Ltd., London, 1979; and International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, Working Group 1 on Availability
of Nuclear Fuel and Heavy Water, Final Report, Draft, Vienna,
Austria, June 11, 1979.
Table A-15
HISTORIC URANIUM PRODUCTION AND REACTOR REQUIREMENTS
NON-U.S. WOCA
(MTU)
Uranium Production
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Uranium Requirements
1 ,400
1,575
2,340
1,900
1,700
2,650
3,430
4,453
6,595
11,348
18,206
20,726
17,595
14,358
12,905
12,420
10,898
7,516
7,403
7,273
8,044
8,694
8,711
9,464
9,987
9,573
9,572
10,180
13,147
17,377
19,631
23,682
Year
90
0
90
40
40
50
320
90
320
990
460
620
1,590
1,210
970
1,880
3,060
1,470
2,570
4,280
4,900
5,800
6,460
10,250
10,750
14,590
14,740
--
Table A-.16
HISTORIC U.S. URANIUM PRODUCTION AND REACTOR REQUIREMENTS
(MTU)
Uranium Production Uraniunl Requirements
1919
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
200
365
420
690
770
1,500
2,700
3,100
6,200
7,567
10,766
13,381
14,457
14,226
13,150
11,304
10,689
8,151
7,536
8,228
9,300
8,900
9,900
9,470
9,900
10,200
8,900
8,900
9,800
11,460
14,400
14,800
70
60
120
50
50
100
420
100
470
690
1,110
1,360
740
2,630
4,810
3,910
3,440
5,580
5,390
6,690
9,610
10,890
11,900
Table A-17
ATTAINABLE PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
(MTU)
Year Australia Canada France S. Africa Namibia Niger Other U.S. Gabon Total
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
600
600
2,300
3,800
5,000
6,500
12,000
13,600
15,200
16,800
18,400
20,000
6,900
7,200
9,000
9,900
11,000
13,500
14,400
14,500
14,500
14,700
15,400
15,500
2,950
3,450
3,650
3,870
4,020
4,020
4,020
4,520
4,520
4,520
4,520
4,520
5,240
6,500
7,300
8,600
9,900
10,400
10,600
10,700
10,700
10,600
10,600
10,400
3,700
4,100
4,400
4,550
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
3,300
4,300
4,500
4,500
5,400
8,000
10,500
12,000
12,000
12,000
12,000
12,000
1,170
2,020
2,810
4,210
5,070
5,320
5,870
5,870
5,940
6,000
6,070
6,130
16,300
20,900
24,300
27,100
30,900
33,000
34,100
35,000
38,400
40,800
42,600
44,200
,000
,000
,000
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
41,160
50,070
59,260
68,030
77,790
87,240
97,990
102,690
107,760
111,920
116,090
119,250
Source: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Uranium Resources, Production and Demand, Paris, 1979.
Table A-18
PLANNED PRODUCTION CAPACITY
(MTU)
Year Australia Canada* France Gabon Niger S. Africa Namibia Other Total
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
600
2,300
3,800
3,800
3,800
4,700
5,500
5,500
5,500
5,500
4,700
6,210
8,080
8,970
9,750
12,030
13,040
13,050
12,860
13,080
13,670
13,670
3,100
3,300
3,500
3,600
3,600
3,600
4,050
4,050
4,050
4,050
4,050
1,000
1,000
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,300
4,300
4,500
4,500
5,400
8,000
10,500
12,000
12,000
12,000
12,000
12,000
5,780
6,370
6,900
7,500
7,870
7,700
7,530
7,510
7,430
7,370
7,230
4,080
4,400
4,550
5,020
5,020
5,020
5,020
5,020
5,020
5,020
5,020
740
970
1,380
1,990
1,780
1,850
1,650
1,060
1,730
1,330
1,580
25,810
30,920
34,900
38,360
43,400
47,710
50,100
49,300
50,110
50,240
49,550
* This represents Canadian production available for export -- production minus domestic requirements.
Source: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Uranium Resources, Production and Demand, Paris, 1979.
WS
Table A-19
NON-U.S. WOCA URANIUM PRODUCTION AND REACTOR REQUIREMENTS1
(MTU)
Year Present Plans INFCE Low Planned Attainable
Uranium Uranium Uranium Uranium
Requirements Requirements Production Production
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
970
1,880
3,060
1,470
2,570
4,280
4,900
5,800
6,460
10,250
10,750
14,590
14,740
17,320
17,550
20,320
20,340
20,470
22,900
22,560
23,170
22,940
23,380
23,280
15,920
19,990
21,490
24,730
27,560
28,940
33,140
36,230
40,030
43,300
46,650
7,273
8,044
8,694
8,711
9,464
9,987
9,573
9,572
10,180
13,147
17,377
19,631
23,682
25,810
30,920
34,900
38,360
43,400
47,710
50,100
49,300
50,110
50,240
49,550
29,170
34,960
40,930
46,890
54,240
63,890
67,690
69,360
71,120
73,490
75,050
1 Does not include enrichment plant feed in excess of actual reactor requirements.
Table A-20
AUSTRALIAN EXPORT COMMITMENTS
(MTU)
DESTINATION
SOUTH .
FRG JAPAN U.S. KOREA FINLAND
- 80
- 80
190 80
190 80
190 80
190 80
190 80
190 80
190 80
190 -
190 -
190 -
TOTAL
I I
1150
950
1180
1170
1280
3000
3270
2980
3100
2810
2500
2500
2500
2420
2230
2230
2040
2040
2040
2040
PRODUCTION
AND PLANNED
CAPACITY
360
520
600
600
2300
3800
3800
3800
4700
5500
5500
5500
5500
4700
YEAR
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
200
180
180
180
180
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
260
310
260
260
50
1230
1230
1220
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
1190
690
460
740
730
970
1500
1580
1300
1450
1160
850
850
850
850
850
850
850
850
850
850
POTENTIAL
CAPACITY
600
2300
3800
5000
6500
12000
13600
15200
16800
18400
20000
Table A-21
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL EXPORT COMMITMENTS1
(MTU)
YEAR DESTINATION 2
Japan U.K. U.S. France Spain FRG Italy Other TOTAL
1967 - - 30 - - - - - 30
1968 - - 30 - - 300 - - 330
1969 1190 - 30 - - 70 - - 1290
1970 1150 - 30 - - 70 - - 1250
1971 1250 - - - - 70 - - 1320
1972 2080 - - - - 360 - - 2440
1973 1150 960 - - - 70 - - 2180
1974 1150 960 - - 850 70 - - 3030
1975 1150 960 580 - 1810 460 - 690 5650
1976 2390 960 190 - 1420 460 320 230 5970
1977 2540 960 90 - 1420 460 320 350 6140
1978 2500 960 200 - 1010 1870 300 270 7110
1979 2500 960 290 - 650 1600 310 400 6710
1980 1620 960 170 - 270 710 310 160 4200
1981 1690 - 820 520 270 1280 310 730 5620
1982 1580 770 960 750 270 1480 310 650 6770
1983 1900 770 1220 750 190 1600 310 320 7060
1984 3460 770 1220 750 190 1600 310 240 8540
1985 3540 770 1070 750 190 1600 310 240 8470
1986 1810 770 1070 750 - 1600 - 160 6160
1987 1730 770 1070 750 - 1600 - 160 6080
1988 1700 770 1070 750 - 1600 - 160 6050
1989 1700 770 1070 750 - 1600 - 160 6050
1990 1540 770 1070 750 - 1600 - 160 5890
1991 1540 770 40 - - 850 - - 3200
1992 1540 390 40 - - 850 - - 2820
1993 1540 390 40 - - 850 - - 2820
1994 - 390 40 - - 850 - - 1280
1995 - 390 40 - - 850 - - 1280
1996 - - 40 - - - - - 40
1997 - - 40 - - - - - 40
1998 - - 40 - - - - - 40
1999 - - 40 - - - - - 40
Both contracts and equity commitments are included; the latter are involved
in supply to France, Italy and the FRG.
2
"Other" includes Belgium, Finland, South Korea, Sweden and Switzerland.
Table A-22
CANADIAN EXPORTS COMPARED WITH PRODUCTION
(MTU)
Year Domestic Exports Production Excess or
Requirements and Planned (Deficit)
Capacity
I J/
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Source:
Urani um
z
180
190
100
150
240
310
520
410
410
570
660
810
990
920
930
1250
1470
1360
1450
1640
1620
1730
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
JU
330
1290
1250
1320
2440
2180
3030
5650
5970
6140
7110
6710
4200
5620
6770
7060
8540
8470
6160
6080
6050
6050
5890
3200
2820
2820
1280
1280
zb4b
3014
3430
3530
3830
4000
3710
3420
3510
4850
5790
6600
7000
7200
9000
9900
11000
13500
14400
14500
14500
14700
15400
15500
15500
15500
15400
15400
15400
zdIU
2500
1950
2180
2360
1320
1220
(130)
(2550)
(1530)
(920)
(1170)
(520)
2010
2460
2200
2690
3490
4570
6890
6780
7030
7620
7780
10470
10850
10750
12290
12290
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Resources, Production and Demand. Paris, 1979.
Table A-23
IDENTIFIABLE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORT COMMITMENTS
Year Destination
Japan U.S. FRG Switz- France Taiwan Other Iran Total
erland
- 30
500 30
- 500
500 500
130 500
190 500
380 500
480 500
480 500
380 500
380 500
380 500
380 500
380 500
380 500
- 500
100
100
100
100
500
580
1300
1150
1200
950
1030
720
800
740
610
380
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
190 -
40 -
70 300
140 750
50 750
140 750
120 900
120 1080
120 1080
210 1080
210 1080
210 770
170 770
170 770
170 770
170 770
170 770
- 770
1 Other includes Austria and Belgium.
of Iranian contracts uncertain.
70 -
70 -
70 -
70 -
320 -
200 770
300 770
140 770
100 770
100 770
- 770
- 770
- 770
- 770
- 770
190
300
400
500
500
500
500
500
130
130
630
600
1570
700
1530
2290
2820
4040
3700
3710
3490
3570
3780
3850
3340
2250
2210
1440
1440
1440
940
770
2 Current status
Table A-24
SOUTR AFRICAN EXPORTS COMPARED WITH PRODUCTION
(MTU)
Year Export Commitments Production and Potential
Planned Production
Capacity Capacity
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
130
130
630
600
1570
700
1530
2290
2820
4040
3700
3710
3490
3570
3780
3850
3340
2250
2210
1440
1440
1440
940
770
3080
3167
3220
3197
2735
2711
2488
2758
3360
3960
5200
5780
6370
6900
7500
7870
7700
7530
7510
7430
7370
7230
6500
7300
8600
9900
10400
10600
10700
10700
10600
10600
10400
Table A-25
JAPAN
NUCLEAR CAPACITY AND URANIUM REQUIREMENTS
(MWe and MTU)
Reactors on Line or Ordered INFCE Projection
Year Capacity U Requirements Capacity U Requirements
(MWe) Annual Cumulative (MWe) Annual Cumulative
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1 79
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
0
0
0
0
0
150
150
150
150
810
1,250
1 ,720
1,720
3,690
5,000
7,070
7,610
11 ,180
14,490
14,490
15,020
16,630
18,190
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
20,040
0
0
70
0
0
20
260
180
190
110
890
710
990
700
1 ,950
2,180
1 ,050
1 ,730
2,580
2,560
2,760
2,290
2,510
1 ,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2, 770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
2,770
0
0
70
70
70
90
350
530
720
830
1 ,720
2,430
3,420
4,120
6,070
8,250
9,300
11 ,030
13,610
16,170
18,930
21,220
23,730
26,500
29,270
32,040
34,810
37,580
40,350
43,120
45,890
48,660
51,430
54,200
56,970
59,740
62,510
65,280
68,050
70,820
15,000
17,000
18,000
1 9,000
21,000
23,000
26,000
29,000
33,000
36,000
41 ,000
45,000
50,000
55,000
60,000
65,000
70,000
76,000
82,000
88,000
94,000
100,000
2,430
3,070
3,170
3,710
3,880
4,610
4,660
5,760
5,950
6,360
7,050
7,610
8,450
9,140
9,680
10,470
11, 380
12,170
12,960
14,080
14,870
16,500
11 ,030
13,460
16,530
19,700
23,410
27,290
31,900
36,560
42,320
48,270
54,630
61,680
69,290
77,740
86,880
96,560
107,030
118,410
130,580
143,540
157,620
172,490
188,990
--- --
Table A-26
FRANCE
NUCLEAR CAPACITY AND URANIUM REQUIREMENTS
(MWe and MTU)
Reactors on Line or Ordered INFCE Projection
Year Capacity U Requirements Capacity U Requirements
(MWe) Annual Cumulative (MWe) Annual Cumulative
1956
1957
1658
1959
1960
,961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
0
0
0
40
80
80
80
80
80
280
280
1,060
1 ,060
1 ,520
1,520
2,030
2,570
2,800
2,800
2,800
4,090
3,690
4,580
10,060
15,540
21,860
25,450
31,900
36,230
42,640
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
43,910
20
20
0
10
10
10
110
10
310
40
250
140
380
450
200
270
340
340
660
660
2,330
2,450
2,880
2,640
4,000
4,540
5,790
4,650
4,780
5,670
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
5,840
20
40
40
50
60
70
180
190
500
540
790
930
1 ,310
1 ,760
1, 960
2,230
2,570
2,910
3,570
4,230
6,560
9,010
11,890
14,530
18,530
23,070
28,860
33,510
38,290
43,960
49,800
55,640
61,480
67,320
73,160
79,000
84,840
90,680
96,520
102,360
108,200
114,040
119,880
125,720
131,560
1 2,000
1 7,500
22,900
24,600
30,300
34,200
39,000
44,000
48,000
53,000
55,000
59,000
61,800
64,600
67,400
70,200
73,000
75,600
78,200
80,800
83,400
86,000
2,260
4,000
4,540
5,190
5,810
5,990
6,500
6,280
7,920
7,670
7,810
8,360
8,630
8,910
9,040
9,320
9,590
9,810
10,030
9,670
9,890
10,110
11,890
14,150
18,150
22,690
27,880
33,690
39,680
46,180
52,460
60,380
68,050
75,860
84,220
92,850
101 ,760
110,800
120,120
129,710
139,520
149,550
159,200
169,110
179,220
Table A-27
WEST GERMANY
NUCLEAR CAPACITY AND URANIUM REQUIREMENTS
(MWe and MTU)
Reactors on Line or Ordered INFCE Projection
(MWe) Annual Cumulative (MWe) Annual CumulativeYear.. Caact.Rqurmet..Caait. Rqurmet
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
0
50
50
50
50
50
287
542
870
870
870
2,140
2,140
2,140
3,280
4,090
6,100
7,330
9,060
10,320
12,770
14,320
19,430
19,720
19,720
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530n
20,530
20,530
20,530
20,530
0
10
10
90
100
120
40
70
580
120
120
710
590
1 ,020
900
1,190
1,300
1,900
1,840
3,280
1 ,760
1 ,970
2,970
2,680
2,680
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
2,790
0
10
20
110
210
330
370
440
1,020
1 ,140
1 ,260
1 ,970
2,560
3,580
4,480
5,670
6,970
8,870
10,710
13,990
15,750
17,720
20,690
23,370
26,050
28,840
31,630
34,420
37,210
40,000
42,790
45,580
48,370
51,160
53,950
56,740
59,530
62,320
65,110
67,900
9,600
11 , 200
13,000
15,000
16,600
17,600
20,200
24,000
26,800
28,800
32,100
35,900
38,540
41,180
43,820
46,460
49,100
50,040
50,980
51,920
52,860
53,800
L
2,050
2,020
2,120
2,970
3,590
3,360
3,430
4,430
4,630
4,690
5,140
5,530
5,840
6,140
6,480
6,780
7,090
7,400
7,720
7,200
7,520
7,840
8,870
10,920
1 2,940
15,060
18,030
21,620
24,980
28,410
32,840
37,470
42,160
47,300
52,830
58,670
64,810
71,290
78,070
85,160
92,560
100,280
107,480
115,000
122,840
Table A-28
IDENTIFIABLE PRIMARY EXPORTER COMMITMENTS
(MTU)
YEAR EXPORTS PRODUCTION
Canada Namibia Niger South
Africa
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
- 30
- 330
- 1,290
- 1,250
- 1,320
- 2,440
- 2,180
- 3,030
- 5,650
- 5,970
1,150 6,140
950 7,110
1,180 6,710
1,170 4,200
1,280 5,620
3,000 6,770
3,270 7,060
2,980 8,540
3,100 8,470
2,810 6,160
2,500 6,080
2,500 6,050
2,500 6,050
2,420 5,890
- 400
- 870
- 950
- 1,120
- 1,300
650 1,450
2,340 1,350
2,670 1,290
3,110 2,520
3,760 3,090
4,370 3,290
4,680 3,290
4,980 4,200
4,960 5,240
4,970 6,500
4,870 7,090
5,110 7,090
5,110 6,510
5,110 6,510
5,110 6,510
Australia Actual or Attainable
Planned
1 30
130
630
600
1 ,570
700
1 ,530
2,290
2,820
4,040
3,700
3,710
3,490
3,570
3,780
3,850
3,340
2,250
2,210
1,440
1,440
1 ,440
Total
30
330
1 ,420
1,380
2,350
3,910
4,700
4,850
8,480
10,360
13,800
16,060
17,220
15,930
18,050
21,310
23,290
25,570
26,380
23,180
22,990
21,610
21,610
21,370
5,579
6,147
6,572
6,849
7,330
7,819
7,087
6,727
6,890
9,664
12,885
15,313
18,982
20,960
25,660
28,720
31,460
36,711
40,950
43,090
42,880
43,020
43,560
42,610
21,110
27,860
30,050
34,690
41,570
50,780
53,990
55,400
57,120
59,250
60,710
#1 
-
1 I
Table A-29
ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE PRODUCER INVENTORIES --
CURRENT EXPORT COMMITMENTS AND PRODUCTION PLANS
Year Australia Canada Ni ger South Africa Total
Annual Cumu- Annual Cumu- Annual Cumu- Annual Cumu- Annual Cumu-
lative lative lative lative lative
1969 250 50 1,950 1,950 2,950 2,950 5,T50 5,150
1970 250 500 2,180 4,130 3,140 6,090 5,570 10,720
1971 0 500 2,360 6,490 2,590 8,680 4,950 15,670
1972 0 500 1,320 7,810 2,600 11,280 3,920 19,590
1973 0 500 1,220 9,030 1,160 12,440 2,380 21,970
1974 0 500 (130) 8,900 2,010 14,450 1,880 23,850
1975 0 500 (2,550) 6,350 960 15,410 (1,590) 22,260
1976 360 860 (1,530) 4,820 470 15,880 (700) 21,560
1977 (790) 70 (920) 3,900 260 260 540 16,420 (910) 20,650
1978 (430) (360) (1,170) 2,730 910 1,170 80 16,500 (610) 20,040
1979 (580) (940) (520) 2,210 780 1,950 1,500 18,000 1,180 21,220
1980 (570) (1,510) 2,010 4,220 1,210 3,160 2,070 20,070 4,720 25,940
1981 1,020 (490) 2,460 6,680 1,210 4,370 2,880 22,950 7,570 33,510
1982 800 310 2,200 8,880 1,210 5,580 3,330 26,280 7,540 41,050
1983 530 840 2,690 11,570 1,200 6,780 3,720 30,000 8,140 49,190
1984 820 1, 660 3,490 15,060 2,760 9,540 4,020 34,020 11,090 60,280
1985 1,600 3,260 4,570 19,630 4,000 13,540 4,360 38,380 14,530 74,810
1986 2,690 5,950 6,890 26,520 4,910 18,450 2,760 41,140 17,250 92,060
1987 3,000 8,950 6,780 33,300 4,910 23,360 2,800 43,940 17,490 109,550
1988 3,000 11, 950 7,030 40,330 5,490 28,850 3,580 47,520 19,100 128,650
1989 3,000 14,950 7,620 47,950 5,490 34,340 3,580 51,100 19,690 148,340
1990 2,280 17,230 7,780 55,730 5,490 39,830 3,580 54,680 19,130 167,470
Notes: 1. Inventories accumulated prior to 1969 are not included here. The precise quantities involved
depend upon sales for weapons purposes. Numbers in () are deficits.
Table A-30
CONSUMER SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS
(Non-U.S. WOCA)
(MTU)
Year Requirements Production*
Imports Domestic Total Present INFCE Actual Attain-
Produc- Supply Plans and able
tion Planned
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
800
2,130
3,200
2,480
4,680
4,900
6,230
9,560
11,440
14,860
17,120
18,920
17,680
19,130
22,880
23,840
27,320
27,800
23,340
22,540
20,1 60
19,760
19,520
1,200
1,340
1,360
1,440
1,710
1 ,780
2,060
2,070
2,210
2,490
2,640
3,080
4,800
5,140
5,740
6,700
6,750
7,520
7,960
7,960
7,960
7,960
7,960
2,020
3,470
4,560
3,920
6,390
6,680
8,290
11,630
13,650
17,350
19,760
22,000
22,480
24,270
28,620
30,540
34,070
35,320
31,310
30,500
28,120
27,720
27,480
1,880
3,060
1,470
2,570
4,280
4,900
5,800
6,460
10,250
10,750
14,590
14,740
17,320
17,550
20,320
20,340
20,470
22,900
22,560
23,170
22,940
23,380
23,280
15,920
19,990
21,490
24,730
27,560
28,940
33,140
36,230
40,030
43,300
46,650
8,044
8,694
8,711
9,464
9,987
9,573
9,572
10,180
13,147
17,377
19,631
23,682
25,810
30,920
34,900
38,360
43,400
47,710
50,100
49,300
50,110
50,240
49,550
29,170
34,960
40,930
46,890
54,240
63,890
67,690
69,360
71,120
73,490
75,050
*Canadian production is net of requirements.
Table A-31
ACTUAL AND PROSPECTIVE CONSUMER INVENTORIES
(Non U.S. WOCA 1 )
(MTU)
Present Plans INFCE "Low"
T I A . . A . . .' - . . ...
eadr Kequire- Annual Cumula-
ments Stock tive
Stock
I U Id I
Supply
2,020
3,470
4,560
3,920
6,390
6,680
8,290
11 ,630
13,650
17,350
19,760
22,000
22,480
24,270
28,620
30,540
34,070
35,320
31,310
30,500
28,120
27,720
27,480
320
920
4,110
5,610
7,960
10,040
13,050
18,640
22,450
29,630
35,460
43,530
49,680
57,320
66,550
78,000
93,070
106,850
117,050
126,020
132,820
138,880
144,910
1,700
2,870
1,370
3,420
4,040
4,600
5,280
6,040
9,840
10,170
13,930
13,930
16,330
16,630
19,390
19,090
19,000
21,540
21,110
21,530
21,320
21,660
21,450
Kequire- Annual (umula-
ments Stock tive
Stock
320
600
3,190
1 ,500
2,350
2,080
3,010
5,590
3,810
7,180
5,830
8,070
6,150
7,640
9,230
11 ,450
15,070
13,780
1 0,200
8,970
6,800
6,060
6,030
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990 16,410 44,670
15,010
19,080
20,270
23,360
26,190
27,320
31,450
33,970
37,770
40,980
43,890
whose requirements are covered by domestic production.
7,470
5,190
8,350
7,180
7,880
8,000
-140
-3,470
-9,650
-13,260
43,530
51,000
56,190
64,540
71,720
79,600
87,600
87,460
83,990
74,340
61,080
1Excludes Canada,
Table A-32
HISTORIC NOMINAL AND REAL PRICE OF URANIUM 1
($/pound U308)
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
6/73
12/73
6/74
12/74
5/75
8/75
12/75
4/76
12/76
6/77
12/77
6/78
12/78
6/79
9/79
12/79
3/80
4/80
8/80
10/80
12/80
Nominal Price
9.20
12.50
8.80
8.00
6.20
6.50
7.00
10.50
15.00
21.00
26.00
35.00
40.00
41.00
42.25
43.20
43.40
43.25
43.00
42.20
40.75
38.00
35.00
31.50
28.50
28.00
1. 1950-1967 from USACE purchases, ERDA, Statistical Summary of
the Uranium Industry (1976); 1968-1980 from NUEXCO Spot Market
Price
2. Deflated by the GNP implicit Price Index for Fixed Investment
Non-Residential Structures (1972=100). Index after 8/80 is estimated.
Real Price 2
18.90
22.00
13.90
12.10
7.00
6.10
6.30
8.40
10.80
14.60
17.80
23.80
26.85
26.45
26.25
26.20
25.30
23.85
22.75
21.60
20.35
18.50
16.90
14.75
13.25
12.90
